Re: Key management with tests - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Stephen Frost
Subject Re: Key management with tests
Date
Msg-id 20210111175449.GR27507@tamriel.snowman.net
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Key management with tests  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
Responses Re: Key management with tests  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
List pgsql-hackers
Greetings,

* Bruce Momjian (bruce@momjian.us) wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2021 at 08:12:00PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
> > Looking at the patch, it supports three algorithms but only
> > PG_CIPHER_AES_KWP is used in the core for now:
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Supported symmetric encryption algorithm. These identifiers are passed
> > + * to pg_cipher_ctx_create() function, and then actual encryption
> > + * implementations need to initialize their context of the given encryption
> > + * algorithm.
> > + */
> > +#define PG_CIPHER_AES_GCM          0
> > +#define PG_CIPHER_AES_KW           1
> > +#define PG_CIPHER_AES_KWP          2
> > +#define PG_MAX_CIPHER_ID           3
> >
> > Are we in the process of experimenting which algorithms are better? If
> > we support one algorithm that is actually used in the core, we would
> > reduce the tests as well.
>
> I think we are only using KWP (Key Wrap with Padding) because that is
> for wrapping keys:
>
>     https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/mac/KWVS.pdf

Yes.

> I am not sure about KW.  I think we are using GCM for the WAP/heap/index
> pages.  Stephen would know more.

KW was more-or-less 'for free' and there were tests for it, which is why
it was included.  Yes, GCM would be for WAL/heap/index pages, it
wouldn't be appropriate to use KW or KWP for that.  Using KW/KWP for the
key wrapping also makes the API simpler- and therefore easier for other
implementations to be written which provide the same API.

> > FWIW, I've written a PoC patch for buffer encryption to make sure the
> > kms patch would be workable with other components using the encryption
> > key managed by kmgr.
>
> Wow, it is a small patch --- nice.

I agree that the actual encryption patch, for just the main heap/index,
won't be too bad.  The larger part will be dealing with all of the
temporary files we create that have user data in them...  I've been
contemplating a way to try and make that part of the patch smaller
though and hopefully that will bear fruit and we can avoid having to
change a lof of, eg, reorderbuffer.c and pgstat.c.

There's a few places where we need to be sure to be updating the LSN for
both logged and unlogged relations properly, including dealing with
things like the magic GIST "GistBuildLSN" fake-LSN too, and we will
absolutely need to have a bit used in the IV to distinguish if it's a
real LSN or an unlogged LSN.

Although, another approach and one that I've discussed a bit with Bruce,
is to have more keys- such as a key for temporary files, and perhaps
even a key for logged relations and a different for unlogged..  Or
perhaps sets of keys for each which automatically are rotating every X
number of GB based on the LSN...  Which is a big part of why key
management is such an important part of this effort.

Thanks,

Stephen

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