Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Stephen Frost
Subject Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check
Date
Msg-id 20170125190940.GM9812@tamriel.snowman.net
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [HACKERS] pg_ls_dir & friends still have a hard-coded superuser check  (Greg Stark <stark@mit.edu>)
List pgsql-hackers
Greg,

* Greg Stark (stark@mit.edu) wrote:
> I tend to agree. But in the past when this came up people pointed out
> you could equally do things this way and still grant all the access
> you wanted using SECURITY DEFINER. Arguably that's a better approach
> because then instead of auditing the entire monitor script you only
> need to audit this one wrapper function, pg_ls_monitor_dir() which
> just calls pg_ls_dir() on this one directory.

I'm not a fan of SECURITY DEFINER functions for this sort of thing and
don't like the suggestion of simply wrapping functions that provide
superuser-level access in a security definer function and then saying
that giving someone access to that function isn't giving them superuser,
because that's just false.

Thanks!

Stephen

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