Re: Monitoring roles patch - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Dave Page
Subject Re: Monitoring roles patch
Date
Msg-id CA+OCxoyuW71uA8TqLpiOk33gB38fwZAUL=1L5wWcGCTu2SAiwg@mail.gmail.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Monitoring roles patch  (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>)
List pgsql-hackers
On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 4:24 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> If we make the users run all the statements individually then they'll
>> also have to get an updated script for the next version of PG too
>> because we will have added things that the tools will want access to.
>
> That's possible, but it really depends on the tool, not on core
> PostgreSQL.  The tool should be the one providing the script, because
> the tool is what knows its own permissions requirements.  Users who
> care about security won't want to grant every privilege given by a
> pg_monitor role to a tool that only needs a subset of those
> privileges.

The upshot of this would be that every time there's a database server
upgrade that changes the permissions required somehow, the user has to
login to every server they have and run a script. It is no longer a
one-time thing, which makes it vastly more painful to deal with
upgrades.

>> With the approach that Dave and I are advocating, we can avoid all of
>> that.  Contrib modules can bake-in GRANTs to the appropriate roles,
>> upgrades can be handled smoothly even when we add new capabilities which
>> are appropriate, users have a simple and straight-forward way to set up
>> good monitoring, and tool authors will know what permissions are
>> available and can finally have a better answer than "well, just make the
>> monior user superuser if you want to avoid all these complexities."
>
> They can have that anyway.  They just have to run a script provided by
> the tool rather than one provided by the core project as a
> one-size-fits-all solution for every tool.

Do you object to having individual default roles specifically for
cases where there are superuser-only checks at the moment that prevent
GRANT? e.g. pg_show_all_settings for SHOW, pg_show_all_stats for
pg_tablespace_size and friends, pg_stat_statements for, well,
pg_stat_statements and so on? It would be an inferior solution in my
opinion, given that it would demonstrably cause users more work, but
at least we could do something.

-- 
Dave Page
Blog: http://pgsnake.blogspot.com
Twitter: @pgsnake

EnterpriseDB UK: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company



pgsql-hackers by date:

Previous
From: Robert Haas
Date:
Subject: Re: parallel "return query" is no good
Next
From: Robert Haas
Date:
Subject: Re: BUG: pg_dump generates corrupted gzip file in Windows