Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Stephen Frost
Subject Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Date
Msg-id 20190710195623.GV29202@tamriel.snowman.net
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>)
List pgsql-hackers
Greetings,

* Alvaro Herrera (alvherre@2ndquadrant.com) wrote:
> On 2019-Jul-10, Bruce Momjian wrote:
>
> > Good, so I think we all now agree we have to put the nonce
> > (pg_class.oid, LSN, page-number) though the cipher using the secret.
>
> Actually, why do you need the page number in the nonce?  The LSN already
> distinguishes pages -- you can't have two pages with the same LSN, can
> you?  (I do think you can have multiple writes of the same page with
> different LSNs, if you change hint bits and don't write WAL about it,
> but maybe we should force CRC enabled in encrypted tables, which I think
> closes this hole?)

The point about the LSN not changing is definitely a very good one..  I
agree that we should require checksums to deal with that possibility.

Thanks,

Stephen

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