Thread: Supporting Windows SChannel as OpenSSL replacement
Hi, I've been looking at Windows' native SSL implementatation, the SChannel API. It would be nice to support that as a replacement for OpenSSL on Windows. Currently, we bundle the OpenSSL library in the PostgreSQL, installers, which is annoying because whenever OpenSSL puts out a new release that fixes vulnerabilities, we need to do a security release of PostgreSQL on Windows. I was reminded of this recently wrt. psqlODBC, which bundles libpq and openssl as well. It's particularly annoying for psqlODBC and other client applications, as people typically update it less diligently than their servers. I think that we should keep the user-visible behavior the same, i.e. the libpq connection options, locations of the certificate files etc. would all be the same regardless of which SSL implementation is used. Using Windows SChannel API might make it possible to integrate better with Windows' own certificate store etc. but I don't really know much about that stuff, so for starters I'd like to just use it as a drop-in replacement for OpenSSL. Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor things so that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, like gnutls. - Heikki
On Monday, June 9, 2014, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote:
--
Magnus Hagander
Me: http://www.hagander.net/
Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
Hi,
I've been looking at Windows' native SSL implementatation, the SChannel API. It would be nice to support that as a replacement for OpenSSL on Windows. Currently, we bundle the OpenSSL library in the PostgreSQL, installers, which is annoying because whenever OpenSSL puts out a new release that fixes vulnerabilities, we need to do a security release of PostgreSQL on Windows. I was reminded of this recently wrt. psqlODBC, which bundles libpq and openssl as well. It's particularly annoying for psqlODBC and other client applications, as people typically update it less diligently than their servers.
I think that we should keep the user-visible behavior the same, i.e. the libpq connection options, locations of the certificate files etc. would all be the same regardless of which SSL implementation is used. Using Windows SChannel API might make it possible to integrate better with Windows' own certificate store etc. but I don't really know much about that stuff, so for starters I'd like to just use it as a drop-in replacement for OpenSSL.
Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor things so that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, like gnutls.
It's a project that many have started, and nobody has finished :) I'm definitely interested in working on such a things, but I've been unable to carve out enough time recently.
One problem is as you say, that we're exposing openssl too much. For one thing, we *cannot* keep the current interface, because it returns OpenSSL internal datastructures. Those functions will need to be deprecated and replaced with something else.
Also, my memory says that SChannel doesn't support the key file format that we use now, which makes a much bigger break with the supported platforms. That may have changed of course - have you researched that part?
The main other entries I've been looking at are NSS and gnutls, both of which can speak our current file formats. I think the right thing is to start with those and thereby make it more pluggable, and only after that tackle schannel. But I do think it would be good to have them all.
It's also a question of if we can accept supporting a different set of libraries on the server vs on the client. It's really on the client that it's a bigger problem, but in the end I think we want to have "symmetrical support". But it might be worth doing just the client side initially, and then move to the server. I think in general, the client side is actually likely to be *harder* than the server side..
--
Magnus Hagander
Me: http://www.hagander.net/
Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
On 06/09/2014 02:53 PM, Magnus Hagander wrote: > Also, my memory says that SChannel doesn't support the key file format that > we use now, which makes a much bigger break with the supported platforms. > That may have changed of course - have you researched that part? A quick web search turned up a few discussion forums threads with a recipe for this (e.g https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1231178/load-an-x509-pem-file-into-windows-cryptoapi). There's no direct "read this file" function, but there are low-level functions that can decode the file format once it's read into memory. So it seems possible to make it work. > It's also a question of if we can accept supporting a different set of > libraries on the server vs on the client. It's really on the client that > it's a bigger problem, but in the end I think we want to have "symmetrical > support". But it might be worth doing just the client side initially, and > then move to the server. I think in general, the client side is actually > likely to be *harder* than the server side.. Once we've modified the client to support multiple libraries, it's probably not much extra effort to do the same to the server. I wouldn't like to support different libraries in client and server, if only because it would be more complicated to have separate ./configure options for client and server. - Heikki
On 2014-06-09 13:53:15 +0200, Magnus Hagander wrote: > The main other entries I've been looking at are NSS and gnutls, both of > which can speak our current file formats. I think the right thing is to > start with those and thereby make it more pluggable, and only after that > tackle schannel. But I do think it would be good to have them all. I think NSS makes a great deal of sense - the advantages of supporting gnutls are much less clear to me. Maybe it's little enough additional code that that doesn't matter much, but we imo shouldn't focus on it. Greetings, Andres Freund -- Andres Freund http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 02:45:08PM +0300, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: > Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor things > so that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, like > gnutls. One project that is proud to support several SSL implementations is curl: http://curl.haxx.se/ Git: https://github.com/bagder/curl.git Implementations: https://github.com/bagder/curl/tree/master/lib/vtls List from vtls.c: - OpenSSL - GnuTLS - NSS - QsoSSL - GSKit - PolarSSL - CyaSSL - Schannel SSPI - SecureTransport (Darwin) We cannot reuse the code directly, but seems it's usable for reference for various gotchas that need to be solved. -- marko
On 06/09/2014 01:45 PM, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: > Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor things so > that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, like gnutls. There was a patch set for this from Martijn van Oosterhout which was quite complete. http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20060504134807.GK4752@svana.org I am interested in dropping the dependency on OpenSSL, if only to fix the situation with Debian, libreadline and OpenSSL[1]. Notes 1. They now compile against libedit and change to using libreadline at runtime. This does not work perfectly though since libreadline supports some features which libedit does not which can only be checked for at compile time. Andreas
On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Andreas Karlsson <andreas@proxel.se> wrote:
On 06/09/2014 01:45 PM, Heikki Linnakangas wrote:There was a patch set for this from Martijn van Oosterhout which was quite complete.Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor things so
that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, like gnutls.
http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20060504134807.GK4752@svana.org
A lot has, unfortunately, changed since 2006. It might be a good startingpoint. But also actively starting from the point of "let's try to support multiple libraries" rather than "let's try to support gnutls" is probably also important.
