Thread: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

[HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:
Hello All,

While stress testing WARM, I encountered a data consistency problem. It happens when index is built concurrently. What I thought to be a WARM induced bug and it took me significant amount of investigation to finally conclude that it's a bug in the master. In fact, we tested all the way up to 9.2 release and the bug exists in all releases.

In my test set up, I keep a UNIQUE index on an "aid" column and then have many other "aid[1-4]" columns, on which indexes are built and dropped. The script then updates a randomly selected row using any of the aid[1-4] columns. Even these columns are updated during the tests to force WARM updates, but within a narrow range of non-overlapping values. So we can always find the unique row using some kind of range condition. The reproduction case is much simpler and I'll explain that below.

In the reproduction scenario (attached), it happens fairly quickly, may be after 3-10 rounds of DROP/CREATE. You may need to adjust the -j value if it does not happen for you even after a few rounds. Just for the record, I haven't checked past reports to correlate if the bug explains any of the index corruption issues we might have received. 

To give a short summary of how CIC works with HOT, it consists of three phases:
1. Create index entry in the catalog, mark it not ready for inserts, commit the transaction, start new transaction and then wait for all potential lock holders on the table to end
2. Take a MVCC snapshot, build the index, mark index ready for inserts, commit and then once again wait for potential lock holders on the table to end
3. Do a validation phase where we look at MVCC-visible tuples and add missing entries to the index. We only look at the root line pointer of each tuple while deciding whether a particular tuple already exists in the index or not. IOW we look at HOT chains and not tuples themselves.

The interesting case is phase 1 and 2. The phase 2 works on the premise that every transaction started after we finished waiting for all existing transactions will definitely see the new index. All these new transactions then look at the columns used by the new index and consider them while deciding HOT-safety of updates. Now for reasons which I don't fully understand, there exists a path where a transaction starts after CIC waited and took its snapshot at the start of the second phase, but still fails to see the new index. Or may be it sees the index, but fails to update its rd_indexattr list to take into account the columns of the new index. That leads to wrong decisions and we end up with a broken HOT chain, something the CIC algorithm is not prepared to handle. This in turn leads the new index missing entries for the update tuples i.e. the index may have aid1 = 10, but the value in the heap could be aid1 = 11. 

Based on my investigation so far and the evidence that I've collected, what probably happens is that after a relcache invalidation arrives at the new transaction, it recomputes the rd_indexattr but based on the old, cached rd_indexlist. So the rd_indexattr does not include the new columns. Later rd_indexlist is updated, but the rd_indexattr remains what it was.

There is definitely an evidence of this sequence of events (collected after sprinkling code with elog messages), but it's not yet clear to me why it affects only a small percentage of transactions. One possibility is that it probably depends on at what stage an invalidation is received and processed by the backend. I find it a bit confusing that even though rd_indexattr is tightly coupled to the rd_indexlist, we don't invalidate or recompute them together. Shouldn't we do that? For example, in the attached patch we invalidate rd_indexattr whenever we recompute rd_indexlist (i.e. if we see that rd_indexvalid is 0). This patch fixes the problem for me (I've only tried master), but I am not sure if this is a correct fix.

Finally, here is the reproduction scenario. Run "cic_bug.sh" and observe the output. The script runs a continuous UPDATE on the table, while running DROP INDEX and CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY on aid1 column in a loop. As soon as we build the index, we run a validation query such that rows are fetched using IOS on the new index and compare them against the rows obtained via a SeqScan on the table. If things are OK, the rows obtained via both methods should match. But every often you'll see a row or two differ. I must say that IOS itself is not a problem, but I'd to setup things that way to ensure that index access does not have to go to the heap. Otherwise, it will just return whatever is there in the heap and things will look fine. May be some index consistency check utility could be handy to check the corruption. But I think the query should just do the job for now.

Some additional server logs are attached too. I've filtered them to include only three sessions. One (PID 73119) which is running CIC, second (PID 73090) which processed relcache invalidation correctly and third  (PID 73091) which got it wrong. Specifically, look at line #77 where snapshot is obtained for the second phase:

2017-01-29 10:44:31.238 UTC [73119] [xid=0]LOG:  CIC (pgb_a_aid1) building first phase with snapshot (4670891:4670893)

At line 108, you'll see a new transaction with XID 4670908 still using the old attribute list. 

2017-01-29 10:44:31.889 UTC [73091] [xid=4670908]LOG:  heap_update (cic_tab_accounts), hot_attrs ((b 9))

Other session, which I included for comparison, sees the new index and recomputes its rd_indexattr in time and hence that update works as expected.


Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
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Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Amit Kapila
Date:
On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 7:20 PM, Pavan Deolasee
<pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hello All,
>
> While stress testing WARM, I encountered a data consistency problem. It
> happens when index is built concurrently. What I thought to be a WARM
> induced bug and it took me significant amount of investigation to finally
> conclude that it's a bug in the master. In fact, we tested all the way up to
> 9.2 release and the bug exists in all releases.
>
> In my test set up, I keep a UNIQUE index on an "aid" column and then have
> many other "aid[1-4]" columns, on which indexes are built and dropped. The
> script then updates a randomly selected row using any of the aid[1-4]
> columns. Even these columns are updated during the tests to force WARM
> updates, but within a narrow range of non-overlapping values. So we can
> always find the unique row using some kind of range condition. The
> reproduction case is much simpler and I'll explain that below.
>
> In the reproduction scenario (attached), it happens fairly quickly, may be
> after 3-10 rounds of DROP/CREATE. You may need to adjust the -j value if it
> does not happen for you even after a few rounds. Just for the record, I
> haven't checked past reports to correlate if the bug explains any of the
> index corruption issues we might have received.
>
> To give a short summary of how CIC works with HOT, it consists of three
> phases:
> 1. Create index entry in the catalog, mark it not ready for inserts, commit
> the transaction, start new transaction and then wait for all potential lock
> holders on the table to end
> 2. Take a MVCC snapshot, build the index, mark index ready for inserts,
> commit and then once again wait for potential lock holders on the table to
> end
> 3. Do a validation phase where we look at MVCC-visible tuples and add
> missing entries to the index. We only look at the root line pointer of each
> tuple while deciding whether a particular tuple already exists in the index
> or not. IOW we look at HOT chains and not tuples themselves.
>
> The interesting case is phase 1 and 2. The phase 2 works on the premise that
> every transaction started after we finished waiting for all existing
> transactions will definitely see the new index. All these new transactions
> then look at the columns used by the new index and consider them while
> deciding HOT-safety of updates. Now for reasons which I don't fully
> understand, there exists a path where a transaction starts after CIC waited
> and took its snapshot at the start of the second phase, but still fails to
> see the new index. Or may be it sees the index, but fails to update its
> rd_indexattr list to take into account the columns of the new index. That
> leads to wrong decisions and we end up with a broken HOT chain, something
> the CIC algorithm is not prepared to handle. This in turn leads the new
> index missing entries for the update tuples i.e. the index may have aid1 =
> 10, but the value in the heap could be aid1 = 11.
>
> Based on my investigation so far and the evidence that I've collected, what
> probably happens is that after a relcache invalidation arrives at the new
> transaction, it recomputes the rd_indexattr but based on the old, cached
> rd_indexlist. So the rd_indexattr does not include the new columns. Later
> rd_indexlist is updated, but the rd_indexattr remains what it was.
>
> There is definitely an evidence of this sequence of events (collected after
> sprinkling code with elog messages), but it's not yet clear to me why it
> affects only a small percentage of transactions. One possibility is that it
> probably depends on at what stage an invalidation is received and processed
> by the backend. I find it a bit confusing that even though rd_indexattr is
> tightly coupled to the rd_indexlist, we don't invalidate or recompute them
> together. Shouldn't we do that?
>

During invalidation processing, we do destroy them together in
function RelationDestroyRelation().  So ideally, after invalidation
processing, both should be built again, but not sure why that is not
happening in this case.

> For example, in the attached patch we
> invalidate rd_indexattr whenever we recompute rd_indexlist (i.e. if we see
> that rd_indexvalid is 0).
 /*
+ * If the index list was invalidated, we better also invalidate the index
+ * attribute list (which should automatically invalidate other attributes
+ * such as primary key and replica identity)
+ */

+ relation->rd_indexattr = NULL;
+

I think setting directly to NULL will leak the memory.

> This patch fixes the problem for me (I've only
> tried master), but I am not sure if this is a correct fix.
>

I think it is difficult to say that fix is correct unless there is a
clear explanation of what led to this problem.  Another angle to
investigate is to find out when relation->rd_indexvalid is set to 0
for the particular session where you are seeing the problem.  I could
see few places where we are setting it to 0 and clearing rd_indexlist,
but not rd_indexattr.  I am not sure whether that has anything to do
with the problem you are seeing.

-- 
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 7:20 PM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:

Based on my investigation so far and the evidence that I've collected, what probably happens is that after a relcache invalidation arrives at the new transaction, it recomputes the rd_indexattr but based on the old, cached rd_indexlist. So the rd_indexattr does not include the new columns. Later rd_indexlist is updated, but the rd_indexattr remains what it was.


I was kinda puzzled this report did not get any attention, though it's clearly a data corruption issue. Anyways, now I know why this is happening and can reproduce this very easily via debugger and two sessions.

The offending code is RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(). Here is the sequence of events:

Taking the same table as in the report:

CREATE TABLE cic_tab_accounts (
        aid bigint UNIQUE,
        abalance bigint,
        aid1 bigint
);

1. Session S1 calls DROP INDEX pgb_a_aid1 and completes
2. Session S2 is in process of rebuilding its rd_indexattr bitmap (because of previous relcache invalidation caused by DROP INDEX). To be premise, assume that the session has finished rebuilding its index list. Since DROP INDEX has just happened,
4793     indexoidlist = RelationGetIndexList(relation);

3. S1 then starts CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY pgb_a_aid1 ON cic_tab_accounts(aid1)
4. S1 creates catalog entry for the new index, commits phase 1 transaction and builds MVCC snapshot for the second phase and also finishes the initial index build
5. S2 now proceeds. Now notice that S2 had computed the index list based on the old view i.e. just one index.

The following comments in relcahce.c are now significant:

4799     /*
4800      * Copy the rd_pkindex and rd_replidindex value computed by
4801      * RelationGetIndexList before proceeding.  This is needed because a
4802      * relcache flush could occur inside index_open below, resetting the
4803      * fields managed by RelationGetIndexList. (The values we're computing
4804      * will still be valid, assuming that caller has a sufficient lock on
4805      * the relation.)
4806      */

That's what precisely goes wrong.

6. When index_open is called, relcache invalidation generated by the first transaction commit in CIC gets accepted and processed. As part of this invalidation, rd_indexvalid is set to 0, which invalidates rd_indexlist too
7. But S2 is currently using index list obtained at step 2 above (which has only old index). It goes ahead and computed rd_indexattr based on just the old index.
8. While relcahce invalidation processing at step 6 cleared rd_indexattr (along with rd_indexvalid), it is again set at
4906     relation->rd_indexattr = bms_copy(indexattrs);

But what gets set at step 8 is based on the old view. There is no way rd_indexattr will be invalidated until S2 receives another relcache invalidation. This will happen when the CIC proceeds. But until then, every update done by S2 will generate broken HOT chains, leading to data corruption.

