Hi,
On 2023-02-22 09:18:34 -0800, Jeff Davis wrote:
> I can't resist mentioning that these are all SECURITY INVOKER problems.
> SECURITY INVOKER is insecure unless the invoker absolutely trusts the
> definer, and that only really makes sense if the definer is a superuser
> (or something very close). That's why we keep adding exceptions with
> SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION, which is really just a way to silently
> ignore the SECURITY INVOKER label and use SECURITY DEFINER instead.
>
> At some point we need to ask: "when is SECURITY INVOKER both safe and
> useful?" and contain it to those cases, rather than silently ignoring
> it in an expanding list of cases.
I can only repeat myself in stating that SECURITY DEFINER solves none of the
relevant issues. I included several examples of why it doesn't in the recent
thread about "blocking SECURITY INVOKER". E.g. that default arguments of
SECDEF functions are evaluated with the current user's privileges, not the
function owner's privs:
https://postgr.es/m/20230113032943.iyxdu7bnxe4cmbld%40awork3.anarazel.de
Greetings,
Andres Freund