I am interested in dropping the dependency on OpenSSL, if only to fix the situation with Debian, libreadline and OpenSSL[1].
That's one of the many reasons, yes :)
Obviously, we also have to do something about PQinitOpenSSL().
Unfortunately, I think it's too late to do that for 9.4 - otherwise it would've been good to have a whole cycle of deprecation on it...
--
Magnus Hagander
Me: http://www.hagander.net/
Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
Magnus Hagander
Me: http://www.hagander.net/
Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:02 PM, Marko Kreen <markokr@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 02:45:08PM +0300, Heikki Linnakangas wrote:One project that is proud to support several SSL implementations
> Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor things
> so that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, like
> gnutls.
is curl: http://curl.haxx.se/
Git: https://github.com/bagder/curl.git
Implementations: https://github.com/bagder/curl/tree/master/lib/vtls
List from vtls.c:
- OpenSSL
- GnuTLS
- NSS
- QsoSSL
- GSKit
- PolarSSL
- CyaSSL
- Schannel SSPI
- SecureTransport (Darwin)
We cannot reuse the code directly, but seems it's usable for
reference for various gotchas that need to be solved.
I did actually talk to Daniel at some point about turning that into a generalized library, and/or getting him interested in helping out with it. I can't remember where that ended up - I'll see if I can poke his interest :)
Magnus Hagander
Me: http://www.hagander.net/
Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> writes:
> I've been looking at Windows' native SSL implementatation, the SChannel
> API. It would be nice to support that as a replacement for OpenSSL on
> Windows. Currently, we bundle the OpenSSL library in the PostgreSQL,
> installers, which is annoying because whenever OpenSSL puts out a new
> release that fixes vulnerabilities, we need to do a security release of
> PostgreSQL on Windows.
Does SChannel have a better security track record than OpenSSL? Or is
the point here just that we can define it as not our problem when a
vulnerability surfaces?
I'm doubtful that we can ignore security issues affecting PG just because
somebody else is responsible for shipping the fix, and thus am concerned
that if we support N different SSL libraries, we will need to keep track
of N sets of vulnerabilities instead of just one.
regards, tom lane
Hi, On 2014-06-09 10:18:40 -0400, Tom Lane wrote: > Does SChannel have a better security track record than OpenSSL? Or is > the point here just that we can define it as not our problem when a > vulnerability surfaces? Well, it's patched as part of the OS - so no new PG binaries have to be released when it's buggy. > I'm doubtful that we can ignore security issues affecting PG just because > somebody else is responsible for shipping the fix, and thus am concerned > that if we support N different SSL libraries, we will need to keep track > of N sets of vulnerabilities instead of just one. In most of the cases where such a issue exists it'll primarily affect binary distributions that include the ssl library - and those will only pick one anyway. Greetings, Andres Freund -- Andres Freund http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
From: "Heikki Linnakangas" <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> > Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor things so > that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, like gnutls. That may be good because it provides users with choices. But I wonder if it is worth the complexity and maintainability of PostgreSQL code. * Are SChannel and other libraries more secure than OpenSSL? IIRC, recently I read in the news that GnuTLS had a vulnerability. OpenSSL is probably the most widely used library, and many people are getting more interested in its quality. I expect the quality will improve thanks to the help from The Linux foundation and other organizations/researchers. * Do other libraries get support from commercial vendor product support? For example, Safenet Inc., the famous HSM (hardware security module) vendor, supports OpenSSL to access the private key stored in its HSM product. Intel offered AES-NI implementation code to OpenSSL community. I guess OpenSSL will continue to be the most functional and obtain the widest adoption and support. Regards MauMau
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:23PM +0200, Magnus Hagander wrote: > On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Andreas Karlsson <andreas@proxel.se> wrote: > > > On 06/09/2014 01:45 PM, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: > > There was a patch set for this from Martijn van Oosterhout which was quite > > complete. > > > > http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20060504134807.GK4752@svana.org Wow, blast from the past. > A lot has, unfortunately, changed since 2006. It might be a good > startingpoint. But also actively starting from the point of "let's try to > support multiple libraries" rather than "let's try to support gnutls" is > probably also important. The patch did provide an API. The idea was that there were a number of functions which would need to be defined to support an SSL library. Each library would then have a wrapper which wrapped the library and based on the results of configure it compiled the right file into the backend. These functions were: extern void pgtls_initialize(void); extern void pgtls_destroy(void); extern int pgtls_open_server(Port *); extern void pgtls_close(Port *); extern ssize_t pgtls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len); extern ssize_t pgtls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len); Which should be easy enough to support for any library. These days you'd need to add support for verifying certificates, but I don't think that that would be difficult (unless the actual certificate formats are different). No switching after compile time, that would just lead to useless overhead. > At some point we should design a new API, so that we can deprecate the old > one. Even if we don't hve the code ready, we need to get rid of PQgetssl(), > and replace it with something else. I'm thinking probably a functoin that > returns both a void pointer and an enum that tells you which library is > actually in use. And a boolean just saying "ssl on/off", because that's > what a lot of clients are interested in and they don't care aobut more than > that. > > Obviously, we also have to do something about PQinitOpenSSL(). Yeah, I think this was one of the more controversial parts. Support in the backend was primarily moving code around and renaming functions, fairly straightforward. Even error handling was not so hard (I found the gnutls handling of errors much easier than openssl). One tricky part is that programs like to use libpq for the authentication, and then they hijack the connection using PGgetssl(). The way I dealt with this is defining a new state "passthrough" where the caller would get a few function pointers to read/write/check the connection. Then the callers would not need to know what library libpq was compiled with. And libpq would know the connection was hijacked and refuse to act anymore. I don't think everyone was pleased with this, but no real alternative was presented (other than requiring people hijacking the connection to do the hard work). For information about which library was in use there was PQgettlsinfo() which returned a PGresult with information about the library and connection. I beleive since then new functions have been added to libpq to retrive info about certificates, so that might need a rethink also. Basically, I think these last two points are the hard parts to get agreement (assuming there's agreement to do anything at all about the problem) and without nailing those down first whoever picks this up will be in for a lot of work. Have a nice day, -- Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog@svana.org> http://svana.org/kleptog/ > He who writes carelessly confesses thereby at the very outset that he does > not attach much importance to his own thoughts. -- Arthur Schopenhauer