I can reproduce this entire scenario using gdb sessions. This also explains why the patch I sent earlier helps to solve the problem. 

Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Alvaro Herrera
Date:
Pavan Deolasee wrote:

> I can reproduce this entire scenario using gdb sessions. This also explains
> why the patch I sent earlier helps to solve the problem.

Ouch.  Great detective work there.

I think it's quite possible that this bug explains some index errors,
such as primary keys (or unique indexes) that when recreated fail with
duplicate values: the first value inserted would get in via an UPDATE
during the CIC race window, and sometime later the second value is
inserted correctly.  Because the first one is missing from the index,
the second one does not give rise to a dupe error upon insertion, but
they are of course both detected when the index is recreated.

I'm going to study the bug a bit more, and put in some patch before the
upcoming minor tag on Monday.

-- 
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Thu, Feb 2, 2017 at 6:14 PM, Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> wrote:

  /*
+ * If the index list was invalidated, we better also invalidate the index
+ * attribute list (which should automatically invalidate other attributes
+ * such as primary key and replica identity)
+ */

+ relation->rd_indexattr = NULL;
+

I think setting directly to NULL will leak the memory.

Good catch, thanks. Will fix.  

Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Thu, Feb 2, 2017 at 10:14 PM, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:


I'm going to study the bug a bit more, and put in some patch before the
upcoming minor tag on Monday.


Looking at the history and some past discussions, it seems Tomas reported somewhat similar problem and Andres proposed a patch here https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20140514155204.GE23943@awork2.anarazel.de which got committed via b23b0f5588d2e2. Not exactly the same issue, but related to relcache flush happening in index_open().

I wonder if we should just add a recheck logic in RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() such that if rd_indexvalid is seen as 0 at the end, we go back and start again from RelationGetIndexList(). Or is there any code path that relies on finding the old information?

The following comment at the top of RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() also seems like a problem to me. CIC works with lower strength lock and hence it can change the set of indexes even though caller is holding the RowExclusiveLock, no? The comment seems to suggest otherwise.

4748  * Caller had better hold at least RowExclusiveLock on the target relation
4749  * to ensure that it has a stable set of indexes.  This also makes it safe
4750  * (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's indexes.

I've attached a revised patch based on these thoughts. It looks a bit more invasive than the earlier one-liner, but looks better to me.

Thanks,
Pavan

--
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 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
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Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Alvaro Herrera
Date:
Pavan Deolasee wrote:

> Looking at the history and some past discussions, it seems Tomas reported
> somewhat similar problem and Andres proposed a patch here
> https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20140514155204.GE23943@awork2.anarazel.de
> which got committed via b23b0f5588d2e2. Not exactly the same issue, but
> related to relcache flush happening in index_open().
> 
> I wonder if we should just add a recheck logic
> in RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() such that if rd_indexvalid is seen as 0 at
> the end, we go back and start again from RelationGetIndexList(). Or is
> there any code path that relies on finding the old information?

Good find on that old report.  It occured to me to re-run Tomas' test
case with this second patch you proposed (the "ddl" test takes 11
minutes in my laptop), and lo and behold -- your "recheck" code enters
an infinite loop.  Not good.  I tried some more tricks that came to
mind, but I didn't get any good results.  Pavan and I discussed it
further and he came up with the idea of returning the bitmapset we
compute, but if an invalidation occurs in index_open, simply do not
cache the bitmapsets so that next time this is called they are all
computed again.  Patch attached.

This appears to have appeased both test_decoding's ddl test under
CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS, as well as the CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY bug.

I intend to commit this soon to all branches, to ensure it gets into the
next set of minors.

Here is a detailed reproducer for the CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY bug.
Line numbers are as of today's master; comments are supposed to help
locating good spots in other branches.  Given the use of gdb
breakpoints, there's no good way to integrate this with regression
tests, which is a pity because this stuff looks a little brittle to me,
and if it breaks it is hard to detect.

Prep:
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS testtab;
CREATE TABLE testtab (a int unique, b int, c int);
INSERT INTO testtab VALUES (1, 100, 10);
CREATE INDEX testindx ON testtab (b);

S1:
SELECT * FROM testtab;
UPDATE testtab SET b = b + 1 WHERE a = 1;
SELECT pg_backend_pid();
  attach GDB to this session.
  break relcache.c:4800
      # right before entering the per-index loop
  cont

S2:
SELECT pg_backend_pid();
DROP INDEX testindx;
  attach GDB to this session
  handle SIGUSR1 nostop
  break indexcmds.c:666
     # right after index_create
  break indexcmds.c:790
     # right before the second CommitTransactionCommand
  cont
CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY testindx ON testtab (b);
  -- this blocks in breakpoint 1.  Leave it there.

S1:
UPDATE testtab SET b = b + 1 WHERE a = 1;
  -- this blocks in breakpoint 1. Leave it there.

S2:
  gdb -> cont
  -- This blocks waiting for S1

S1:
  gdb -> cont
  -- S1 finishes the update.  S2 awakens and blocks again in breakpoint 2.

S1:
  -- Now run more UPDATEs:
UPDATE testtab SET b = b + 1 WHERE a = 1;
  This produces a broken HOT chain.
  This can be done several times; all these updates should be non-HOT
  because of the index created by CIC, but they are marked HOT.

S2: "cont"
  From this point onwards, update are correct.

SELECT * FROM testtab;
SET enable_seqscan TO 0;
SET enable_bitmapscan TO 0;
SELECT * FROM testtab WHERE b between 100 and 110;

-- 
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services

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Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Amit Kapila
Date:
On Sat, Feb 4, 2017 at 12:12 AM, Alvaro Herrera
<alvherre@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
> Pavan Deolasee wrote:
>
>> Looking at the history and some past discussions, it seems Tomas reported
>> somewhat similar problem and Andres proposed a patch here
>> https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20140514155204.GE23943@awork2.anarazel.de
>> which got committed via b23b0f5588d2e2. Not exactly the same issue, but
>> related to relcache flush happening in index_open().
>>
>> I wonder if we should just add a recheck logic
>> in RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() such that if rd_indexvalid is seen as 0 at
>> the end, we go back and start again from RelationGetIndexList(). Or is
>> there any code path that relies on finding the old information?
>
> Good find on that old report.  It occured to me to re-run Tomas' test
> case with this second patch you proposed (the "ddl" test takes 11
> minutes in my laptop), and lo and behold -- your "recheck" code enters
> an infinite loop.  Not good.  I tried some more tricks that came to
> mind, but I didn't get any good results.  Pavan and I discussed it
> further and he came up with the idea of returning the bitmapset we
> compute, but if an invalidation occurs in index_open, simply do not
> cache the bitmapsets so that next time this is called they are all
> computed again.  Patch attached.
>
> This appears to have appeased both test_decoding's ddl test under
> CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS, as well as the CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY bug.
>
> I intend to commit this soon to all branches, to ensure it gets into the
> next set of minors.
>

Thanks for detailed explanation, using steps mentioned in your mail
and Pavan's previous mail steps, I could reproduce the problem.

Regarding your fix:

+ * Now save copies of the bitmaps in the relcache entry, but only if no
+ * invalidation occured in the meantime.  We intentionally set rd_indexattr
+ * last, because that's the one that signals validity of the values; if we
+ * run out of memory before making that copy, we won't leave the relcache
+ * entry looking like the other ones are valid but empty. */
- oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(CacheMemoryContext);
- relation->rd_keyattr = bms_copy(uindexattrs);
- relation->rd_pkattr = bms_copy(pkindexattrs);
- relation->rd_idattr = bms_copy(idindexattrs);
- relation->rd_indexattr = bms_copy(indexattrs);
- MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
+ if (relation->rd_indexvalid != 0)
+ {
+ MemoryContext oldcxt;
+
+ oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(CacheMemoryContext);
+ relation->rd_keyattr = bms_copy(uindexattrs);
+ relation->rd_pkattr = bms_copy(pkindexattrs);
+ relation->rd_idattr = bms_copy(idindexattrs);
+ relation->rd_indexattr = bms_copy(indexattrs);
+ MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
+ }

If we do above, then I think primary key attrs won't be returned
because for those we are using relation copy rather than an original
working copy of attrs. See code below:

switch (attrKind)
{
..
case INDEX_ATTR_BITMAP_PRIMARY_KEY:
return bms_copy(relation->rd_pkattr);


Apart from above, I think after the proposed patch, it will be quite
possible that in heap_update(), hot_attrs, key_attrs and id_attrs are
computed using different index lists (consider relcache flush happens
after computation of hot_attrs or key_attrs) which was previously not
possible.  I think in the later code we assume that all the three
should be computed using the same indexlist.  For ex. see the below
code:

HeapSatisfiesHOTandKeyUpdate()
{
..
Assert(bms_is_subset(id_attrs, key_attrs));
Assert(bms_is_subset(key_attrs, hot_attrs));
..
}

Also below comments in heap_update indicate that we shouldn't worry
about relcache flush between the computation of hot_attrs, key_attrs
and id_attrs.

heap_update()
{
..

* Note that we get a copy here, so we need not worry about relcache flush
* happening midway through.
*/

hot_attrs = RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(relation, INDEX_ATTR_BITMAP_ALL);
key_attrs = RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(relation, INDEX_ATTR_BITMAP_KEY);
id_attrs = RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(relation, INDEX_ATTR_BITMAP_IDENTITY_KEY);
..
}


Typo.
/occured/occurred


-- 
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Sat, Feb 4, 2017 at 12:10 PM, Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> wrote:


If we do above, then I think primary key attrs won't be returned
because for those we are using relation copy rather than an original
working copy of attrs. See code below:

switch (attrKind)
{
..
case INDEX_ATTR_BITMAP_PRIMARY_KEY:
return bms_copy(relation->rd_pkattr);


I don't think that would a problem since if relation_rd_indexattr is NULL, primary key attrs will be recomputed and returned.
 

Apart from above, I think after the proposed patch, it will be quite
possible that in heap_update(), hot_attrs, key_attrs and id_attrs are
computed using different index lists (consider relcache flush happens
after computation of hot_attrs or key_attrs) which was previously not
possible.  I think in the later code we assume that all the three
should be computed using the same indexlist.  For ex. see the below
code:

This seems like a real problem to me. I don't know what the consequences are, but definitely having various attribute lists to have different view of the set of indexes doesn't seem right.

The problem we are trying to fix is very clear by now. Relcache flush clears rd_indexvalid and rd_indexattr together, but because of the race, rd_indexattr is recomputed with the old information and gets cached again, while rd_indexvalid (and rd_indexlist) remains unset. That leads to the index corruption in CIC and may cause other issues too that we're not aware right now. We want cached attribute lists to become invalid whenever index list is invalidated and that's not happening right now.

