On 11 April 2013 18:15, Selena Deckelmann <selena@chesnok.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 8:05 AM, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 07:51:01AM -0700, Robert Bernier wrote:
>> > Comments?
>> >
>> > http://blog.blackwinghq.com/2013/04/08/2/
>>
>> It is interesting how they try to combine the write ability to a web
>> server or postgres .profile file; I find the .profile particularly
>> nasty.
>
>
> Yup. It's maybe an argument for chroot'ing the server to the $PGDATA
> directory. I realize that's probably not reasonable for stuff like
> extensions right now.
>
> Also, a related best practice is keeping track of all the files that are in
> home directories of privileged users with something like Puppet or Chef --
> so even if an attacker *does* overwrite a file like this, automation will
> wipe it out.
Couldn't you deny write-access to .profile to the postgres user?
--
Thom