On 06/09/2014 05:22 PM, Andres Freund wrote: > Hi, > > On 2014-06-09 10:18:40 -0400, Tom Lane wrote: >> Does SChannel have a better security track record than OpenSSL? Or is >> the point here just that we can define it as not our problem when a >> vulnerability surfaces? > > Well, it's patched as part of the OS - so no new PG binaries have to be > released when it's buggy. Right. I have no idea what SChannel's track record is, but when there's a vulnerability in the native SSL implementation in Windows, you better upgrade anyway, regardless of PostgreSQL. So when we rely on that, we don't put any extra burden on users. And we won't need to release new binaries just to update the DLL included in it. - Heikki
On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 10:40 AM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote: > Right. I have no idea what SChannel's track record is, but when there's a > vulnerability in the native SSL implementation in Windows, you better > upgrade anyway, regardless of PostgreSQL. So when we rely on that, we don't > put any extra burden on users. And we won't need to release new binaries > just to update the DLL included in it. Right, heartily agreed. It wouldn't surprise me if there are lots of Windows machines out there that have 4 or 5 copies of OpenSSL on them, each provided by a different installer for some other piece of software that happens to depend on OpenSSL. When OpenSSL then has a security vulnerability, you're not safe until all of the people who produce those installers produce new versions and you upgrade to all of those new versions. In practice, I'm sure that an enormous amount slips through the cracks here. Relying on something that is part of the OS and updated by the OS vendor seems like less work for both packagers (who have to prepare the updates) and users (who have to apply them). Of course there may be cases where the OS implementation sucks badly or otherwise can't be relied upon, and then we'll just have to live with shipping copies of things. But avoiding it sounds better, if someone's volunteering to do the work.... -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog@svana.org> wrote:
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:23PM +0200, Magnus Hagander wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Andreas Karlsson <andreas@proxel.se> wrote:
>
> > On 06/09/2014 01:45 PM, Heikki Linnakangas wrote:> > There was a patch set for this from Martijn van Oosterhout which was quiteWow, blast from the past.
> > complete.
> >
> > http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20060504134807.GK4752@svana.org
That's fun, itsn't it? :)
> A lot has, unfortunately, changed since 2006. It might be a goodThe patch did provide an API. The idea was that there were a number of
> startingpoint. But also actively starting from the point of "let's try to
> support multiple libraries" rather than "let's try to support gnutls" is
> probably also important.
functions which would need to be defined to support an SSL library.
Each library would then have a wrapper which wrapped the library and
based on the results of configure it compiled the right file into the
backend.
These functions were:
extern void pgtls_initialize(void);
extern void pgtls_destroy(void);
extern int pgtls_open_server(Port *);
extern void pgtls_close(Port *);
extern ssize_t pgtls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len);
extern ssize_t pgtls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len);
Which should be easy enough to support for any library. These days
you'd need to add support for verifying certificates, but I don't think
that that would be difficult (unless the actual certificate formats are
different).
The two difficult points I think are the async support (libpq) and the windows socket emulation support (backend). Do those really work there? In particular the win32 stuff - though I guess that's less critical since we can actually do hackish things there, unlike in libpq. But the example there is that we can't have the library use recv()/send(), instead having it work through our own functions.
No switching after compile time, that would just lead to useless
overhead.
Yes, I absolutely think we don't need to support >1 library at runtime.
> At some point we should design a new API, so that we can deprecate the oldYeah, I think this was one of the more controversial parts. Support in
> one. Even if we don't hve the code ready, we need to get rid of PQgetssl(),
> and replace it with something else. I'm thinking probably a functoin that
> returns both a void pointer and an enum that tells you which library is
> actually in use. And a boolean just saying "ssl on/off", because that's
> what a lot of clients are interested in and they don't care aobut more than
> that.
>
> Obviously, we also have to do something about PQinitOpenSSL().
the backend was primarily moving code around and renaming functions,
fairly straightforward. Even error handling was not so hard (I found
the gnutls handling of errors much easier than openssl).
Yeah, the backend is easier, but also less important from the original reason. For the patching reason, it's of course just as important.
One tricky part is that programs like to use libpq for the
authentication, and then they hijack the connection using PGgetssl().
Is there *anybody* other than odbc that does that? Do we actually need a published API for that, or just a hack for pgodbc?
The way I dealt with this is defining a new state "passthrough" where
the caller would get a few function pointers to read/write/check the
connection. Then the callers would not need to know what library libpq
was compiled with. And libpq would know the connection was hijacked
and refuse to act anymore. I don't think everyone was pleased with
this, but no real alternative was presented (other than requiring
people hijacking the connection to do the hard work).
For information about which library was in use there was PQgettlsinfo()
which returned a PGresult with information about the library and
connection. I beleive since then new functions have been added to
libpq to retrive info about certificates, so that might need a rethink
also.
Not really, no. we return the OpenSSL structure and have the client use that one directly. That's quite horrible already :)
Basically, I think these last two points are the hard parts to get
agreement (assuming there's agreement to do anything at all about the
problem) and without nailing those down first whoever picks this up
will be in for a lot of work.
Agreed.
