Thread: FW: [ppa-dev] Severe bug in debian - phppgadmin opens up databases for anyone!
FW: [ppa-dev] Severe bug in debian - phppgadmin opens up databases for anyone!
From
"Christopher Kings-Lynne"
Date:
Hi guys, This came across the phpPgAdmin list, and I'm reposting it here in case it is actually true...? If it is, is it a Postgres or a Debian package issue? Chris -----Original Message----- From: phppgadmin-devel-admin@lists.sourceforge.net [mailto:phppgadmin-devel-admin@lists.sourceforge.net]On Behalf Of Guilherme Barile Sent: Wednesday, 28 November 2001 3:58 AM To: phpPgAdmin-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: [ppa-dev] Severe bug in debian - phppgadmin opens up databases for anyone! Debian comes with a severe configuration fault in postgresql ... in pg_hba.conf, it uses TRUST as the default authentication method (from localhost) ... as phpPgAdmin runs on localhost, anyone can login without a password. There are DOZENS of sites out there running without any security! And this is terrible! If I weren't a very nice person and simply didn't change anything (I could, as postgres is superuser and I can log as it). Here's how to fix it (on debian, don't know if any other distribution is affected): log in as postgres run psql check the pg_shadow table (SELECT * FROM pg_shadow;) see if everyone has a password (especially user postgres) After setting all the passwords, edit /etc/postgres/pg_hba.conf to match the following lines: local all password host all 127.0.0.1 255.0.0.0 password Then it will require a password. Also, If you wish to block connections from the internet, add this also: host all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 reject Please put this on the page or together with PhpPgAdmin's documentation. (Search google.com with "phppgadmin local:5432" and check for yourself ... login as postgres and type anything as password!) Thank you very much for your attention (Please be kind and reply) Guilherme Barile Infoage Web Solutions Sao Paulo - SP - Brazil
This is a known problem. I just updated the documentation today to stress that local users have full access to any database by default, and that initdb -W and changing pg_hba.conf to password/md5 are the best ways to fix this. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Hi guys, > > This came across the phpPgAdmin list, and I'm reposting it here in case it > is actually true...? If it is, is it a Postgres or a Debian package issue? > > Chris > > -----Original Message----- > From: phppgadmin-devel-admin@lists.sourceforge.net > [mailto:phppgadmin-devel-admin@lists.sourceforge.net]On Behalf Of Guilherme > Barile > Sent: Wednesday, 28 November 2001 3:58 AM > To: phpPgAdmin-devel@lists.sourceforge.net > Subject: [ppa-dev] Severe bug in debian - phppgadmin opens up databases for > anyone! > > > Debian comes with a severe configuration fault in postgresql ... in > pg_hba.conf, it uses TRUST as the default authentication method (from > localhost) ... as phpPgAdmin runs on localhost, anyone can login without a > password. > > There are DOZENS of sites out there running without any security! And this > is terrible! If I weren't a very nice person and simply didn't change > anything (I could, as postgres is superuser and I can log as it). > Here's how to fix it (on debian, don't know if any other distribution is > affected): > log in as postgres > run psql > check the pg_shadow table (SELECT * FROM pg_shadow;) > see if everyone has a password (especially user postgres) > > After setting all the passwords, edit /etc/postgres/pg_hba.conf to match the > following lines: > > local all password > host all 127.0.0.1 255.0.0.0 password > > Then it will require a password. > Also, If you wish to block connections from the internet, add this also: > > host all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 reject > > Please put this on the page or together with PhpPgAdmin's documentation. > (Search google.com with "phppgadmin local:5432" and check for yourself ... > login as postgres and type anything as password!) > > > Thank you very much for your attention (Please be kind and reply) > > Guilherme Barile > Infoage Web Solutions > Sao Paulo - SP - Brazil > > > ---------------------------(end of broadcast)--------------------------- > TIP 2: you can get off all lists at once with the unregister command > (send "unregister YourEmailAddressHere" to majordomo@postgresql.org) > -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Re: FW: [ppa-dev] Severe bug in debian - phppgadmin opens up databases for anyone!
