On Sun, Sep 02, 2012 at 11:34:42PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> writes:
> > On 03.09.2012 03:23, Tom Lane wrote:
> >> 1. As you can see above, the feature is triggered by specifying the new
> >> connection option "standalone_datadir", whose value must be the location
> >> of the data directory. I also invented an option "standalone_backend",
> >> which can be set to specify which postgres executable to launch.
>
> > Are there security issues with this? If a user can specify libpq
> > connection options, he can now execute any file he wants by passing it
> > as standalone_backend. Granted, you shouldn't allow an untrusted user to
> > specify libpq connection options, because allowing to open a TCP
> > connection to an arbitrary address can be a problem by itself, but it
> > seems like this might make the situation much worse. contrib/dblink
> > springs to mind..
>
> Hmm, that's a good point. Maybe we should only allow the executable
> name to come from an environment variable? Seems kinda klugy though.
I don't think it's libpq's job to enforce security policy this way. In any
event, it has no reason to presume an environment variable is a safer source.
> >> 3. The bulk of the changes have to do with the fact that we need to keep
> >> track of two file descriptors not one.
>
> > Would socketpair(2) be simpler?
>
> Hm, yes, but is it portable enough? It seems to be required by SUS v2,
> so we're likely okay on the Unix side, but does Windows have this?
Windows does not have socketpair(), nor a strict pipe() equivalent. I expect
switching to socketpair() makes the Windows side trickier in some ways and
simpler in others. +1 for exploring that direction first.