Magnus Hagander
Me: http://www.hagander.net/
Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 11:39:17PM +0900, MauMau wrote: > From: "Heikki Linnakangas" <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> > >Thoughts? While we're at it, we'll probably want to refactor > >things so that it's easy to support other SSL implementations too, > >like gnutls. > > That may be good because it provides users with choices. But I > wonder if it is worth the complexity and maintainability of > PostgreSQL code. The complexity is very low. SSL is a standard protocol and so all libraries offer the same functionality. Were not really doing anything complex. > * Are SChannel and other libraries more secure than OpenSSL? IIRC, > recently I read in the news that GnuTLS had a vulnerability. > OpenSSL is probably the most widely used library, and many people > are getting more interested in its quality. I expect the quality > will improve thanks to the help from The Linux foundation and other > organizations/researchers. Does that matter? What's wrong with letting people choose. OpenVPN these days supports multiple SSL libraries, because PolarSSL (for example) has been vetted for a higher security level than OpenSSL. > * Do other libraries get support from commercial vendor product > support? For example, Safenet Inc., the famous HSM (hardware > security module) vendor, supports OpenSSL to access the private key > stored in its HSM product. Intel offered AES-NI implementation code > to OpenSSL community. I guess OpenSSL will continue to be the most > functional and obtain the widest adoption and support. And the crappiest license. I think it's silly for PostgreSQL dictate what SSL library users must use, when there are so many possibilities. We also support libedit for, in my opinion, worse reasons. Have a nice day, -- Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog@svana.org> http://svana.org/kleptog/ > He who writes carelessly confesses thereby at the very outset that he does > not attach much importance to his own thoughts. -- Arthur Schopenhauer
On 06/09/2014 06:03 PM, Magnus Hagander wrote: > One tricky part is that programs like to use libpq for the >> >authentication, and then they hijack the connection using PGgetssl(). >> > > Is there*anybody* other than odbc that does that? Do we actually need a > published API for that, or just a hack for pgodbc? I wish psqlODBC would stop doing that. It's kind of cool that it supports compiling without libpq, but it's really quite a mess. I think we should modify psqlODBC to use the libpq API like most people do. - Heikki
On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 7:45 PM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote:
On 06/09/2014 06:03 PM, Magnus Hagander wrote:One tricky part is that programs like to use libpq for theIs there*anybody* other than odbc that does that? Do we actually need a>authentication, and then they hijack the connection using PGgetssl().
>
published API for that, or just a hack for pgodbc?
I wish psqlODBC would stop doing that. It's kind of cool that it supports compiling without libpq, but it's really quite a mess. I think we should modify psqlODBC to use the libpq API like most people do.
This was, I believe, done at one point, and then reverted. I think that was because libpq didn't actually have all the features required either for the current or for planned featues of the ODBC driver. That situation might be very different now though, there's more functionality available in libpq..
Magnus Hagander
Me: http://www.hagander.net/
Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
On 06/09/2014 05:39 PM, Martijn van Oosterhout wrote: > On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:23PM +0200, Magnus Hagander wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Andreas Karlsson <andreas@proxel.se> wrote: >> >>> On 06/09/2014 01:45 PM, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: >>> There was a patch set for this from Martijn van Oosterhout which was quite >>> complete. >>> >>> http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20060504134807.GK4752@svana.org > > Wow, blast from the past. > >> A lot has, unfortunately, changed since 2006. It might be a good >> startingpoint. But also actively starting from the point of "let's try to >> support multiple libraries" rather than "let's try to support gnutls" is >> probably also important. > > The patch did provide an API. The idea was that there were a number of > functions which would need to be defined to support an SSL library. > Each library would then have a wrapper which wrapped the library and > based on the results of configure it compiled the right file into the > backend. > > These functions were: > > extern void pgtls_initialize(void); > extern void pgtls_destroy(void); > extern int pgtls_open_server(Port *); > extern void pgtls_close(Port *); > extern ssize_t pgtls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len); > extern ssize_t pgtls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len); > > Which should be easy enough to support for any library. These days > you'd need to add support for verifying certificates, but I don't think > that that would be difficult (unless the actual certificate formats are > different). > > No switching after compile time, that would just lead to useless > overhead. Yeah, that seems like a reasonable design. I did again the refactoring you did back in 2006, patch attached. One thing I did differently: I moved the raw, non-encrypted, read/write functions to separate functions: pqsecure_raw_read and pqsecure_raw_write. Those functions encapsulate the SIGPIPE handling. The OpenSSL code implements a custom BIO, which calls to pqsecure_raw_read/write to do the low-level I/O. Similarly in the server-side, there are be_tls_raw_read and pg_tls_raw_write functions, which do the prepare_for_client_read()/client_read_ended() dance, so that the SSL implementation doesn't need to know about that. I then implemented a quick proof-of-concept Windows SChannel implementation of that API. It's client-side only, and there's no support for validating server certificate or specifying non-default ciphers or anything yet. But I did implement performing authentication with a client certificate, as a proof of concept that it's possible to read the OpenSSL key and certificate files - although in this proof of concept the key and certificate are hard-coded in the sources, not read from a file. The SChannel implementation obviously needs a lot of work, but I'm fairly confident that it's doable, and the new internal SSL API works for that. Except for the user-visible PQgetssl() functions and such - I don't know what to do with those. >> At some point we should design a new API, so that we can deprecate the old >> one. Even if we don't hve the code ready, we need to get rid of PQgetssl(), >> and replace it with something else. I'm thinking probably a functoin that >> returns both a void pointer and an enum that tells you which library is >> actually in use. And a boolean just saying "ssl on/off", because that's >> what a lot of clients are interested in and they don't care aobut more than >> that. >> >> Obviously, we also have to do something about PQinitOpenSSL(). > > Yeah, I think this was one of the more controversial parts. Support in > the backend was primarily moving code around and renaming functions, > fairly straightforward. Even error handling was not so hard (I found > the gnutls handling of errors much easier than openssl). > > One tricky part is that programs like to use libpq for the > authentication, and then they hijack the connection using PGgetssl(). > The way I dealt with this is defining a new state "passthrough" where > the caller would get a few function pointers to read/write/check the > connection. Then the callers would not need to know what library libpq > was compiled with. And libpq would know the connection was hijacked > and refuse to act anymore. I don't think everyone was pleased with > this, but no real alternative was presented (other than requiring > people hijacking the connection to do the hard work). Sounds good. If we want to support such hijacking if the first place. - Heikki
Attachment
On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 7:51 AM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote:
>
>
> I did again the refactoring you did back in 2006, patch attached. One thing
> I did differently: I moved the raw, non-encrypted, read/write functions to
> separate functions: pqsecure_raw_read and pqsecure_raw_write. Those
> functions encapsulate the SIGPIPE handling. The OpenSSL code implements a
> custom BIO, which calls to pqsecure_raw_read/write to do the low-level I/O.