From
Tom Lane
Date:
"Christopher Kings-Lynne" <chriskl@familyhealth.com.au> writes:
> This came across the phpPgAdmin list, and I'm reposting it here in case it
> is actually true...? If it is, is it a Postgres or a Debian package issue?
The default installation is indeed insecure with respect to other local
users; you don't want to use TRUST auth method on a multi-user box. We
need to document that more prominently. But the default install is not
insecure w.r.t. to outside connections, because it doesn't allow any.
In particular, this advice is horsepucky:
> Also, If you wish to block connections from the internet, add this also:
> host all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 reject
because that will happen anyway.
regards, tom lane
> "Christopher Kings-Lynne" <chriskl@familyhealth.com.au> writes: > > This came across the phpPgAdmin list, and I'm reposting it here in case it > > is actually true...? If it is, is it a Postgres or a Debian package issue? > > The default installation is indeed insecure with respect to other local > users; you don't want to use TRUST auth method on a multi-user box. We > need to document that more prominently. But the default install is not > insecure w.r.t. to outside connections, because it doesn't allow any. > In particular, this advice is horsepucky: Let me tell you what bothers me about our default install. If some software installed all its data files in a world-writable directory, we would consider it a security hole. But because we are Internet-enabled, and because our insecurity is only local, it seems OK to people. I am not sure about a solution, but I am shocked we haven't been beaten up about this more often. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Re: FW: [ppa-dev] Severe bug in debian - phppgadmin opens up databases for anyone!
From
Tom Lane
Date:
Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes:
> ... But because we are Internet-enabled,
> and because our insecurity is only local, it seems OK to people.
It's not that it's "okay", it's that we haven't got any good
alternatives. Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view
(or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget
the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a
script *cannot* supply a password to psql). Ident auth doesn't work,
or isn't secure, in a lot of cases. Kerberos, well, not a lot to
offer there either. What else do you want to make the default?
regards, tom lane
At 01:08 AM 11/28/01 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: >Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: >> ... But because we are Internet-enabled, >> and because our insecurity is only local, it seems OK to people. > >It's not that it's "okay", it's that we haven't got any good >alternatives. Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view >(or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget >the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a >script *cannot* supply a password to psql). Ident auth doesn't work, > Ack. We can't send in passwords to psql anymore? :( Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql? Cheerio, Link.
Lincoln Yeoh wrote: > > At 01:08 AM 11/28/01 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: > >Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > >> ... But because we are Internet-enabled, > >> and because our insecurity is only local, it seems OK to people. > > > >It's not that it's "okay", it's that we haven't got any good > >alternatives. Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view > >(or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget > >the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a > >script *cannot* supply a password to psql). Ident auth doesn't work, > > > > Ack. We can't send in passwords to psql anymore? :( > > Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql? smbclient does it via a file which must be 0600, but I don't know if psql has anything like that. ----------- Hannu
Lincoln Yeoh <lyeoh@pop.jaring.my> writes:
> At 01:08 AM 11/28/01 -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
>> ... Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view
>> (or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget
>> the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a
>> script *cannot* supply a password to psql).
> Ack. We can't send in passwords to psql anymore? :(
Well, Bruce, you were the one that was hot to make that /dev/tty change.
Time to defend it.
> Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql?
If you want to put those things in a script, you could still do
export PGUSER=whateverexport PGPASSWORD=whateverpsql ...
This would actually work a lot better than other ways for cases such
as doing pg_dumpall, where you'd otherwise need to supply the password
multiple times.
regards, tom lane
Doug McNaught <doug@wireboard.com> writes:
> But this way the password ends up in the environment, which on many
> systems is visible to other processes/users (via /proc or the 'ps'
> command).
