Re: Row Level Security − leakproof-ness and performance implications - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Dean Rasheed
Subject Re: Row Level Security − leakproof-ness and performance implications
Date
Msg-id CAEZATCWWAmLCi-200msEEOj+0gT7+X0zGdnJLzVcQY-TqGcysA@mail.gmail.com
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In response to Re: Row Level Security − leakproof-ness and performance implications  (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>)
Responses Re: Row Level Security − leakproof-ness and performance implications  (Chapman Flack <chap@anastigmatix.net>)
List pgsql-hackers
On Thu, 28 Feb 2019 at 14:13, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
> A wild idea might be to let
> proleakproof take on three values: yes, no, and maybe.  When 'maybe'
> functions are involved, we tell them whether or not the current query
> involves any security barriers, and if so they self-censor.
>

Does self-censoring mean that they might still throw an error for some
inputs, but that error won't reveal any information about the input
values? That's not entirely consistent with my understanding of the
definition of leakproof, but maybe there are situations where that
amount of information leakage would be OK. So maybe we could have
"strictly leakproof" functions that never throw errors and "weakly
leakproof" functions (needs a better name) that can throw errors, as
long as those errors don't include data values. Then we could allow
strict and weak security barriers on a per-table basis, depending on
how sensitive the data is in each table (I'm not a fan of using GUCs
to control this).

Regards,
Dean


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