> Similarly in the server-side, there are be_tls_raw_read and pg_tls_raw_write
> functions, which do the prepare_for_client_read()/client_read_ended() dance,
> so that the SSL implementation doesn't need to know about that.
I've tried your 0001 patch, reflecting this refactoring, on Linux and it caused 'make check' to hang at 'starting postmaster'.
The hang seems to be in:
/tmp_check/install//home/jjanes/pgsql/test_ssl/bin/psql -X postgres
with a backtrace of:
#0 0x0000003550edf2f8 in __poll (fds=0x7fff610cbd50, nfds=1, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/poll.c:83
#1 0x00007fcf372035b1 in pqSocketPoll (conn=0x2317770, forRead=1, forWrite=0, end_time=-1) at fe-misc.c:1122
#2 pqSocketCheck (conn=0x2317770, forRead=1, forWrite=0, end_time=-1) at fe-misc.c:1064
#3 0x00007fcf37203630 in pqWaitTimed (forRead=<value optimized out>, forWrite=<value optimized out>, conn=0x2317770, finish_time=<value optimized out>)
at fe-misc.c:996
#4 0x00007fcf371fe632 in connectDBComplete (conn=0x2317770) at fe-connect.c:1498
#5 0x00007fcf371ff27f in PQconnectdbParams (keywords=<value optimized out>, values=<value optimized out>, expand_dbname=<value optimized out>)
at fe-connect.c:462
#6 0x0000000000411bb5 in main (argc=<value optimized out>, argv=0x7fff610cc038) at startup.c:219
The make check never times out, like it usually does when something gets stalled.
>
>
> I did again the refactoring you did back in 2006, patch attached. One thing
> I did differently: I moved the raw, non-encrypted, read/write functions to
> separate functions: pqsecure_raw_read and pqsecure_raw_write. Those
> functions encapsulate the SIGPIPE handling. The OpenSSL code implements a
> custom BIO, which calls to pqsecure_raw_read/write to do the low-level I/O.
> Similarly in the server-side, there are be_tls_raw_read and pg_tls_raw_write
> functions, which do the prepare_for_client_read()/client_read_ended() dance,
> so that the SSL implementation doesn't need to know about that.
I've tried your 0001 patch, reflecting this refactoring, on Linux and it caused 'make check' to hang at 'starting postmaster'.
The hang seems to be in:
/tmp_check/install//home/jjanes/pgsql/test_ssl/bin/psql -X postgres
with a backtrace of:
#0 0x0000003550edf2f8 in __poll (fds=0x7fff610cbd50, nfds=1, timeout=-1) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/poll.c:83
#1 0x00007fcf372035b1 in pqSocketPoll (conn=0x2317770, forRead=1, forWrite=0, end_time=-1) at fe-misc.c:1122
#2 pqSocketCheck (conn=0x2317770, forRead=1, forWrite=0, end_time=-1) at fe-misc.c:1064
#3 0x00007fcf37203630 in pqWaitTimed (forRead=<value optimized out>, forWrite=<value optimized out>, conn=0x2317770, finish_time=<value optimized out>)
at fe-misc.c:996
#4 0x00007fcf371fe632 in connectDBComplete (conn=0x2317770) at fe-connect.c:1498
#5 0x00007fcf371ff27f in PQconnectdbParams (keywords=<value optimized out>, values=<value optimized out>, expand_dbname=<value optimized out>)
at fe-connect.c:462
#6 0x0000000000411bb5 in main (argc=<value optimized out>, argv=0x7fff610cc038) at startup.c:219
The make check never times out, like it usually does when something gets stalled.
That was on CentOS 6.5 patched up to date, but OpenSuSE 13.1 gives the same hang.
Cheers,
Jeff
On 06/24/2014 03:20 AM, Jeff Janes wrote: > I've tried your 0001 patch, reflecting this refactoring, on Linux and it > caused 'make check' to hang at 'starting postmaster'. I found the bug in the code, and I have attached the a patch which you can apply on top of the patch. The regression tests pass now on my Debian machine. One thing I noticed when trying to find the bug is that be-secure.c still includes some OpenSSL headers. Those should be removed since they have already been moved to be-secure-openssl.c. -- Andreas Karlsson
Attachment
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 4:26 PM, Andreas Karlsson <andreas@proxel.se> wrote:
On 06/24/2014 03:20 AM, Jeff Janes wrote:I found the bug in the code, and I have attached the a patch which you can apply on top of the patch. The regression tests pass now on my Debian machine.I've tried your 0001 patch, reflecting this refactoring, on Linux and it
caused 'make check' to hang at 'starting postmaster'.
Your fix works for me as well. Thanks.
Is there some recipe for testing the 0002 patch? Can it be tested on an MinGW environment, or does it need to use the MicroSoft supplied compilers?
Thanks,
Jeff
Heikki Linnakangas wrote:
> I did again the refactoring you did back in 2006, patch attached.
> One thing I did differently: I moved the raw, non-encrypted,
> read/write functions to separate functions: pqsecure_raw_read and
> pqsecure_raw_write. Those functions encapsulate the SIGPIPE
> handling. The OpenSSL code implements a custom BIO, which calls to
> pqsecure_raw_read/write to do the low-level I/O. Similarly in the
> server-side, there are be_tls_raw_read and pg_tls_raw_write
> functions, which do the
> prepare_for_client_read()/client_read_ended() dance, so that the SSL
> implementation doesn't need to know about that.