So we have tried three approaches so far.

1. Simply reset rd_indexattr whenever we detect rd_indexvalid has been reset. This was the first patch. It's a very simple patch and has worked for me with CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS and even fixes the CIC bug. The only downside it seems that we're invalidating cached attribute lists outside the normal relcache invalidation path. It also works on the premise that RelationGetIndexList() will be called every time before RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() is called, otherwise we could still end up using stale cached copies. I wonder if cached plans can be a problem here.

2. In the second patch, we tried to recompute attribute lists if a relcache flush happens in between and index list is invalidated. We've seen problems with that, especially it getting into an infinite loop with CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS. Not clear why it happens, but apparently relcache flushes keep happening.

3. We tried the third approach where we don't cache attribute lists if know that index set has changed and hope that the next caller gets the correct info. But Amit rightly identified problems with that approach too. 

So we either need to find a 4th approach or stay with the first patch unless we see a problem there too (cached plans, anything else). Or may be fix CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY so that at least the first phase which add the index entry to the catalog happens with a strong lock. This will lead to momentary blocking of write queries, but protect us from the race. I'm assuming this is the only code that can cause the problem, and I haven't checked other potential hazards.

Ideas/suggestions?

Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com> writes:
> I intend to commit this soon to all branches, to ensure it gets into the
> next set of minors.

Based on Pavan's comments, I think trying to force this into next week's
releases would be extremely unwise.  If the bug went undetected this long,
it can wait for a fix for another three months.  That seems better than
risking new breakage when it's barely 48 hours to the release wrap
deadline.  We do not have time to recover from any mistakes.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:

On Sat, Feb 4, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:

Based on Pavan's comments, I think trying to force this into next week's
releases would be extremely unwise.  If the bug went undetected this long,
it can wait for a fix for another three months. 

Yes, I think bug existed ever since and went unnoticed. One reason could be that the race happens only when the new index turns HOT updates into non-HOT updates. Another reason could be that we don't have checks in place to catch these kinds of corruption. Having said that, since we have discovered the bug, at least many 2ndQuadrant customers have expressed worry and want to know if the fix will be available in 9.6.2 and other minor releases.  Since the bug can lead to data corruption, the worry is justified. Until we fix the bug, there will be a constant worry about using CIC. 

If we can have some kind of band-aid fix to plug in the hole, that might be enough as well. I tested my first patch (which will need some polishing) and that works well AFAIK. I was worried about prepared queries and all, but that seems ok too. RelationGetIndexList() always get called within ExecInitModifyTable. The fix seems quite unlikely to cause any other side effects.

Another possible band-aid is to throw another relcache invalidation in CIC. Like adding a dummy index_set_state_flags() within yet another transaction. Seems ugly, but should fix the problem for now and not cause any impact on relcache mechanism whatsoever.

That seems better than
risking new breakage when it's barely 48 hours to the release wrap
deadline.  We do not have time to recover from any mistakes.

I'm not sure what the project policies are, but can we consider delaying the release by a week for issues like these? Or do you think it will be hard to come up with a proper fix for the issue and it will need some serious refactoring?

Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavel Stehule
Date:


2017-02-05 7:54 GMT+01:00 Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com>:

On Sat, Feb 4, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:

Based on Pavan's comments, I think trying to force this into next week's
releases would be extremely unwise.  If the bug went undetected this long,
it can wait for a fix for another three months. 

Yes, I think bug existed ever since and went unnoticed. One reason could be that the race happens only when the new index turns HOT updates into non-HOT updates. Another reason could be that we don't have checks in place to catch these kinds of corruption. Having said that, since we have discovered the bug, at least many 2ndQuadrant customers have expressed worry and want to know if the fix will be available in 9.6.2 and other minor releases.  Since the bug can lead to data corruption, the worry is justified. Until we fix the bug, there will be a constant worry about using CIC. 

If we can have some kind of band-aid fix to plug in the hole, that might be enough as well. I tested my first patch (which will need some polishing) and that works well AFAIK. I was worried about prepared queries and all, but that seems ok too. RelationGetIndexList() always get called within ExecInitModifyTable. The fix seems quite unlikely to cause any other side effects.

Another possible band-aid is to throw another relcache invalidation in CIC. Like adding a dummy index_set_state_flags() within yet another transaction. Seems ugly, but should fix the problem for now and not cause any impact on relcache mechanism whatsoever.

That seems better than
risking new breakage when it's barely 48 hours to the release wrap
deadline.  We do not have time to recover from any mistakes.

I'm not sure what the project policies are, but can we consider delaying the release by a week for issues like these? Or do you think it will be hard to come up with a proper fix for the issue and it will need some serious refactoring?

I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.

Pavel


Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Michael Paquier
Date:
On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:53 PM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com> wrote:
> I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.

This bug has been around for some time, so I would recommend taking
the time necessary to make the best fix possible, even if it means
waiting for the next round of minor releases.
-- 
Michael



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com> writes:
> On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:53 PM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.

> This bug has been around for some time, so I would recommend taking
> the time necessary to make the best fix possible, even if it means
> waiting for the next round of minor releases.

I think the way to think about this sort of thing is, if we had found
this bug when a release wasn't imminent, would we consider it bad enough
to justify an unscheduled release cycle?  I have to think the answer for
this one is "probably not".
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavel Stehule
Date:


2017-02-05 18:51 GMT+01:00 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>:
Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com> writes:
> On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:53 PM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.

> This bug has been around for some time, so I would recommend taking
> the time necessary to make the best fix possible, even if it means
> waiting for the next round of minor releases.

I think the way to think about this sort of thing is, if we had found
this bug when a release wasn't imminent, would we consider it bad enough
to justify an unscheduled release cycle?  I have to think the answer for
this one is "probably not".

There are a questions

1. is it critical bug?
2. if is it, will be reason for special minor release?
3. how much time is necessary for fixing of this bug?

These questions can be unimportant if there is some security fixes in next release, what I cannot to know. 

Regards

Pavel
 

                        regards, tom lane

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Martín Marqués
Date:
El 05/02/17 a las 10:03, Michael Paquier escribió:
> On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:53 PM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.
> 
> This bug has been around for some time, so I would recommend taking
> the time necessary to make the best fix possible, even if it means
> waiting for the next round of minor releases.

The fact that the bug has been around for a long time doesn't mean we
shouldn't take it seriously.

IMO any kind of corruption (heap or index) should be prioritized.
There's also been comments about maybe this being the cause of old
reports about index corruption.

I ask myself if it's a good idea to make a point release with a know
corruption bug in it.

Regards,

-- 
Martín Marqués                http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
[ Having now read the whole thread, I'm prepared to weigh in ... ]

Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> writes:
> This seems like a real problem to me. I don't know what the consequences
> are, but definitely having various attribute lists to have different view
> of the set of indexes doesn't seem right.

For sure.

> 2. In the second patch, we tried to recompute attribute lists if a relcache
> flush happens in between and index list is invalidated. We've seen problems
> with that, especially it getting into an infinite loop with
> CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS. Not clear why it happens, but apparently relcache
> flushes keep happening.

Well, yeah: the point of CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS is to make a relcache flush
happen whenever it possibly could.  The way to deal with that without
looping is to test whether the index set *actually* changed, not whether
it just might have changed.

I do not like any of the other patches proposed in this thread, because
they fail to guarantee delivering an up-to-date attribute bitmap to the
caller.  I think we need a retry loop, and I think that it needs to look
like the attached.

(Note that the tests whether rd_pkindex and rd_replidindex changed might
be redundant; but I'm not totally sure of that, and they're cheap.)

            regards, tom lane

diff --git a/src/backend/utils/cache/relcache.c b/src/backend/utils/cache/relcache.c
index 8a7c560..b659994 100644
*** a/src/backend/utils/cache/relcache.c
--- b/src/backend/utils/cache/relcache.c
*************** RelationGetFKeyList(Relation relation)
*** 4327,4335 ****
   * it is the pg_class OID of a unique index on OID when the relation has one,
   * and InvalidOid if there is no such index.
   *
!  * In exactly the same way, we update rd_replidindex, which is the pg_class
!  * OID of an index to be used as the relation's replication identity index,
!  * or InvalidOid if there is no such index.
   */
  List *
  RelationGetIndexList(Relation relation)
--- 4327,4336 ----
   * it is the pg_class OID of a unique index on OID when the relation has one,
   * and InvalidOid if there is no such index.
   *
!  * In exactly the same way, we update rd_pkindex, which is the OID of the
!  * relation's primary key index if any, else InvalidOid; and rd_replidindex,
!  * which is the pg_class OID of an index to be used as the relation's
!  * replication identity index, or InvalidOid if there is no such index.
   */
  List *
  RelationGetIndexList(Relation relation)
*************** RelationGetIndexPredicate(Relation relat
*** 4746,4753 ****
   * we can include system attributes (e.g., OID) in the bitmap representation.
   *
   * Caller had better hold at least RowExclusiveLock on the target relation
!  * to ensure that it has a stable set of indexes.  This also makes it safe
!  * (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's indexes.
   *
   * The returned result is palloc'd in the caller's memory context and should
   * be bms_free'd when not needed anymore.
--- 4747,4756 ----
   * we can include system attributes (e.g., OID) in the bitmap representation.
   *
   * Caller had better hold at least RowExclusiveLock on the target relation
!  * to ensure it is safe (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's
!  * indexes.  Note that since the introduction of CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY,
!  * that lock level doesn't guarantee a stable set of indexes, so we have to
!  * be prepared to retry here in case of a change in the set of indexes.
   *
   * The returned result is palloc'd in the caller's memory context and should
   * be bms_free'd when not needed anymore.
*************** RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(Relation rela
*** 4760,4765 ****
--- 4763,4769 ----
      Bitmapset  *pkindexattrs;    /* columns in the primary index */
      Bitmapset  *idindexattrs;    /* columns in the replica identity */
      List       *indexoidlist;
+     List       *newindexoidlist;
      Oid            relpkindex;
      Oid            relreplindex;
      ListCell   *l;
*************** RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(Relation rela
*** 4788,4795 ****
          return NULL;

      /*
!      * Get cached list of index OIDs
       */
      indexoidlist = RelationGetIndexList(relation);

      /* Fall out if no indexes (but relhasindex was set) */
--- 4792,4800 ----
          return NULL;

      /*
!      * Get cached list of index OIDs. If we have to start over, we do so here.
       */
+ restart:
      indexoidlist = RelationGetIndexList(relation);

