Thread: Anonymized database dumps
Hi, I am working on postgresql 9.1 and loving it! Sometimes we need a full database dump to test some performance issues with real data. Of course we don't like to have sensible data like bunches of e-mail addresses on our development machines as they are of no interest for developers and should be kept secure. So we need an anonymized database dump. I thought about a few ways to achieve this. 1. Best solution would be a special db user and some rules which fire on reading some tables and replace privacy data with some random data. Now doing a dump as this special user doesn't even copy the sensible data at all. The user just has a different view on this database even when he calls pg_dump. But as rules are not fired on COPY it can't work, right? 2. The other solution I can think of is something like pg_dump | sed > pgdump_anon where 'sed' does a lot of magical replace operations on the content of the dump. I don't think this is going to work reliable. 3. More reliable would be to dump the database, restore it on a different server, run some sql script which randomize some data, and dump it again. hmm, seems to be the only reliable way so far. But it is no fun when dumping and restoring takes an hour. Does anybody has a better idea how to achieve an anonymized database dump? regards Janning -- Kicktipp GmbH Venloer Straße 8, 40477 Düsseldorf Sitz der Gesellschaft: Düsseldorf Geschäftsführung: Janning Vygen Handelsregister Düsseldorf: HRB 55639 http://www.kicktipp.de/
I would store sensitive data encrypted in the database. Check the pgcrypto module. Kiriakos On Mar 18, 2012, at 1:00 PM, Janning Vygen wrote: > Hi, > > I am working on postgresql 9.1 and loving it! > > Sometimes we need a full database dump to test some performance issues with real data. > > Of course we don't like to have sensible data like bunches of e-mail addresses on our development machines as they areof no interest for developers and should be kept secure. > > So we need an anonymized database dump. I thought about a few ways to achieve this. > > 1. Best solution would be a special db user and some rules which fire on reading some tables and replace privacy data withsome random data. Now doing a dump as this special user doesn't even copy the sensible data at all. The user just hasa different view on this database even when he calls pg_dump. > > But as rules are not fired on COPY it can't work, right? > > 2. The other solution I can think of is something like > > pg_dump | sed > pgdump_anon > > where 'sed' does a lot of magical replace operations on the content of the dump. I don't think this is going to work reliable. > > 3. More reliable would be to dump the database, restore it on a different server, run some sql script which randomize somedata, and dump it again. hmm, seems to be the only reliable way so far. But it is no fun when dumping and restoring takesan hour. > > Does anybody has a better idea how to achieve an anonymized database dump? > > regards > Janning > > > > > > -- > Kicktipp GmbH > > Venloer Straße 8, 40477 Düsseldorf > Sitz der Gesellschaft: Düsseldorf > Geschäftsführung: Janning Vygen > Handelsregister Düsseldorf: HRB 55639 > > http://www.kicktipp.de/ > > -- > Sent via pgsql-general mailing list (pgsql-general@postgresql.org) > To make changes to your subscription: > http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-general
pgcrypto does not work for this scenario as far as i know. pgcrypto enables me to encrypt my data and let only a user with the right password (or key or whatever) decrypt it, right? So if i run it in a test environment without this password the application is broken. I still want to use these table columns in my test environment but instead of real email addresses i want addresses like random_number@example.org. You might be right that it is a good idea to additional encrypt this data. regards Janning Am 19.03.2012 06:24, schrieb Kiriakos Georgiou: > I would store sensitive data encrypted in the database. Check the pgcrypto module. > > Kiriakos > > > On Mar 18, 2012, at 1:00 PM, Janning Vygen wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I am working on postgresql 9.1 and loving it! >> >> Sometimes we need a full database dump to test some performance issues with real data. >> >> Of course we don't like to have sensible data like bunches of e-mail addresses on our development machines as they areof no interest for developers and should be kept secure. >> >> So we need an anonymized database dump. I thought about a few ways to achieve this. >> >> 1. Best solution would be a special db user and some rules which fire on reading some tables and replace privacy datawith some random data. Now doing a dump as this special user doesn't even copy the sensible data at all. The user justhas a different view on this database even when he calls pg_dump. >> >> But as rules are not fired on COPY it can't work, right? >> >> 2. The other solution I can think of is something like >> >> pg_dump | sed> pgdump_anon >> >> where 'sed' does a lot of magical replace operations on the content of the dump. I don't think this is going to work reliable. >> >> 3. More reliable would be to dump the database, restore it on a different server, run some sql script which randomizesome data, and dump it again. hmm, seems to be the only reliable way so far. But it is no fun when dumping and restoringtakes an hour. >> >> Does anybody has a better idea how to achieve an anonymized database dump? >> >> regards >> Janning >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Kicktipp GmbH >> >> Venloer Straße 8, 40477 Düsseldorf >> Sitz der Gesellschaft: Düsseldorf >> Geschäftsführung: Janning Vygen >> Handelsregister Düsseldorf: HRB 55639 >> >> http://www.kicktipp.de/ >> >> -- >> Sent via pgsql-general mailing list (pgsql-general@postgresql.org) >> To make changes to your subscription: >> http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-general > -- Kicktipp GmbH Venloer Straße 8, 40477 Düsseldorf Sitz der Gesellschaft: Düsseldorf Geschäftsführung: Janning Vygen Handelsregister Düsseldorf: HRB 55639 http://www.kicktipp.de/
Janning Vygen <vygen@kicktipp.de> writes: > pgcrypto does not work for this scenario as far as i know. > > pgcrypto enables me to encrypt my data and let only a user with the > right password (or key or whatever) decrypt it, right? So if i run it > in a test environment without this password the application is broken. > > I still want to use these table columns in my test environment but > instead of real email addresses i want addresses like > random_number@example.org. > > You might be right that it is a good idea to additional encrypt this data. Maybe you could change your application so that it doesn't access the critical tables directly and instead define views for them which, based on current_user, either do decryption or return randim strings.