I'm skimming over this patch (0001). There are some issues:
* You duplicated the long comment under the IDENTIFICATION tag that was in be-secure.c; it's now both in that file and
alsoin be-secure-openssl.c. I think it should be removed from be-secure.c. Also, the hardcoded DH params are
duplicatedin be-secure.c, but they belong in -openssl.c only now.
* There is some mixup regarding USE_SSL and USE_OPENSSL in be-secure.c. I think anything that's OpenSSL-specific should
bein be-secure-openssl.c only; any new SSL implementation will need to implement all those functions. For instance,
be_tls_init().I imagine that if we select any SSL implementation, USE_SSL would get defined, and each SSL
implementationwould additionally define its own symbol. Unless the idea is to get rid of USE_OPENSSL completely, and
useonly the Makefile bit to decide which implementation to use? If so, then USE_OPENSSL as a preprocessor symbol is
useless...
* ssl_renegotiation_limit is also duplicated. But removing this one is probably not going to be as easy as deleting a
linefrom be-secure.c, because guc.c depends on that one. I think that variable should be defined in be-secure.c (i.e.
deleteit from -openssl) and make sure that all SSL implementations enforce it on their own somehow.
The DISABLE_SIGPIPE thingy looks wrong in pqsecure_write. I think it
should be like this:
ssize_t
pqsecure_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
{ssize_t n;
#ifdef USE_SSLif (conn->ssl_in_use){ DECLARE_SIGPIPE_INFO(spinfo);
DISABLE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo, return -1);
n = pgtls_write(conn, ptr, len);
RESTORE_SIGPIPE(spinfo);}else
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */{ n = pqsecure_raw_write(conn, ptr, len);}
return n;
}
You are missing the restore call, and I moved the declaration inside the
ssl_in_use block since otherwise it's not useful. The other path is
fine since pqsecure_raw_write disables and restores the flag by itself.
Also, you're missing DECLARE/DISABLE/RESTORE in the ssl_in_use block in
pqsecure_read. (The original code does not have that code in the
non-SSL path. I assume, without checking, that that's okay.) I also
assume without checking that all SSL implementations would be fine with
this SIGPIPE handling.
Another thing that seems wrong is the REMEMBER_EPIPE stuff. The
fe-secure-openssl.c code should be setting the flag, but AFAICS only the
non-SSL code is doing it.
Thanks for working on this -- I'm sure many distributors will be happy
to be able to enable other, less license-broken TLS implementations.
--
Álvaro Herrera http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
On 06/27/2014 02:26 AM, Andreas Karlsson wrote: > On 06/24/2014 03:20 AM, Jeff Janes wrote: >> I've tried your 0001 patch, reflecting this refactoring, on Linux and it >> caused 'make check' to hang at 'starting postmaster'. > > I found the bug in the code, and I have attached the a patch which you > can apply on top of the patch. The regression tests pass now on my > Debian machine. Ah, thanks! > One thing I noticed when trying to find the bug is that be-secure.c > still includes some OpenSSL headers. Those should be removed since they > have already been moved to be-secure-openssl.c. Removed. Here's a new version of the patch, rebased over master and those two things fixed. - Heikki
Attachment
On 07/11/2014 08:39 PM, Alvaro Herrera wrote:
> Heikki Linnakangas wrote:
>
>> I did again the refactoring you did back in 2006, patch attached.
>> One thing I did differently: I moved the raw, non-encrypted,
>> read/write functions to separate functions: pqsecure_raw_read and
>> pqsecure_raw_write. Those functions encapsulate the SIGPIPE
>> handling. The OpenSSL code implements a custom BIO, which calls to
>> pqsecure_raw_read/write to do the low-level I/O. Similarly in the
>> server-side, there are be_tls_raw_read and pg_tls_raw_write
>> functions, which do the
>> prepare_for_client_read()/client_read_ended() dance, so that the SSL
>> implementation doesn't need to know about that.
>
> I'm skimming over this patch (0001). There are some issues:
>
> * You duplicated the long comment under the IDENTIFICATION tag that was
> in be-secure.c; it's now both in that file and also in
> be-secure-openssl.c. I think it should be removed from be-secure.c.
> Also, the hardcoded DH params are duplicated in be-secure.c, but they
> belong in -openssl.c only now.
Hmm. Once we add other SSL implementations, shouldn't they share the
hardcoded DH parameters? That would warrant keeping them in be-secure.c.
> * There is some mixup regarding USE_SSL and USE_OPENSSL in be-secure.c.
> I think anything that's OpenSSL-specific should be in
> be-secure-openssl.c only; any new SSL implementation will need to
> implement all those functions. For instance, be_tls_init().
Agreed.
> I imagine that if we select any SSL implementation, USE_SSL would get
> defined, and each SSL implementation would additionally define its own
> symbol.
Yeah, that was the idea.
> * ssl_renegotiation_limit is also duplicated. But removing this one is
> probably not going to be as easy as deleting a line from be-secure.c,
> because guc.c depends on that one. I think that variable should be
> defined in be-secure.c (i.e. delete it from -openssl) and make sure
> that all SSL implementations enforce it on their own somehow.
Agreed.
> The DISABLE_SIGPIPE thingy looks wrong in pqsecure_write. I think it
> should be like this:
>
> ssize_t
> pqsecure_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
> {
> ssize_t n;
>
> #ifdef USE_SSL
> if (conn->ssl_in_use)
> {
> DECLARE_SIGPIPE_INFO(spinfo);
>
> DISABLE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo, return -1);
>
> n = pgtls_write(conn, ptr, len);
>
> RESTORE_SIGPIPE(spinfo);
> }
> else
> #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
> {
> n = pqsecure_raw_write(conn, ptr, len);
> }
>
> return n;
> }
>
> You are missing the restore call, and I moved the declaration inside the
> ssl_in_use block since otherwise it's not useful. The other path is
> fine since pqsecure_raw_write disables and restores the flag by itself.
