Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Greg Stark
Subject Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check
Date
Msg-id CAM-w4HOQfcHvoZ0a7uh3ERuV25cjZJV9pT+qf--Q8TzEh6h=TA@mail.gmail.com
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In response to [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check  (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>)
Responses Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check  (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>)
Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
List pgsql-hackers
I tend to agree. But in the past when this came up people pointed out
you could equally do things this way and still grant all the access
you wanted using SECURITY DEFINER. Arguably that's a better approach
because then instead of auditing the entire monitor script you only
need to audit this one wrapper function, pg_ls_monitor_dir() which
just calls pg_ls_dir() on this one directory.



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