On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 10:12:01AM +0100, hari.fuchs@gmail.com wrote: > Janning Vygen <vygen@kicktipp.de> writes: > > pgcrypto does not work for this scenario as far as i know. > > > > pgcrypto enables me to encrypt my data and let only a user with the > > right password (or key or whatever) decrypt it, right? So if i run it > > in a test environment without this password the application is broken. > > > > I still want to use these table columns in my test environment but > > instead of real email addresses i want addresses like > > random_number@example.org. > > > > You might be right that it is a good idea to additional encrypt this data. > > Maybe you could change your application so that it doesn't access the > critical tables directly and instead define views for them which, based > on current_user, either do decryption or return randim strings. Encryption is wrong tool for "anonymization". The right tool is hmac() which gives you one-way hash that is protected by key, which means other side can't even calcutate the hashes unless they have same key. You can calculate it with pgcrypto when dumping, or later post-processing the dumps. But it produces random values, if you need something realistic-looking you need custom mapping logic. -- marko
In response to Janning Vygen <vygen@kicktipp.de>: > > I am working on postgresql 9.1 and loving it! > > Sometimes we need a full database dump to test some performance issues > with real data. > > Of course we don't like to have sensible data like bunches of e-mail > addresses on our development machines as they are of no interest for > developers and should be kept secure. > > So we need an anonymized database dump. I thought about a few ways to > achieve this. > > 1. Best solution would be a special db user and some rules which fire on > reading some tables and replace privacy data with some random data. Now > doing a dump as this special user doesn't even copy the sensible data at > all. The user just has a different view on this database even when he > calls pg_dump. > > But as rules are not fired on COPY it can't work, right? > > 2. The other solution I can think of is something like > > pg_dump | sed > pgdump_anon > > where 'sed' does a lot of magical replace operations on the content of > the dump. I don't think this is going to work reliable. > > 3. More reliable would be to dump the database, restore it on a > different server, run some sql script which randomize some data, and > dump it again. hmm, seems to be the only reliable way so far. But it is > no fun when dumping and restoring takes an hour. > > Does anybody has a better idea how to achieve an anonymized database dump? I highly recommend #3. It's how we do it where I work. At first it seems like a big, slow, complicated monster, but once you've built the tools and have it running reliably it's very nice. Our system does the dumps overnight via cron (we have over 100 production databases) then changes the sensitive data, as well changing all the passwords to "password" so developers can easily log in as any account. During the day, the developers have access to all the sanitized dump files and can use them to make as many testing databases as they need. Yes, the data gets up to 24 hours out of date, but it's never been a problem for us. -- Bill Moran http://www.potentialtech.com http://people.collaborativefusion.com/~wmoran/
Am 19.03.2012 um 13:22 schrieb Bill Moran <wmoran@potentialtech.com>: > In response to Janning Vygen <vygen@kicktipp.de>: >> >> I am working on postgresql 9.1 and loving it! >> >> Sometimes we need a full database dump to test some performance issues >> with real data. >> >> Of course we don't like to have sensible data like bunches of e-mail >> addresses on our development machines as they are of no interest for >> developers and should be kept secure. >> >> So we need an anonymized database dump. I thought about a few ways to >> achieve this. >> >> 1. Best solution would be a special db user and some rules which fire on >> reading some tables and replace privacy data with some random data. Now >> doing a dump as this special user doesn't even copy the sensible data at >> all. The user just has a different view on this database even when he >> calls pg_dump. >> >> But as rules are not fired on COPY it can't work, right? >> >> 2. The other solution I can think of is something like >> >> pg_dump | sed > pgdump_anon >> >> where 'sed' does a lot of magical replace operations on the content of >> the dump. I don't think this is going to work reliable. >> >> 3. More reliable would be to dump the database, restore it on a >> different server, run some sql script which randomize some data, and >> dump it again. hmm, seems to be the only reliable way so far. But it is >> no fun when dumping and restoring takes an hour. >> >> Does anybody has a better idea how to achieve an anonymized database dump? > > I highly recommend #3. It's how we do it where I work. > > At first it seems like a big, slow, complicated monster, but once you've > built the tools and have it running reliably it's very nice. Our system > does the dumps overnight via cron (we have over 100 production databases) > then changes the sensitive data, as well changing all the passwords to > "password" so developers can easily log in as any account. During the > day, the developers have access to all the sanitized dump files and can > use them to make as many testing databases as they need. Yes, the data > gets up to 24 hours out of date, but it's never been a problem for us. Thanks for your response and your insights to your process. Sounds reasonable. Regards Janning