> Also, you're missing DECLARE/DISABLE/RESTORE in the ssl_in_use block in
> pqsecure_read. (The original code does not have that code in the
> non-SSL path. I assume, without checking, that that's okay.) I also
> assume without checking that all SSL implementations would be fine with
> this SIGPIPE handling.
>
> Another thing that seems wrong is the REMEMBER_EPIPE stuff. The
> fe-secure-openssl.c code should be setting the flag, but AFAICS only the
> non-SSL code is doing it.
I think you're missing a change to the way fe-secure-openssl.c now uses
the OpenSSL library: it defines custom read/write functions,
my_sock_read and my_sock_write, which in turn call
pqsecure_raw_read/write. So all the actual I/O now goes through
pqsecure_raw_read/write. I believe it's therefore enough to put do the
REMEMBER_EPIPE in pqsecure_raw_write. Come to think of it,
pqsecure_write() shouldn't be doing any SIGPIGE stuff at all anymore.
- Heikki
On 07/08/2014 08:11 PM, Jeff Janes wrote: > Is there some recipe for testing the 0002 patch? Can it be tested on an > MinGW environment, or does it need to use the MicroSoft supplied compilers? I used MSVC. It ought to work with MinGW, I think, although you might need to tweak the Makefiles to make it compile. Certainly we should eventually make it work, before committing. If you try it out, let me know how it goes. - Heikki
On Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 10:58 AM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote:
On 07/08/2014 08:11 PM, Jeff Janes wrote:I used MSVC. It ought to work with MinGW, I think, although you might need to tweak the Makefiles to make it compile. Certainly we should eventually make it work, before committing. If you try it out, let me know how it goes.Is there some recipe for testing the 0002 patch? Can it be tested on an
MinGW environment, or does it need to use the MicroSoft supplied compilers?
I couldn't it to work when I tried it long time ago, but I didn't record the error and it may have been a failure to use the correct arguments to the configure. I think it was taking a path through all the #ifdef that resulted in a function never getting defined.
But now it looks like 0002 needs a rebase....
Cheers,
Jeff
Here's a new version of the refactoring patch. I've fixed the issues reported so far. Upon looking closer at the SIGPIPE stuff in libpq, I realized that we can remove this line from fe-secure-openssl.c: > - /* We cannot use MSG_NOSIGNAL to block SIGPIPE when using SSL */ > - conn->sigpipe_flag = false; That's because all the I/O now goes through our wrapper functions that do the send/recv, and will use MSG_NOSIGNAL if it's available. That avoids two syscalls per send. I haven't measured the performance impact of that - it's probably negligible compared to doing encryption - but it's still nice to avoid it. This patch is just refactoring of existing code. It doesn't have any user-visible changes; the libpq functions that expose OpenSSL stuff are still intact. Doing something about those are the next phase of this project. Please review. I think this is in a good shape, ready for commit. - Heikki
Attachment
On 08/06/2014 08:37 PM, Jeff Janes wrote: > But now it looks like 0002 needs a rebase.... I've committed the refactoring patch, and here's a rebased and improved version of the Windows SChannel implementation over that. Server-side support is now implemented too, but it's all very crude and work-in-progress. CRLs are not supported, intermediary CAs are not supported, and probably many other bells and whistles are missing too. But the basics work, including cert authentication. Consider this a Proof of Concept. One issue came up with managing private keys: In the server, it's necessary to import the private key into a permanent key container that's managed by the Windows Crypto API. That can be done programmatically (as I do in the patch), but the keys are permanently stored in the system (in the user's profile). They will be left behind even if you completely delete the data directory. That's not the end of the world, but it would be nicer if we could use some kind of a temporary key container that only lives in memory, but the Crypto API doesn't seem to have such a concept. You can acquire an ephemeral context by passing the CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT flag to CryptAcquireContext function, and that's exactly what I'm doing in the client, but that method doesn't seem to work when acting as an SSL server. Also, the key container needs to be given a name, or we can use the default container, but either way all the keys are shared among all applications that use the same container. We'll have to figure out how to set that up so that there are no conflicts, if you try to use the same server certificate for two PostgreSQL instances running on the same host (useful while developing/testing replication). This isn't a showstopper, but needs some thought. As the patch stands, it uses a single key container called "PostgreSQL server key container", and makes no attempt to delete the keys after they're no longer used. That works, but it leaves the key lying on the system. - Heikki
Attachment
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 1:52 PM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote: > This isn't a showstopper, but needs some thought. As the patch stands, it > uses a single key container called "PostgreSQL server key container", and > makes no attempt to delete the keys after they're no longer used. That > works, but it leaves the key lying on the system. What about using something like 'PostgreSQL ' || system_identifier? Would it make sense to have pg_ctl unregister delete the key container, or do we need a separate facility for that? -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 10:52 AM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote:
On 08/06/2014 08:37 PM, Jeff Janes wrote:I've committed the refactoring patch, and here's a rebased and improved version of the Windows SChannel implementation over that.But now it looks like 0002 needs a rebase....
On MinGW, I get the following error when compiling with options --host=x86_64-w64-mingw32 --without-zlib:
be-secure.c: In function 'secure_open_server':
be-secure.c:106:2: error: 'Port' has no member named 'peer_cn'
be-secure.c:106:2: error: 'Port' has no member named 'peer_cn'
make[3]: *** [be-secure.o] Error 1
make[2]: *** [libpq-recursive] Error 2
make[1]: *** [all-backend-recurse] Error 2
make: *** [all-src-recurse] Error 2
Should the ereport DEBUG2 be inside the "#ifdef USE_SSL"?