      /* Fall out if no indexes (but relhasindex was set) */
*************** RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(Relation rela
*** 4800,4808 ****
       * Copy the rd_pkindex and rd_replidindex value computed by
       * RelationGetIndexList before proceeding.  This is needed because a
       * relcache flush could occur inside index_open below, resetting the
!      * fields managed by RelationGetIndexList. (The values we're computing
!      * will still be valid, assuming that caller has a sufficient lock on
!      * the relation.)
       */
      relpkindex = relation->rd_pkindex;
      relreplindex = relation->rd_replidindex;
--- 4805,4812 ----
       * Copy the rd_pkindex and rd_replidindex value computed by
       * RelationGetIndexList before proceeding.  This is needed because a
       * relcache flush could occur inside index_open below, resetting the
!      * fields managed by RelationGetIndexList.  We need to do the work with
!      * stable values of these fields.
       */
      relpkindex = relation->rd_pkindex;
      relreplindex = relation->rd_replidindex;
*************** RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(Relation rela
*** 4880,4886 ****
          index_close(indexDesc, AccessShareLock);
      }

!     list_free(indexoidlist);

      /* Don't leak the old values of these bitmaps, if any */
      bms_free(relation->rd_indexattr);
--- 4884,4915 ----
          index_close(indexDesc, AccessShareLock);
      }

!     /*
!      * During one of the index_opens in the above loop, we might have received
!      * a relcache flush event on this relcache entry, which might have been
!      * signaling a change in the rel's index list.  If so, we'd better start
!      * over to ensure we deliver up-to-date attribute bitmaps.
!      */
!     newindexoidlist = RelationGetIndexList(relation);
!     if (equal(indexoidlist, newindexoidlist) &&
!         relpkindex == relation->rd_pkindex &&
!         relreplindex == relation->rd_replidindex)
!     {
!         /* Still the same index set, so proceed */
!         list_free(newindexoidlist);
!         list_free(indexoidlist);
!     }
!     else
!     {
!         /* Gotta do it over ... might as well not leak memory */
!         list_free(newindexoidlist);
!         list_free(indexoidlist);
!         bms_free(uindexattrs);
!         bms_free(pkindexattrs);
!         bms_free(idindexattrs);
!         bms_free(indexattrs);
!         goto restart;
!     }

      /* Don't leak the old values of these bitmaps, if any */
      bms_free(relation->rd_indexattr);

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Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Robert Haas
Date:
On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 1:34 PM, Martín Marqués <martin@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
> El 05/02/17 a las 10:03, Michael Paquier escribió:
>> On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:53 PM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.
>>
>> This bug has been around for some time, so I would recommend taking
>> the time necessary to make the best fix possible, even if it means
>> waiting for the next round of minor releases.
>
> The fact that the bug has been around for a long time doesn't mean we
> shouldn't take it seriously.
>
> IMO any kind of corruption (heap or index) should be prioritized.
> There's also been comments about maybe this being the cause of old
> reports about index corruption.
>
> I ask myself if it's a good idea to make a point release with a know
> corruption bug in it.

I don't think this kind of black-and-white thinking is very helpful.
Obviously, data corruption is bad.  However, this bug has (from what
one can tell from this thread) been with us for over a decade; it must
necessarily be either low-probability or low-severity, or somebody
would've found it and fixed it before now.  Indeed, the discovery of
this bug was driven by new feature development, not a user report.  It
seems pretty clear that if we try to patch this and get it wrong, the
effects of our mistake could easily be a lot more serious than the
original bug.

Now, I do not object to patching this tomorrow before the wrap if the
various senior hackers who have studied this (Tom, Alvaro, Pavan,
Amit) are all in agreement on the way forward.  But if there is any
significant chance that we don't fully understand this issue and that
our fix might cause bigger problems, it would be more prudent to wait.
I'm all in favor of releasing important bug fixes quickly, but
releasing a bug fix before we're sure we've fixed the bug correctly is
taking a good principle to an irrational extreme.

--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Peter Geoghegan
Date:
On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 4:09 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't think this kind of black-and-white thinking is very helpful.
> Obviously, data corruption is bad.  However, this bug has (from what
> one can tell from this thread) been with us for over a decade; it must
> necessarily be either low-probability or low-severity, or somebody
> would've found it and fixed it before now.  Indeed, the discovery of
> this bug was driven by new feature development, not a user report.  It
> seems pretty clear that if we try to patch this and get it wrong, the
> effects of our mistake could easily be a lot more serious than the
> original bug.

+1. The fact that it wasn't driven by a user report convinces me that
this is the way to go.


-- 
Peter Geoghegan



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Andres Freund
Date:
On 2017-02-05 12:51:09 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com> writes:
> > On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:53 PM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.
> 
> > This bug has been around for some time, so I would recommend taking
> > the time necessary to make the best fix possible, even if it means
> > waiting for the next round of minor releases.
> 
> I think the way to think about this sort of thing is, if we had found
> this bug when a release wasn't imminent, would we consider it bad enough
> to justify an unscheduled release cycle?  I have to think the answer for
> this one is "probably not".

+1.  I don't think we serve our users by putting out a nontrivial bugfix
hastily. Nor do I think we serve them in this instance by delaying the
release to cover this fix; there's enough other fixes in the release
imo.

- Andres



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Andres Freund
Date:
On 2017-02-05 15:14:59 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> I do not like any of the other patches proposed in this thread, because
> they fail to guarantee delivering an up-to-date attribute bitmap to the
> caller.  I think we need a retry loop, and I think that it needs to look
> like the attached.

That looks like a reasonable approach, although I'm not sure it's the
best one.


> (Note that the tests whether rd_pkindex and rd_replidindex changed might
> be redundant; but I'm not totally sure of that, and they're cheap.)

I don't think they can, but I'm all for re-checking.


>  RelationGetIndexList(Relation relation)
> @@ -4746,8 +4747,10 @@ RelationGetIndexPredicate(Relation relat
>   * we can include system attributes (e.g., OID) in the bitmap representation.
>   *
>   * Caller had better hold at least RowExclusiveLock on the target relation
> - * to ensure that it has a stable set of indexes.  This also makes it safe
> - * (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's indexes.
> + * to ensure it is safe (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's
> + * indexes.  Note that since the introduction of CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY,
> + * that lock level doesn't guarantee a stable set of indexes, so we have to
> + * be prepared to retry here in case of a change in the set of indexes.

I've not yet read the full thread, but I'm a bit confused so far. We
obviously can get changing information about indexes here, but isn't
that something we have to deal with anyway?  If we guarantee that we
don't loose knowledge that there's a pending invalidation, why do we
have to retry?  Pretty much by definition the knowledge in a relcache
entry can be outdated as soon as returned unless locking prevents that
from being possible - which is not the case here.

ISTM it'd be better not to have retry logic here, but to follow the more
general pattern of making sure that we know whether the information
needs to be recomputed at the next access.  We could either do that by
having an additional bit of information about the validity of the
bitmaps (so we have invalid, building, valid - and only set valid at the
end of computing the bitmaps when still building and not invalid again),
or we simply move the bitmap computation into the normal relcache build.


BTW, the interactions of RelationSetIndexList with
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() look more than a bit fragile to me, even if
documented:** We deliberately do not change rd_indexattr here: even when operating* with a temporary partial index
list,HOT-update decisions must be made* correctly with respect to the full index set.  It is up to the caller* to
ensurethat a correct rd_indexattr set has been cached before first* calling RelationSetIndexList; else a subsequent
inquirymight cause a* wrong rd_indexattr set to get computed and cached.  Likewise, we do not* touch rd_keyattr,
rd_pkattror rd_idattr.
 


Greetings,

Andres Freund



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tomas Vondra
Date:
On 02/06/2017 01:11 AM, Peter Geoghegan wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 4:09 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I don't think this kind of black-and-white thinking is very
>> helpful. Obviously, data corruption is bad. However, this bug has
>> (from what one can tell from this thread) been with us for over a
>> decade; it must necessarily be either low-probability or
>> low-severity, or somebody would've found it and fixed it before
>> now. Indeed, the discovery of this bug was driven by new feature
>> development, not a user report. It seems pretty clear that if we
>> try to patch this and get it wrong, the effects of our mistake
>> could easily be a lot more serious than the original bug.
>
> +1. The fact that it wasn't driven by a user report convinces me
> that this is the way to go.
>

+1 to not rushing fixes into releases. While I think we now finally 
understand the mechanics of this bug, the fact that we came up with 
three different fixes in this thread, only to discover issues with each 
of them, warrants some caution.

OTOH I disagree with the notion that bugs that are not driven by user 
reports are somehow less severe. Some data corruption bugs cause quite 
visible breakage - segfaults, immediate crashes, etc. Those are pretty 
clear bugs, and are reported by users.

Other data corruption bugs are much more subtle - for example this bug 
may lead to incorrect results to some queries, failing to detect values 
violating UNIQUE constraints, issues with foreign keys, etc.

It's damn impossible to notice incorrect query results that only affect 
tiny subset of the rows (e.g. rows updated when the CIC was running), 
especially when the issue may go away after a while due to additional 
non-HOT updates.

Regarding the other symptoms - I wonder how many strange 'duplicate 
value' errors were misdiagnosed, wrongly attributed to a recent power 
outage, etc.


regards

-- 
Tomas Vondra                  http://www.2ndQuadrant.com
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Andres Freund
Date:
Hi,

On 2017-02-05 16:37:33 -0800, Andres Freund wrote:
> >  RelationGetIndexList(Relation relation)
> > @@ -4746,8 +4747,10 @@ RelationGetIndexPredicate(Relation relat
> >   * we can include system attributes (e.g., OID) in the bitmap representation.
> >   *
> >   * Caller had better hold at least RowExclusiveLock on the target relation
> > - * to ensure that it has a stable set of indexes.  This also makes it safe
> > - * (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's indexes.
> > + * to ensure it is safe (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's
> > + * indexes.  Note that since the introduction of CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY,
> > + * that lock level doesn't guarantee a stable set of indexes, so we have to
> > + * be prepared to retry here in case of a change in the set of indexes.
> 
> I've not yet read the full thread, but I'm a bit confused so far. We
> obviously can get changing information about indexes here, but isn't
> that something we have to deal with anyway?  If we guarantee that we
> don't loose knowledge that there's a pending invalidation, why do we
> have to retry?  Pretty much by definition the knowledge in a relcache
> entry can be outdated as soon as returned unless locking prevents that
> from being possible - which is not the case here.
> 
> ISTM it'd be better not to have retry logic here, but to follow the more
> general pattern of making sure that we know whether the information
> needs to be recomputed at the next access.  We could either do that by
> having an additional bit of information about the validity of the
> bitmaps (so we have invalid, building, valid - and only set valid at the
> end of computing the bitmaps when still building and not invalid again),
> or we simply move the bitmap computation into the normal relcache build.

To show what I mean here's an *unpolished* and *barely tested* patch
implementing the first of my suggestions.

Alvaro, Pavan, I think should address the issue as well?

- Andres

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Attachment

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Peter Geoghegan
Date:
On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Tomas Vondra
<tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
> OTOH I disagree with the notion that bugs that are not driven by user
> reports are somehow less severe. Some data corruption bugs cause quite
> visible breakage - segfaults, immediate crashes, etc. Those are pretty clear
> bugs, and are reported by users.

I meant that I find the fact that there were no user reports in all
these years to be a good reason to not proceed for now in this
instance.

I wrote amcheck to detect the latter variety of bug, so clearly I
think that they are very serious.

-- 
Peter Geoghegan



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 1:44 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:


> 2. In the second patch, we tried to recompute attribute lists if a relcache
> flush happens in between and index list is invalidated. We've seen problems
> with that, especially it getting into an infinite loop with
> CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS. Not clear why it happens, but apparently relcache
> flushes keep happening.

Well, yeah: the point of CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS is to make a relcache flush
happen whenever it possibly could. 

Ah, ok. That explains why the retry logic as originally proposed was causing infinite loop.
 
The way to deal with that without
looping is to test whether the index set *actually* changed, not whether
it just might have changed.

I like this approach. I'll run the patch on a build with CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS, but I'm pretty sure it will be ok. I also like the fact that retry logic is now limited to only when index set changes, which fits in the situation we're dealing with.

Thanks,
Pavan 

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Amit Kapila
Date:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 6:27 AM, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 2017-02-05 16:37:33 -0800, Andres Freund wrote:
>> >  RelationGetIndexList(Relation relation)
>> > @@ -4746,8 +4747,10 @@ RelationGetIndexPredicate(Relation relat
>> >   * we can include system attributes (e.g., OID) in the bitmap representation.
>> >   *
>> >   * Caller had better hold at least RowExclusiveLock on the target relation
>> > - * to ensure that it has a stable set of indexes.  This also makes it safe
>> > - * (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's indexes.
>> > + * to ensure it is safe (deadlock-free) for us to take locks on the relation's
>> > + * indexes.  Note that since the introduction of CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY,
>> > + * that lock level doesn't guarantee a stable set of indexes, so we have to
>> > + * be prepared to retry here in case of a change in the set of indexes.
>>
>> I've not yet read the full thread, but I'm a bit confused so far. We
>> obviously can get changing information about indexes here, but isn't
>> that something we have to deal with anyway?  If we guarantee that we
>> don't loose knowledge that there's a pending invalidation, why do we
>> have to retry?  Pretty much by definition the knowledge in a relcache
>> entry can be outdated as soon as returned unless locking prevents that
>> from being possible - which is not the case here.
>>
>> ISTM it'd be better not to have retry logic here, but to follow the more
>> general pattern of making sure that we know whether the information
>> needs to be recomputed at the next access.  We could either do that by
>> having an additional bit of information about the validity of the
>> bitmaps (so we have invalid, building, valid - and only set valid at the
>> end of computing the bitmaps when still building and not invalid again),
>> or we simply move the bitmap computation into the normal relcache build.
>
> To show what I mean here's an *unpolished* and *barely tested* patch
> implementing the first of my suggestions.
>

+ * Signal that the attribute bitmaps are being built. If there's any
+ * relcache invalidations while building them, rd_bitmapsvalid will be
+ * reset to 0.  In that case return the bitmaps, but don't mark them as
+ * valid.
+ */

I don't see in your patch that you are setting rd_bitmapsvalid to 0.
Also, I think this suffers from the same problem as the patch proposed
by Alvaro which is that different attrs (hot_attrs, key_attrs and
id_attrs) will get computed based on different index lists which can
cause a problem as mentioned in my mail up thread.  However, I think
your general approach and idea that we have to set the things up for
next time is on spot. I am not sure but I think your solution can be
extended to make it somewhat similar to what we do with rd_indexvalid
(basically, we should set rd_bitmapsvalid to 2 (bitmap is temporarily
forced) at rel cache invalidation and then clean it up transaction
end).  I can try something on those lines.


-- 
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 5:41 AM, Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie> wrote:
On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 4:09 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't think this kind of black-and-white thinking is very helpful.
> Obviously, data corruption is bad.  However, this bug has (from what
> one can tell from this thread) been with us for over a decade; it must
> necessarily be either low-probability or low-severity, or somebody
> would've found it and fixed it before now.  Indeed, the discovery of
> this bug was driven by new feature development, not a user report.  It
> seems pretty clear that if we try to patch this and get it wrong, the
> effects of our mistake could easily be a lot more serious than the
> original bug.

+1. The fact that it wasn't driven by a user report convinces me that
this is the way to go.


I'm not sure that just because the bug wasn't reported by a user, makes it any less critical. As Tomas pointed down thread, the nature of the bug is such that the users may not discover it very easily, but that doesn't mean it couldn't be affecting them all the time. We can now correlate many past reports of index corruption to this bug, but we don't have evidence to prove that. Lack of any good tool or built-in checks probably makes it even harder.

The reason why I discovered this with WARM is because it now has a built-in recheck logic, which was discarding some tuples returned by the index scan. It took me lots of code review and inspection to finally conclude that this must be an existing bug. Even then for lack of any utility, I could not detect this easily with master. That doesn't mean I wasn't able to reproduce, but detection was a problem.

If you look at the reproduction setup, one in every 10, if not 5, CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY ends up creating a corrupt index. That's a good 10% probability. And this is on a low end laptop, with just 5-10 concurrent clients running. Probability of hitting the problem will be much higher on a bigger machine, with many users (on a decent AWS machine, I would find every third CIC to be corrupt). Moreover the setup is not doing anything extraordinary. Just concurrent updates which change between HOT to non-HOT and a CIC.
 
Thanks,
Pavan 
--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Amit Kapila
Date:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 1:44 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> > 2. In the second patch, we tried to recompute attribute lists if a
>> > relcache
>> > flush happens in between and index list is invalidated. We've seen
>> > problems
>> > with that, especially it getting into an infinite loop with
>> > CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS. Not clear why it happens, but apparently relcache
>> > flushes keep happening.
>>
>> Well, yeah: the point of CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS is to make a relcache flush
>> happen whenever it possibly could.
>
>
> Ah, ok. That explains why the retry logic as originally proposed was causing
> infinite loop.
>
>>
>> The way to deal with that without
>> looping is to test whether the index set *actually* changed, not whether
>> it just might have changed.
>
>
> I like this approach. I'll run the patch on a build with
> CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS, but I'm pretty sure it will be ok. I also like the
> fact that retry logic is now limited to only when index set changes, which
> fits in the situation we're dealing with.
>

Don't you think it also has the same problem as mentioned by me in
Alvaro's patch and you also agreed on it?  Do you see any need to fix
it locally in
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(), why can't we clear at transaction end?



-- 
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Peter Geoghegan
Date:
On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:42 PM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
> I'm not sure that just because the bug wasn't reported by a user, makes it
> any less critical. As Tomas pointed down thread, the nature of the bug is
> such that the users may not discover it very easily, but that doesn't mean
> it couldn't be affecting them all the time. We can now correlate many past
> reports of index corruption to this bug, but we don't have evidence to prove
> that. Lack of any good tool or built-in checks probably makes it even
> harder.

I think that we need to make an automated checker tool a requirement
for very complicated development projects in the future. We're behind
here.


-- 
Peter Geoghegan



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Andres Freund
Date:
On 2017-02-06 08:08:01 +0530, Amit Kapila wrote:
> I don't see in your patch that you are setting rd_bitmapsvalid to 0.

IIRC a plain relcache rebuild should do that (note there's also no place
that directly resets rd_indexattrs).


> Also, I think this suffers from the same problem as the patch proposed
> by Alvaro which is that different attrs (hot_attrs, key_attrs and
> id_attrs) will get computed based on different index lists which can
> cause a problem as mentioned in my mail up thread.

I'm not convinced that that's a legitimate concern.  If that's an issue
with CIC, then we have a lot bigger problems, because relcache entries
and such will be inconsistent anyway if you have non-exclusive locks
while changing catalog data.  In the situations where that happens it
better be harmless (otherwis CiC is broken), and the next access will
recompute them.


> I am not sure but I think your solution can be
> extended to make it somewhat similar to what we do with rd_indexvalid
> (basically, we should set rd_bitmapsvalid to 2 (bitmap is temporarily
> forced) at rel cache invalidation and then clean it up transaction
> end).  I can try something on those lines.

Not sure I understand what you mean with "clean it up at transaction end"?

Greetings,

Andres Freund



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> writes:
> I've not yet read the full thread, but I'm a bit confused so far. We
> obviously can get changing information about indexes here, but isn't
> that something we have to deal with anyway?  If we guarantee that we
> don't loose knowledge that there's a pending invalidation, why do we
> have to retry?

We don't *have to* retry; the core of the fix is to not enter stale data
into the cache after we've already received an invalidation signal.  The
current caller can survive with stale data; or if that's not true, C.I.C.
has got more fundamental problems than posited here.  But it seems like a
generally bad idea for relcache to return data that it knows (or at least
has reason to believe) is stale.

Also, even if you're okay with return-stale-data-but-don't-cache-it,
I have little faith that invalidate_indexattr_v3.patch successfully
implements that.  Consider the sequence: inval received during
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap, we clear rd_indexvalid, something asks for
the relation OID list, we recalculate that and set rd_indexvalid, then
we reach the end of RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap and see that rd_indexvalid
is set.  If that happened, we'd cache the bitmaps whether or not they were
really up to date.  Now admittedly, it's a bit hard to think of a reason
why anything would ask for the index list of anything but a system catalog
in that sequence, so as long as you assume that we don't allow C.I.C. (or
more realistically, REINDEX CONCURRENTLY) on system catalogs, this failure
mode is unreachable.  But I much prefer having a positive verification
that the index list is still what it was when we started.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 1:44 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> > 2. In the second patch, we tried to recompute attribute lists if a
>> > relcache
>> > flush happens in between and index list is invalidated. We've seen
>> > problems
>> > with that, especially it getting into an infinite loop with
>> > CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS. Not clear why it happens, but apparently relcache
>> > flushes keep happening.
>>
>> Well, yeah: the point of CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS is to make a relcache flush
>> happen whenever it possibly could.
>
>
> Ah, ok. That explains why the retry logic as originally proposed was causing
> infinite loop.
>
>>
>> The way to deal with that without
>> looping is to test whether the index set *actually* changed, not whether
>> it just might have changed.
>
>
> I like this approach. I'll run the patch on a build with
> CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS, but I'm pretty sure it will be ok. I also like the
> fact that retry logic is now limited to only when index set changes, which
> fits in the situation we're dealing with.
>

Don't you think it also has the same problem as mentioned by me in
Alvaro's patch and you also agreed on it? 

No, I don't think so. There can't be any more relcache flushes occurring between the first RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() and the subsequent RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() calls. The problem with the earlier proposed approach was that we were not caching, yet returning stale information. That implied the next call will again recompute a possibly different value. The retry logic is trying to close a small race yet important race condition where index set invalidation happens, but we cache stale information.
 
Do you see any need to fix
it locally in
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(), why can't we clear at transaction end?


We're trying to fix it in RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() because that's where the race exists. I'm not saying there aren't other and better ways of handling it, but we don't know (I've studied Andres's proposal yet).

Thanks,
Pavan

-- 
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 5:44 AM, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
On 2017-02-05 12:51:09 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com> writes:
> > On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 6:53 PM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.stehule@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> I agree with Pavan - a release with known important bug is not good idea.
>
> > This bug has been around for some time, so I would recommend taking
> > the time necessary to make the best fix possible, even if it means
> > waiting for the next round of minor releases.
>
> I think the way to think about this sort of thing is, if we had found
> this bug when a release wasn't imminent, would we consider it bad enough
> to justify an unscheduled release cycle?  I have to think the answer for
> this one is "probably not".

+1.  I don't think we serve our users by putting out a nontrivial bugfix
hastily. Nor do I think we serve them in this instance by delaying the
release to cover this fix; there's enough other fixes in the release
imo.


I'm bit a surprised with this position. What do we tell our users now that we know this bug exists? They can't fully trust CIC and they don't have any mechanism to confirm if the newly built index is corruption free or not. I'm not suggesting that we should hastily refactor the code, but at the very least some sort of band-aid fix which helps the situation, yet have minimal side-effects, is warranted. I believe proposed retry patch does exactly that.

Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Andres Freund
Date:
On 2017-02-05 21:49:57 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> writes:
> > I've not yet read the full thread, but I'm a bit confused so far. We
> > obviously can get changing information about indexes here, but isn't
> > that something we have to deal with anyway?  If we guarantee that we
> > don't loose knowledge that there's a pending invalidation, why do we
> > have to retry?
> 
> We don't *have to* retry; the core of the fix is to not enter stale data
> into the cache after we've already received an invalidation signal.

Right, the bug is that we do so without remembering that fact.


> The current caller can survive with stale data; or if that's not true,
> C.I.C.  has got more fundamental problems than posited here.

Indeed.


> But it seems like a generally bad idea for relcache to return data
> that it knows (or at least has reason to believe) is stale.

I'm not convinced by this - this kind of staleness can only occur if
changes happen during the execution of the cache building. And the
information returned can be outdated by pretty much the moment you
return anyway.  It's also how a number of the current caches
essentially already work.


> Also, even if you're okay with return-stale-data-but-don't-cache-it,
> I have little faith that invalidate_indexattr_v3.patch successfully
> implements that.

I sent a prototype clarifying what I mean. It's not really like
invalidate_indexattr_v3.patch


Btw, it seems RelationGetIndexList() avoids a similar issue onlye due to
either luck or a lot of undocumented assumptions.  The only reason that
setting relation->rd_indexlist / rd_indexvalid at the end doesn't cause
a similar issue seems to be that no invalidations appear to be processed
after the systable_beginscan().  And that in turn seems to not process
relcache invals after RegisterSnapshot(GetCatalogSnapshot(relid)).
Phew, that seems a bit fragile.

Greetings,

Andres Freund



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> writes:
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 5:44 AM, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
>> +1.  I don't think we serve our users by putting out a nontrivial bugfix
>> hastily. Nor do I think we serve them in this instance by delaying the
>> release to cover this fix; there's enough other fixes in the release
>> imo.

> I'm bit a surprised with this position.

The point is that there's a nontrivial chance of a hasty fix introducing
worse problems than we fix.

Given the lack of consensus about exactly how to fix this, I'm feeling
like it's a good idea if whatever we come up with gets some time to age
awhile in git before we ship it.

Obviously, 2ndQ or EDB or any other distributor can choose to ship a patch
in their own builds if they're sufficiently comfortable with the particular
patch.  That doesn't translate to there having to be a fix in the
community's wraps this week.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Andres Freund
Date:
On 2017-02-05 22:34:34 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
> Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> writes:
> The point is that there's a nontrivial chance of a hasty fix introducing
> worse problems than we fix.
> 
> Given the lack of consensus about exactly how to fix this, I'm feeling
> like it's a good idea if whatever we come up with gets some time to age
> awhile in git before we ship it.

Right. And I'm not even convinced that we really know the extent of the
bug; it seems fairly plausible that there's further incidences of this.
There's also the issue that the mechanics in the older backbranches are
different again, because of SnapshotNow.


>> I'm bit a surprised with this position. What do we tell our users now that
>> we know this bug exists?

That we're scheduling a bugfix for the next point release.  I don't
think we can truthfully claim that there's no known corruption bugs in
any of the  release in the last few years.

Greetings,

Andres Freund



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Amit Kapila
Date:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:35 AM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:15 AM, Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 1:44 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> > 2. In the second patch, we tried to recompute attribute lists if a
>> >> > relcache
>> >> > flush happens in between and index list is invalidated. We've seen
>> >> > problems
>> >> > with that, especially it getting into an infinite loop with
>> >> > CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS. Not clear why it happens, but apparently
>> >> > relcache
>> >> > flushes keep happening.
>> >>
>> >> Well, yeah: the point of CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS is to make a relcache
>> >> flush
>> >> happen whenever it possibly could.
>> >
>> >
>> > Ah, ok. That explains why the retry logic as originally proposed was
>> > causing
>> > infinite loop.
>> >
>> >>
>> >> The way to deal with that without
>> >> looping is to test whether the index set *actually* changed, not
>> >> whether
>> >> it just might have changed.
>> >
>> >
>> > I like this approach. I'll run the patch on a build with
>> > CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS, but I'm pretty sure it will be ok. I also like the
>> > fact that retry logic is now limited to only when index set changes,
>> > which
>> > fits in the situation we're dealing with.
>> >
>>
>> Don't you think it also has the same problem as mentioned by me in
>> Alvaro's patch and you also agreed on it?
>
>
> No, I don't think so. There can't be any more relcache flushes occurring
> between the first RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() and the subsequent
> RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() calls. The problem with the earlier proposed
> approach was that we were not caching, yet returning stale information. That
> implied the next call will again recompute a possibly different value. The
> retry logic is trying to close a small race yet important race condition
> where index set invalidation happens, but we cache stale information.
>

Hmm.  Consider that the first time relcahe invalidation occurs while
computing id_attrs, so now the retry logic will compute the correct
set of attrs (considering two indexes, if we take the example given by
Alvaro above.).  However, the attrs computed for hot_* and key_* will
be using only one index, so this will lead to a situation where two of
the attrs (hot_attrs and key_attrs) are computed with one index and
id_attrs is computed with two indexes. I think this can lead to
Assertion in HeapSatisfiesHOTandKeyUpdate().

>>
>> Do you see any need to fix
>> it locally in
>> RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(), why can't we clear at transaction end?
>>
>
> We're trying to fix it in RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() because that's where
> the race exists. I'm not saying there aren't other and better ways of
> handling it, but we don't know (I've studied Andres's proposal yet).
>

Okay, please find attached patch which is an extension of Tom's and
Andres's patch and I think it fixes the above problem noted by me.
Basically, invalidate the bitmaps at transaction end rather than in
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap().  I think it is okay for
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() to use stale information until
transaction end because all the updates in the current running
transaction will be consumed by the second phase of CIC.

-- 
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com

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Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 9:41 AM, Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> wrote:


Hmm.  Consider that the first time relcahe invalidation occurs while
computing id_attrs, so now the retry logic will compute the correct
set of attrs (considering two indexes, if we take the example given by
Alvaro above.).

I don't quite get that. Since rd_idattr must be already cached at that point and we don't expect to process a relcache flush between successive calls to RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(), we should return a consistent copy of rd_idattr. But may be I am missing something.

Thanks,
Pavan


--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:


I like this approach. I'll run the patch on a build with CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS, but I'm pretty sure it will be ok. 

While it looks certain that the fix will miss this point release, FWIW I ran this patch with CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS and it seems to be working as expected.. Hard to run all the tests, but a small subset of regression and test_decoding seems ok.

Thanks,
Pavan
 
--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Amit Kapila
Date:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 9:47 AM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 9:41 AM, Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Hmm.  Consider that the first time relcahe invalidation occurs while
>> computing id_attrs, so now the retry logic will compute the correct
>> set of attrs (considering two indexes, if we take the example given by
>> Alvaro above.).
>
>
> I don't quite get that. Since rd_idattr must be already cached at that point
> and we don't expect to process a relcache flush between successive calls to
> RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap(), we should return a consistent copy of
> rd_idattr.
>

Right, I was mistaken.  However, I am not sure if there is a need to
perform retry logic in RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap().  It is safe to do
that at transaction end.  I feel even though Tom's fix looks reliable
with respect to the problem reported in this thread, we should take
some time and evaluate different proposals and see which one is the
best way to move forward.


-- 
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Vladimir Borodin
Date:

6 февр. 2017 г., в 4:57, Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie> написал(а):

I meant that I find the fact that there were no user reports in all
these years to be a good reason to not proceed for now in this
instance.

Well, we had some strange situations with indexes (see below for example) but I couldn’t even think that CIC is the problem.

And it is really difficult to give diagnostics for problems of such kind. Because 1. you may see the problem several days after last major change in the database and 2. you don’t even know how to start investigating the problem.

xdb314g/maildb M # show enable_indexscan ;
 enable_indexscan
------------------
 off
(1 row)

Time: 0.120 ms
xdb314g/maildb M #  select * from mail.folders where uid=448300241 and fid=1;
-[ RECORD 1 ]---+------------------------------
uid             | 448300241
fid             | 1
<...>

Time: 30398.637 ms
xdb314g/maildb M # set enable_indexscan to true;
SET
Time: 0.111 ms
xdb314g/maildb M #  select * from mail.folders where uid=448300241 and fid=1;
(0 rows)

Time: 0.312 ms

xdb314g/maildb M #


The row of course hasn’t been deleted.

--
May the force be with you…

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Martín Marqués
Date:
El 05/02/17 a las 21:57, Tomas Vondra escribió:
> 
> +1 to not rushing fixes into releases. While I think we now finally
> understand the mechanics of this bug, the fact that we came up with
> three different fixes in this thread, only to discover issues with each
> of them, warrants some caution.

I agree also with Robert on not rushing the patch. My point was if we
had to rush the release.

> OTOH I disagree with the notion that bugs that are not driven by user
> reports are somehow less severe. Some data corruption bugs cause quite
> visible breakage - segfaults, immediate crashes, etc. Those are pretty
> clear bugs, and are reported by users.
> 
> Other data corruption bugs are much more subtle - for example this bug
> may lead to incorrect results to some queries, failing to detect values
> violating UNIQUE constraints, issues with foreign keys, etc.

I was recalling just yesterday after sending the mail a logical
replication setup we did on a 9.3 server of a customer which brought up
data inconsistencies on the primary key of one of the tables. The table
had duplicate values.

As Tomas says, it's subtle and hard to find unless you constantly run
index checks (query a sample of the data from the heap and from the
index and check they match). In our case, the customer was not aware of
the dups until we found them.

Regards,

-- 
Martín Marqués                http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Alvaro Herrera
Date:
Tom Lane wrote:

> Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> writes:

> > 2. In the second patch, we tried to recompute attribute lists if a relcache
> > flush happens in between and index list is invalidated. We've seen problems
> > with that, especially it getting into an infinite loop with
> > CACHE_CLOBBER_ALWAYS. Not clear why it happens, but apparently relcache
> > flushes keep happening.
> 
> Well, yeah: the point of CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS is to make a relcache flush
> happen whenever it possibly could.  The way to deal with that without
> looping is to test whether the index set *actually* changed, not whether
> it just might have changed.

Ah, that's a nice and simple way to fix that patch!  I see that Pavan
confirmed that it fixes the tests we saw failing too.  It seems to me
that we should go with this one, and it looks unlikely that this causes
other problems.

BTW, while neiter Pavan nor I sent this patch to -hackers, this
implementation is pretty much the same thing we did.  Pavan deserves
credit as co-author in this commit.

-- 
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Alvaro Herrera
Date:
Andres Freund wrote:

> To show what I mean here's an *unpolished* and *barely tested* patch
> implementing the first of my suggestions.
> 
> Alvaro, Pavan, I think should address the issue as well?

Hmm, interesting idea.  Maybe a patch along these lines is a good way to
make index-list cache less brittle going forward.  However, I'm against
putting it in the stable branches -- and we should definitely not stall
an immediate fix in order to get this patch ready.  IMO we should get
Tom's patch in tree for all branches very soon, and then after the
release you can finalize this one and put it to master.

-- 
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> writes:
> Hmm.  Consider that the first time relcahe invalidation occurs while
> computing id_attrs, so now the retry logic will compute the correct
> set of attrs (considering two indexes, if we take the example given by
> Alvaro above.).  However, the attrs computed for hot_* and key_* will
> be using only one index, so this will lead to a situation where two of
> the attrs (hot_attrs and key_attrs) are computed with one index and
> id_attrs is computed with two indexes. I think this can lead to
> Assertion in HeapSatisfiesHOTandKeyUpdate().

That seems like something we'd be best off to fix by changing the
assertion.  I doubt it's really going to be practical to guarantee that
those bitmapsets are always 100% consistent throughout a transaction.

> Okay, please find attached patch which is an extension of Tom's and
> Andres's patch and I think it fixes the above problem noted by me.

I don't like this patch at all.  It only fixes the above issue if the
relcache inval arrives while RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap is executing.
If the inval arrives between two such calls, you still have the problem
of the second one delivering a bitmapset that might be inconsistent
with the first one.

To go in this direction, I think we would have to hot-wire
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap so that once any bitmapset has been requested
in a transaction, we intentionally ignore all index set updates for the
remainder of the transaction.  And that would very likely create more
problems than it solves (consider locally initiated DDL within the
transaction, for example).

Better to fix the callers so that they don't have the assumption you
refer to.  Or maybe we could adjust the API of RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap
so that it returns all the sets needed by a given calling module at
once, which would allow us to guarantee they're consistent.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Alvaro Herrera
Date:
Tom Lane wrote:

> Better to fix the callers so that they don't have the assumption you
> refer to.  Or maybe we could adjust the API of RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap
> so that it returns all the sets needed by a given calling module at
> once, which would allow us to guarantee they're consistent.

Note that my "interesting attrs" patch does away with these independent
bitmaps (which was last posted by Pavan as part of his WARM set).  I
think we should fix just this bug now, and for the future look at that
other approach.

-- 
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com> writes:
> Tom Lane wrote:
>> Better to fix the callers so that they don't have the assumption you
>> refer to.  Or maybe we could adjust the API of RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap
>> so that it returns all the sets needed by a given calling module at
>> once, which would allow us to guarantee they're consistent.

> Note that my "interesting attrs" patch does away with these independent
> bitmaps (which was last posted by Pavan as part of his WARM set).  I
> think we should fix just this bug now, and for the future look at that
> other approach.

BTW, if there is a risk of the assertion failure that Amit posits,
it seems like it should have happened in the tests that Pavan was doing
originally.  I'd sort of like to see a demonstration that it can actually
happen before we spend any great amount of time fixing it.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Robert Treat
Date:
On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 9:42 PM, Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 5:41 AM, Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie> wrote:
>> On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 4:09 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > I don't think this kind of black-and-white thinking is very helpful.
>> > Obviously, data corruption is bad.  However, this bug has (from what
>> > one can tell from this thread) been with us for over a decade; it must
>> > necessarily be either low-probability or low-severity, or somebody
>> > would've found it and fixed it before now.  Indeed, the discovery of
>> > this bug was driven by new feature development, not a user report.  It
>> > seems pretty clear that if we try to patch this and get it wrong, the
>> > effects of our mistake could easily be a lot more serious than the
>> > original bug.
>>
>> +1. The fact that it wasn't driven by a user report convinces me that
>> this is the way to go.
>>
>
> I'm not sure that just because the bug wasn't reported by a user, makes it
> any less critical. As Tomas pointed down thread, the nature of the bug is
> such that the users may not discover it very easily, but that doesn't mean
> it couldn't be affecting them all the time. We can now correlate many past
> reports of index corruption to this bug, but we don't have evidence to prove
> that. Lack of any good tool or built-in checks probably makes it even
> harder.
>
> The reason why I discovered this with WARM is because it now has a built-in
> recheck logic, which was discarding some tuples returned by the index scan.
> It took me lots of code review and inspection to finally conclude that this
> must be an existing bug. Even then for lack of any utility, I could not
> detect this easily with master. That doesn't mean I wasn't able to
> reproduce, but detection was a problem.
>
> If you look at the reproduction setup, one in every 10, if not 5, CREATE
> INDEX CONCURRENTLY ends up creating a corrupt index. That's a good 10%
> probability. And this is on a low end laptop, with just 5-10 concurrent
> clients running. Probability of hitting the problem will be much higher on a
> bigger machine, with many users (on a decent AWS machine, I would find every
> third CIC to be corrupt). Moreover the setup is not doing anything
> extraordinary. Just concurrent updates which change between HOT to non-HOT
> and a CIC.
>

Not that I am advocating that we should do a release just for this;
having a fix we believe in is certainly as important a factor, but
that the idea that the bug has been around a long time means it is
less of an issue does seem wrong. We've certainly seen plenty of cases
over the years where bugs have existed in the code in seldom used code
paths, only to be exposed by new features or other code changes over
time. In general, we should be less worried about the age of a bug vs
our expectations that users are likely to hit that bug now, which does
seem high based on the above numbers.

In the meantime, it's certainly worth warning users, providing help on
how to determine if this is a likely problem for them, and possibly
rolling a patch ahead of upstream in cases where that's feasible.

Robert Treat
play: xzilla.net
work: omniti.com



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
After some discussion among the release team, we've concluded that the
best thing to do is to push Pavan's/my patch into today's releases.
This does not close the matter by any means: we should continue to
study whether there are related bugs or whether there's a more principled
way of fixing this bug.  But that patch clearly makes things better,
and we shouldn't let worries about whether there are more bugs stop
us from providing some kind of fix to users.

I've made the push, and barring negative reports from the buildfarm,
it will be in today's releases.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
After some discussion among the release team, we've concluded that the
best thing to do is to push Pavan's/my patch into today's releases.
This does not close the matter by any means: we should continue to
study whether there are related bugs or whether there's a more principled
way of fixing this bug.  But that patch clearly makes things better,
and we shouldn't let worries about whether there are more bugs stop
us from providing some kind of fix to users.

I've made the push, and barring negative reports from the buildfarm,
it will be in today's releases.
 
Thank you for taking care of it. Buildfarm is looking green until now.

Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Amit Kapila
Date:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:28 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> writes:
>> Hmm.  Consider that the first time relcahe invalidation occurs while
>> computing id_attrs, so now the retry logic will compute the correct
>> set of attrs (considering two indexes, if we take the example given by
>> Alvaro above.).  However, the attrs computed for hot_* and key_* will
>> be using only one index, so this will lead to a situation where two of
>> the attrs (hot_attrs and key_attrs) are computed with one index and
>> id_attrs is computed with two indexes. I think this can lead to
>> Assertion in HeapSatisfiesHOTandKeyUpdate().
>
> That seems like something we'd be best off to fix by changing the
> assertion.
>

The above-mentioned problem doesn't exist in your version of the patch
(which is now committed) because the index attrs are cached after
invalidation and I have mentioned the same in my yesterday's followup
mail.   The guarantee of safety is that we don't handle invalidation
between two consecutive calls to RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() in
heap_update, but if we do handle due to any reason which is not
apparent to me, then I think there is some chance of hitting the
assertion.

>  I doubt it's really going to be practical to guarantee that
> those bitmapsets are always 100% consistent throughout a transaction.
>

Agreed.  As the code stands, I think it is only expected to be
guaranteed across three consecutive calls to
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() in heap_update. Now, if the assertion in
HeapSatisfiesHOTandKeyUpdate() is useless and we can remove it, then
probably we don't need a guarantee to be consistent in three
consecutive calls as well.

>> Okay, please find attached patch which is an extension of Tom's and
>> Andres's patch and I think it fixes the above problem noted by me.
>
> I don't like this patch at all.  It only fixes the above issue if the
> relcache inval arrives while RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap is executing.
> If the inval arrives between two such calls, you still have the problem
> of the second one delivering a bitmapset that might be inconsistent
> with the first one.
>

I think it won't happen between two consecutive calls to
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap in heap_update.  It can happen during
multi-row update, but that should be fine.  I think this version of
patch only defers the creation of fresh bitmapsets where ever
possible.

-- 
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Keith Fiske
Date:

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:17 PM, Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:28 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> Amit Kapila <amit.kapila16@gmail.com> writes:
>> Hmm.  Consider that the first time relcahe invalidation occurs while
>> computing id_attrs, so now the retry logic will compute the correct
>> set of attrs (considering two indexes, if we take the example given by
>> Alvaro above.).  However, the attrs computed for hot_* and key_* will
>> be using only one index, so this will lead to a situation where two of
>> the attrs (hot_attrs and key_attrs) are computed with one index and
>> id_attrs is computed with two indexes. I think this can lead to
>> Assertion in HeapSatisfiesHOTandKeyUpdate().
>
> That seems like something we'd be best off to fix by changing the
> assertion.
>

The above-mentioned problem doesn't exist in your version of the patch
(which is now committed) because the index attrs are cached after
invalidation and I have mentioned the same in my yesterday's followup
mail.   The guarantee of safety is that we don't handle invalidation
between two consecutive calls to RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() in
heap_update, but if we do handle due to any reason which is not
apparent to me, then I think there is some chance of hitting the
assertion.

>  I doubt it's really going to be practical to guarantee that
> those bitmapsets are always 100% consistent throughout a transaction.
>

Agreed.  As the code stands, I think it is only expected to be
guaranteed across three consecutive calls to
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap() in heap_update. Now, if the assertion in
HeapSatisfiesHOTandKeyUpdate() is useless and we can remove it, then
probably we don't need a guarantee to be consistent in three
consecutive calls as well.

>> Okay, please find attached patch which is an extension of Tom's and
>> Andres's patch and I think it fixes the above problem noted by me.
>
> I don't like this patch at all.  It only fixes the above issue if the
> relcache inval arrives while RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap is executing.
> If the inval arrives between two such calls, you still have the problem
> of the second one delivering a bitmapset that might be inconsistent
> with the first one.
>

I think it won't happen between two consecutive calls to
RelationGetIndexAttrBitmap in heap_update.  It can happen during
multi-row update, but that should be fine.  I think this version of
patch only defers the creation of fresh bitmapsets where ever
possible.

--
With Regards,
Amit Kapila.
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com


--
Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org)
To make changes to your subscription:
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Was just curious if anyone was able to come up with any sort of method to test whether an index was corrupted by this bug, other than just waiting for bad query results? We've used concurrent index rebuilding quite extensively over the years to remove bloat from busy systems, but reindexing the entire database "just in case" is unrealistic in many of our cases.

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Alvaro Herrera
Date:
Keith Fiske wrote:

> Was just curious if anyone was able to come up with any sort of method to
> test whether an index was corrupted by this bug, other than just waiting
> for bad query results? We've used concurrent index rebuilding quite
> extensively over the years to remove bloat from busy systems, but
> reindexing the entire database "just in case" is unrealistic in many of our
> cases.

As stated, if the CREATE INDEX operates on columns that are previously
already indexed (which is normally the case when you rebuild because of
bloat) then there is no chance of index corruption.

Scanning indexes+tables is just as load-intensive as rebuilding the
indexes anyway.  You don't save any work.  I suppose it can be a problem
if you have an index big enough that it doesn't fit on your remaining
free space (but in that case you have a pre-existing problem which you
should solve anyway).

-- 
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Keith Fiske
Date:

On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 11:12 AM, Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com> wrote:
Keith Fiske wrote:

> Was just curious if anyone was able to come up with any sort of method to
> test whether an index was corrupted by this bug, other than just waiting
> for bad query results? We've used concurrent index rebuilding quite
> extensively over the years to remove bloat from busy systems, but
> reindexing the entire database "just in case" is unrealistic in many of our
> cases.

As stated, if the CREATE INDEX operates on columns that are previously
already indexed (which is normally the case when you rebuild because of
bloat) then there is no chance of index corruption.

Scanning indexes+tables is just as load-intensive as rebuilding the
indexes anyway.  You don't save any work.  I suppose it can be a problem
if you have an index big enough that it doesn't fit on your remaining
free space (but in that case you have a pre-existing problem which you
should solve anyway).

--
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services

It's not the load I'm worried about, it's the locks that are required at some point during the rebuild. Doing an index rebuild here and there isn't a big deal, but trying to do it for an entire heavily loaded, multi-terabyte database is hardly trivial. And I'd say doing a scan is far less invasive than actually rebuilding the index since little to no writing is actually being done.

I can understandable if it's simply not possible, but if it is, I think in any cases of data corruption, having some means to check for it to be sure you're in the clear would be useful.

Keith

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Alvaro Herrera
Date:
Keith Fiske wrote:

> I can understandable if it's simply not possible, but if it is, I think in
> any cases of data corruption, having some means to check for it to be sure
> you're in the clear would be useful.

Maybe it is possible.  I just didn't try, since it didn't seem very
useful.

-- 
Álvaro Herrera                https://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Peter Geoghegan
Date:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 8:23 AM, Keith Fiske <keith@omniti.com> wrote:
> It's not the load I'm worried about, it's the locks that are required at
> some point during the rebuild. Doing an index rebuild here and there isn't a
> big deal, but trying to do it for an entire heavily loaded, multi-terabyte
> database is hardly trivial. And I'd say doing a scan is far less invasive
> than actually rebuilding the index since little to no writing is actually
> being done.

Certainly, the checks that amcheck performs that don't require a
heavier lock (just a SELECT-style AccessShareLock) were vastly less
expensive than reindexing, and of course had only negligible potential
to block other operations. And, REINDEX certainly is a foot-gun,
lock-wise, which is why I try to avoid it.

The difference with a test that could detect this variety of
corruption is that that would need to visit the heap, which tends to
be much larger than any one index, or even all indexes. That would
probably need to be random I/O, too. It might be possible to mostly
not visit the heap, though -- I'm not sure offhand. I'd have to study
the problem in detail, which I have no time for at the moment.

-- 
Peter Geoghegan



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie> writes:
> The difference with a test that could detect this variety of
> corruption is that that would need to visit the heap, which tends to
> be much larger than any one index, or even all indexes. That would
> probably need to be random I/O, too. It might be possible to mostly
> not visit the heap, though -- I'm not sure offhand. I'd have to study
> the problem in detail, which I have no time for at the moment.

Unless I misunderstand this problem, the issue is that there might be some
broken HOT chains, that is chains in which not all the heap tuples have
the same values for the index columns, and in particular the live entry at
the end of the chain doesn't agree with the index.  It seems pretty
impossible to detect that by examining the index alone.

However, you might be able to find it without so much random I/O.
I'm envisioning a seqscan over the table, in which you simply look for
HOT chains in which the indexed columns aren't all the same.  When you
find one, you'd have to do a pretty expensive index lookup to confirm
whether things are OK or not, but hopefully that'd be rare enough to not
be a big performance sink.

This seems like it'd be quite a different tool than amcheck, though.
Also, it would only find broken-HOT-chain corruption, which might be
a rare enough issue to not deserve a single-purpose tool.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Tom Lane
Date:
I wrote:
> However, you might be able to find it without so much random I/O.
> I'm envisioning a seqscan over the table, in which you simply look for
> HOT chains in which the indexed columns aren't all the same.  When you
> find one, you'd have to do a pretty expensive index lookup to confirm
> whether things are OK or not, but hopefully that'd be rare enough to not
> be a big performance sink.

Ah, nah, scratch that.  If any post-index-build pruning had occurred on a
page, the evidence would be gone --- the non-matching older tuples would
be removed and what remained would look consistent.  But it wouldn't
match the index.  You might be able to find problems if you were willing
to do the expensive check on *every* HOT chain, but that seems none too
practical.
        regards, tom lane



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Peter Geoghegan
Date:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 9:31 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> This seems like it'd be quite a different tool than amcheck, though.
> Also, it would only find broken-HOT-chain corruption, which might be
> a rare enough issue to not deserve a single-purpose tool.

FWIW, my ambition for amcheck is that it will have checks for a large
variety of invariants that involve the heap, and related SLRU
structures such as MultiXacts. Though, that would probably necessitate
code written by other people that are subject matter experts in areas
that I am not.

-- 
Peter Geoghegan



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Robert Haas
Date:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 11:15 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> I wrote:
>> However, you might be able to find it without so much random I/O.
>> I'm envisioning a seqscan over the table, in which you simply look for
>> HOT chains in which the indexed columns aren't all the same.  When you
>> find one, you'd have to do a pretty expensive index lookup to confirm
>> whether things are OK or not, but hopefully that'd be rare enough to not
>> be a big performance sink.
>
> Ah, nah, scratch that.  If any post-index-build pruning had occurred on a
> page, the evidence would be gone --- the non-matching older tuples would
> be removed and what remained would look consistent.  But it wouldn't
> match the index.  You might be able to find problems if you were willing
> to do the expensive check on *every* HOT chain, but that seems none too
> practical.

If the goal is just to detect tuples that aren't indexed and should
be, what about scanning each index and building a TIDBitmap of all of
the index entries, and then scanning the heap for non-HOT tuples and
probing the TIDBitmap for each one?  If you find a heap entry for
which you didn't find an index entry, go and recheck the index and see
if one got added concurrently.  If not, whine.

One problem is that you'd need to make sure that the TIDBitmap didn't
lossify, but that could be prevented either by specifying a very large
maxbytes setting or by using something that serves the same function
instead of a TIDBitmap per se.

-- 
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Pavan Deolasee
Date:


On Sun, Feb 19, 2017 at 3:43 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 11:15 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:

> Ah, nah, scratch that.  If any post-index-build pruning had occurred on a
> page, the evidence would be gone --- the non-matching older tuples would
> be removed and what remained would look consistent.  But it wouldn't
> match the index.  You might be able to find problems if you were willing
> to do the expensive check on *every* HOT chain, but that seems none too
> practical.

If the goal is just to detect tuples that aren't indexed and should
be, what about scanning each index and building a TIDBitmap of all of
the index entries, and then scanning the heap for non-HOT tuples and
probing the TIDBitmap for each one?  If you find a heap entry for
which you didn't find an index entry, go and recheck the index and see
if one got added concurrently.  If not, whine.


This particular case of corruption results in a heap tuple getting indexed by a wrong key (or to be precise, indexed by its old value). So the only way to detect the corruption is to look at each index key and check if it matches with the corresponding heap tuple. We could write some kind of self join that can use a sequential scan and an index-only scan (David Rowley had suggested something of that sort internally here), but we can't guarantee index-only scan on a table which is being concurrently updated. So not sure even that will catch every possible case.

Thanks,
Pavan

--
 Pavan Deolasee                   http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
 PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services

Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Robert Haas
Date:
On Sun, Feb 19, 2017 at 3:52 PM, Pavan Deolasee
<pavan.deolasee@gmail.com> wrote:
> This particular case of corruption results in a heap tuple getting indexed
> by a wrong key (or to be precise, indexed by its old value). So the only way
> to detect the corruption is to look at each index key and check if it
> matches with the corresponding heap tuple. We could write some kind of self
> join that can use a sequential scan and an index-only scan (David Rowley had
> suggested something of that sort internally here), but we can't guarantee
> index-only scan on a table which is being concurrently updated. So not sure
> even that will catch every possible case.

Oh, so the problem isn't index entries that are altogether missing?  I
guess I was confused.

You can certainly guarantee an index-only scan if you write the
validation code in C rather than using SQL.  I think the issue is that
if the table is large enough that keeping a TID -> index value mapping
in a hash table is impractical, there's not going to be a real
efficient strategy for this.  Ignoring the question of whether you use
the main executor for this or just roll your own code, your options
for a large table are (1) a multi-batch hash join, (2) a nested loop,
and (3) a merge join.  (2) is easy to implement but will generate a
ton of random I/O if the table is not resident in RAM.  (3) is most
suitable for very large tables but takes more work to code, and is
also likely to be a lot slower for small tables than a hash or
nestloop-based approach.

-- 
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company



Re: [HACKERS] Index corruption with CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY

From
Jim Nasby
Date:
On 2/19/17 5:27 AM, Robert Haas wrote:
> (1) a multi-batch hash join, (2) a nested loop,
> and (3) a merge join.  (2) is easy to implement but will generate a
> ton of random I/O if the table is not resident in RAM.  (3) is most
> suitable for very large tables but takes more work to code, and is
> also likely to be a lot slower for small tables than a hash or
> nestloop-based approach.

As I understand it, #3 is already in place for validate_index(). I think 
you'd just need a different callback that checks the heap key.
-- 
Jim Nasby, Data Architect, Blue Treble Consulting, Austin TX
Experts in Analytics, Data Architecture and PostgreSQL
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