Re: XTS cipher mode for cluster file encryption - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Sasasu
Subject Re: XTS cipher mode for cluster file encryption
Date
Msg-id 01cc0870-5526-de25-7ab5-55247f7cfca6@sasa.su
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: XTS cipher mode for cluster file encryption  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
Responses Re: XTS cipher mode for cluster file encryption  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
List pgsql-hackers
On 2021/10/16 04:57, Tomas Vondra wrote:
 >
 > Seems reasonable, on the assumption the threat models are the same.

On 2021/10/16 03:22, Stephen Frost wrote:
> plain64: the initial vector is the 64-bit little-endian version of the
> sector number, padded with zeros if necessary
> 
> That is, the default for LUKS is AES, XTS, with a simple IV.  That
> strikes me as a pretty ringing endorsement
On 2021/10/18 05:23, Tomas Vondra wrote:
 >
 > AFAICS the threat model the patch aims to address is an attacker who can
 > observe the data (e.g. a low-privileged OS user), but can't modify the
 > files. Which seems like a reasonable model for shared environments.

I agree this threat model.

And if PostgreSQL is using XTS, there is no different with dm-encrypt.
The user can use dm-encrypt directly.

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