Thanks,
Jeff
On 08/15/2014 08:16 PM, Jeff Janes wrote: > On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 10:52 AM, Heikki Linnakangas < > hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote: > >> On 08/06/2014 08:37 PM, Jeff Janes wrote: >> >>> But now it looks like 0002 needs a rebase.... >> >> I've committed the refactoring patch, and here's a rebased and improved >> version of the Windows SChannel implementation over that. > > On MinGW, I get the following error when compiling with options > --host=x86_64-w64-mingw32 --without-zlib: > > be-secure.c: In function 'secure_open_server': > be-secure.c:106:2: error: 'Port' has no member named 'peer_cn' > be-secure.c:106:2: error: 'Port' has no member named 'peer_cn' > make[3]: *** [be-secure.o] Error 1 > make[2]: *** [libpq-recursive] Error 2 > make[1]: *** [all-backend-recurse] Error 2 > make: *** [all-src-recurse] Error 2 > > Should the ereport DEBUG2 be inside the "#ifdef USE_SSL"? Yeah. I've been thinking though, perhaps we should always have the ssl_in_use, peer_cn and peer_cert_valid members in the Port struct. If not compiled with USE_SSL, they would just always be false/NULL. Then we wouldn't need #ifdefs around all the places that check hose fields either. - Heikki
Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> writes:
> On 08/15/2014 08:16 PM, Jeff Janes wrote:
>> Should the ereport DEBUG2 be inside the "#ifdef USE_SSL"?
> Yeah.
> I've been thinking though, perhaps we should always have the ssl_in_use,
> peer_cn and peer_cert_valid members in the Port struct. If not compiled
> with USE_SSL, they would just always be false/NULL. Then we wouldn't
> need #ifdefs around all the places that check hose fields either.
+1. This would also make it less risky for add-on code to touch the Port
struct.
regards, tom lane
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 1:52 PM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnakangas@vmware.com> wrote: > On 08/06/2014 08:37 PM, Jeff Janes wrote: >> >> But now it looks like 0002 needs a rebase.... > > I've committed the refactoring patch, and here's a rebased and improved > version of the Windows SChannel implementation over that. > > Server-side support is now implemented too, but it's all very crude and > work-in-progress. CRLs are not supported, intermediary CAs are not > supported, and probably many other bells and whistles are missing too. But > the basics work, including cert authentication. Consider this a Proof of > Concept. Heikki, do you have any plans to work more on this? Or does anyone else? -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> Heikki, do you have any plans to work more on this?
> Or does anyone else?
FWIW, I have some interest in the Apple Secure Transport patch that
is in the CF queue, and will probably pick that up at some point if
no one beats me to it (but it's not real high on my to-do list).
I won't be touching the Windows version though. I suspect that the
folk who might be competent to review the Windows code may have
correspondingly little interest in the macOS patch. This is a bit
of a problem, since it would be good for someone to look at both of
them, with an eye to whether there are any places in our SSL abstraction
API that ought to be rethought now that we have actual non-OpenSSL
implementations to compare to.
regards, tom lane
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On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 2:50 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes: >> Heikki, do you have any plans to work more on this? >> Or does anyone else? > > FWIW, I have some interest in the Apple Secure Transport patch that > is in the CF queue, and will probably pick that up at some point if > no one beats me to it (but it's not real high on my to-do list). > I won't be touching the Windows version though. I suspect that the > folk who might be competent to review the Windows code may have > correspondingly little interest in the macOS patch. This is a bit > of a problem, since it would be good for someone to look at both of > them, with an eye to whether there are any places in our SSL abstraction > API that ought to be rethought now that we have actual non-OpenSSL > implementations to compare to. Well, the best way to handle that might be to get some of this stuff done before we get too much later into the release cycle, so that there's time to tinker with it before the release goes out the door (or is deep in beta). However, if nobody's working on this and the other patch is someplace far down your to-do list, then I guess that isn't going to happen. -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
Re: [HACKERS] Supporting Windows SChannel as OpenSSL replacement
From
Satyanarayana Narlapuram
Date:
Tom, Robert, Microsoft is interested in supporting windows SChannel for Postgres. Please let know how we can help
takingthis forward. We would love contributing to this either by enhancing the original patch provided by Heikki, or
testthe changes on Windows.
Thanks,
Satya
-----Original Message-----
From: pgsql-hackers-owner@postgresql.org [mailto:pgsql-hackers-owner@postgresql.org] On Behalf Of Tom Lane
Sent: Wednesday, October 18, 2017 11:51 AM
To: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Cc: hlinnaka <hlinnaka@iki.fi>; Jeff Janes <jeff.janes@gmail.com>; Andreas Karlsson <andreas@proxel.se>; Martijn van
Oosterhout<kleptog@svana.org>; Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>; PostgreSQL-development
<pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org>
Subject: Re: [HACKERS] Supporting Windows SChannel as OpenSSL replacement
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> Heikki, do you have any plans to work more on this?
> Or does anyone else?
FWIW, I have some interest in the Apple Secure Transport patch that is in the CF queue, and will probably pick that up
atsome point if no one beats me to it (but it's not real high on my to-do list).
I won't be touching the Windows version though. I suspect that the folk who might be competent to review the Windows
codemay have correspondingly little interest in the macOS patch. This is a bit of a problem, since it would be good
forsomeone to look at both of them, with an eye to whether there are any places in our SSL abstraction API that ought
tobe rethought now that we have actual non-OpenSSL implementations to compare to.
regards, tom lane
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On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 1:15 AM, Satyanarayana Narlapuram <Satyanarayana.Narlapuram@microsoft.com> wrote: > Tom, Robert, Microsoft is interested in supporting windows SChannel for Postgres. Please let know how we can help takingthis forward. We would love contributing to this either by enhancing the original patch provided by Heikki, or testthe changes on Windows. That would be great! I think the first thing to do would be look over Heikki's comments about what was left to be done and maybe try to do some of those things. And then test the result. :-) -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers