Thread: SHA-1 FIPS - compliance
Hi all,
I am a new maintainer of PostgreSQL in Fedora and RHEL. Currently, I am solving usage SHA-1 for key-derivation in pgcrypto (the s2k-digest-algo). In the documentation, I have found that there are options SHA-1 or MD5. Unfortunately, none of these algorithms are FIPS compliant. So I would like to ask if exists a possibility to add or enable support for some type of stronger hash algorithm?
Thanks
-Filip-
On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 02:33:33PM +0200, Filip Janus wrote: > Hi all, > I am a new maintainer of PostgreSQL in Fedora and RHEL. Currently, I am solving > usage SHA-1 for key-derivation in pgcrypto (the s2k-digest-algo). In the > documentation, I have found that there are options SHA-1 or MD5. Unfortunately, > none of these algorithms are FIPS compliant. So I would like to ask if exists a > possibility to add or enable support for some type of stronger hash algorithm? I don't know of any official way to disable them, but I do know that PG 14 will use a different set of algorithms that are more FIPS-compliant because we rely more on the OpenSSL for its implementation (or blockage). -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> https://momjian.us EDB https://enterprisedb.com If only the physical world exists, free will is an illusion.
On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 09:58:35AM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote: > On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 02:33:33PM +0200, Filip Janus wrote: >> I am a new maintainer of PostgreSQL in Fedora and RHEL. Currently, I am solving >> usage SHA-1 for key-derivation in pgcrypto (the s2k-digest-algo). In the >> documentation, I have found that there are options SHA-1 or MD5. Unfortunately, >> none of these algorithms are FIPS compliant. So I would like to ask if exists a >> possibility to add or enable support for some type of stronger hash algorithm? Patches and improvements are always welcome. > I don't know of any official way to disable them, but I do know that PG > 14 will use a different set of algorithms that are more FIPS-compliant > because we rely more on the OpenSSL for its implementation (or > blockage). The set of algorithms supported for pgcrypto does not change. The only thing that does change is that, by going through the EVP layer instead of the low-level cryptohash APIs, OpenSSL will not do a blind exit() when using algos that are not FIPS compliant (MD5 and SHA-1) when linking to OpenSSL 1.0.2 if FIPS is enabled at system or process level. -- Michael