The data anonymizer process is flawed because you are one misstep away from data spillage. Sensitive data should be storedencrypted to begin. For test databases you or your developers can invoke a process that replaces the real encrypteddata with fake encrypted data (for which everybody has the key/password.) Or if the overhead is too much (ie billionsof rows), you can have different decrypt() routines on your test databases that return fake data without touchingthe real encrypted columns. Kiriakos On Mar 19, 2012, at 8:22 AM, Bill Moran wrote: > In response to Janning Vygen <vygen@kicktipp.de>: >> >> I am working on postgresql 9.1 and loving it! >> >> Sometimes we need a full database dump to test some performance issues >> with real data. >> >> Of course we don't like to have sensible data like bunches of e-mail >> addresses on our development machines as they are of no interest for >> developers and should be kept secure. >> >> So we need an anonymized database dump. I thought about a few ways to >> achieve this. >> >> 1. Best solution would be a special db user and some rules which fire on >> reading some tables and replace privacy data with some random data. Now >> doing a dump as this special user doesn't even copy the sensible data at >> all. The user just has a different view on this database even when he >> calls pg_dump. >> >> But as rules are not fired on COPY it can't work, right? >> >> 2. The other solution I can think of is something like >> >> pg_dump | sed > pgdump_anon >> >> where 'sed' does a lot of magical replace operations on the content of >> the dump. I don't think this is going to work reliable. >> >> 3. More reliable would be to dump the database, restore it on a >> different server, run some sql script which randomize some data, and >> dump it again. hmm, seems to be the only reliable way so far. But it is >> no fun when dumping and restoring takes an hour. >> >> Does anybody has a better idea how to achieve an anonymized database dump? > > I highly recommend #3. It's how we do it where I work. > > At first it seems like a big, slow, complicated monster, but once you've > built the tools and have it running reliably it's very nice. Our system > does the dumps overnight via cron (we have over 100 production databases) > then changes the sensitive data, as well changing all the passwords to > "password" so developers can easily log in as any account. During the > day, the developers have access to all the sanitized dump files and can > use them to make as many testing databases as they need. Yes, the data > gets up to 24 hours out of date, but it's never been a problem for us. > > -- > Bill Moran > http://www.potentialtech.com > http://people.collaborativefusion.com/~wmoran/ > > -- > Sent via pgsql-general mailing list (pgsql-general@postgresql.org) > To make changes to your subscription: > http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-general
In response to Kiriakos Georgiou <kg.postgresql@olympiakos.com>: > The data anonymizer process is flawed because you are one misstep away from data spillage. In our case, it's only one layer. Other layers that exist: * The systems where this test data is instantiated can't send email * The systems where this exist have limited access (i.e., not all developers can access it, and it's not used for typical testing -- only for specific testing that requires production-like data) You are correct, however, in that there's always the danger of spillage if new sensitive data is added and the sanitation script is not properly updated. It's part of the ongoing overhead of maintaining such a system. > Sensitive data should be stored encrypted to begin. For test databases you or your developers can invoke a process thatreplaces the real encrypted data with fake encrypted data (for which everybody has the key/password.) Or if the overheadis too much (ie billions of rows), you can have different decrypt() routines on your test databases that return fakedata without touching the real encrypted columns. The thing is, this process has the same potential data spillage issues as sanitizing the data. I find it intriguing, however, and I'm going to see if there are places where this approach might have advantages over our current one. Since much of our sensitive data is already de-identified, it provides an additional level of protection on that level as well. -- Bill Moran http://www.potentialtech.com http://people.collaborativefusion.com/~wmoran/
On Mar 19, 2012, at 5:55 PM, Bill Moran wrote: > >> Sensitive data should be stored encrypted to begin. For test databases you or your developers can invoke a process thatreplaces the real encrypted data with fake encrypted data (for which everybody has the key/password.) Or if the overheadis too much (ie billions of rows), you can have different decrypt() routines on your test databases that return fakedata without touching the real encrypted columns. > > The thing is, this process has the same potential data spillage > issues as sanitizing the data. Not really, in the modality I describe the sensitive data is always encrypted in the database and "useless" because nobodywill have the private key or know the password that protects it other than the ops subsystems that require access. So even if you take an ops dump, load it to a test box, and walk away, you are good. If your developers/testers want toplay with the data they will be forced to over-write and "stage" test encrypted data they can decrypt, or call a "fake"decrypt() that gives them test data (eg: joins to a test data table.) Kiriakos