> On Jul 23, 2021, at 1:54 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Yeah, but you're inventing a system for allowing the restriction on a
> GUC to be something other than is-superuser in the very patch we're
> talking about. So it could be something like is-database-security.
> Therefore I don't grok the objection.
I'm not objecting to how hard it would be to implement. I'm objecting to the semantics. If the only non-superuser who
canset the GUC is pg_database_security, then it is absolutely worthless in preventing pg_database_security from
trappingactions performed by pg_network_security members. On the other hand, if pg_network_security can also set the
GUC,then pg_network_security can circumvent audit logging that pg_database_security put in place. What's the point in
havingthese as separate roles if they can circumvent each other's authority?
—
Mark Dilger
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