Your *environment* is visible to other users? Geez, what a broken
system ...
regards, tom lane
Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> writes: > > Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql? > > If you want to put those things in a script, you could still do > > export PGUSER=whatever > export PGPASSWORD=whatever > psql ... But this way the password ends up in the environment, which on many systems is visible to other processes/users (via /proc or the 'ps' command). Might as well use "trust"... -Doug -- Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees. --T. J. Jackson, 1863
Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> writes: > Doug McNaught <doug@wireboard.com> writes: > > But this way the password ends up in the environment, which on many > > systems is visible to other processes/users (via /proc or the 'ps' > > command). > > Your *environment* is visible to other users? Geez, what a broken > system ... True on Solaris (/usr/ucb/ps -eax) at least. Other systems too I'm pretty sure. I thought that Linux let you do it but I just checked and /proc/<pid>/environ is mode 0400... -Doug -- Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees. --T. J. Jackson, 1863
> At 01:08 AM 11/28/01 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: > >Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > >> ... But because we are Internet-enabled, > >> and because our insecurity is only local, it seems OK to people. > > > >It's not that it's "okay", it's that we haven't got any good > >alternatives. Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view > >(or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget > >the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a > >script *cannot* supply a password to psql). Ident auth doesn't work, > > > > Ack. We can't send in passwords to psql anymore? :( > > Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql? The standard way I know of is to use 'expect' and wrap your psql call around that. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes:
>> Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql?
> The standard way I know of is to use 'expect' and wrap your psql call
> around that.
Didn't you break that by making psql read the password from /dev/tty?
Or can 'expect' take control of /dev/tty?
regards, tom lane
> Lincoln Yeoh <lyeoh@pop.jaring.my> writes: > > At 01:08 AM 11/28/01 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: > >> ... Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view > >> (or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget > >> the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a > >> script *cannot* supply a password to psql). > > > Ack. We can't send in passwords to psql anymore? :( > > Well, Bruce, you were the one that was hot to make that /dev/tty change. > Time to defend it. Hey, if people want it back, it is easy to do. My only goal was to make psql consistent with other applications that require passwords. > > Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql? > > If you want to put those things in a script, you could still do > > export PGUSER=whatever > export PGPASSWORD=whatever > psql ... > > This would actually work a lot better than other ways for cases such > as doing pg_dumpall, where you'd otherwise need to supply the password > multiple times. What about 'ps -e' that shows all environment variables? This is in some ways worse than piping the password into psql. At least there was some chance that they were using 'cat' from a file with the proper permissions. WIth PGPASSWORD, there is no way to restrict who can see it via 'ps -e'. Seems we shouldn't allow PGPASSWORD either. The idea of allowing the password to be stored in a file with 600 permissions seems quite standard. CVS does this. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
> Lincoln Yeoh <lyeoh@pop.jaring.my> writes: > > At 01:08 AM 11/28/01 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: > >> ... Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view > >> (or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget > >> the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a > >> script *cannot* supply a password to psql). > > > Ack. We can't send in passwords to psql anymore? :( > > Well, Bruce, you were the one that was hot to make that /dev/tty change. > Time to defend it. OK, I remember now. The issue was how to handle:cat file | psql test In previous releases, you _had_ to have the password as the first line in file. In the current code, if you are running from a terminal, you supply the password from the keyboard. If you are running from a batch job that has no terminal (/dev/tty), you must have the password as the first line in the file. People were complaining about the old behavior. I modeled the changes after the BSD getpass(), which I assume is the standard behavior on most unixes. It would be nice to extend .psqlrc to allow storage of passwords, but that is only read by psql and not by all libpq applications. Not sure how to handle this. I will document the security problem with PGPASSWORD and add a TODO item to remove it in 7.3. Is that OK with everyone? -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes:
> I will document the security problem with PGPASSWORD and add a TODO item
> to remove it in 7.3. Is that OK with everyone?
I don't think we should remove it. Documenting that using it is a
security risk on some platforms seems a good idea, however.
regards, tom lane
> Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > > I will document the security problem with PGPASSWORD and add a TODO item > > to remove it in 7.3. Is that OK with everyone? > > I don't think we should remove it. Documenting that using it is a > security risk on some platforms seems a good idea, however. OK, new text is: <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar>sets the password used if the backend demands passwordauthentication. This is not recommended becausethe password canbe read by others using <command>ps -e</command>. I am unsure if Linux has this problem but it seems most other Unix's do. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes:
> The idea of allowing the password to be stored in a file with 600
> permissions seems quite standard. CVS does this.
Seems it would be nice if psql could accept a switch along the lines of--password-is-in-file filename
and go off to read the password from the named file (which we hope is
secured correctly).
Or take it a little further: what about defining a PGPASSWORDFILE
environment variable that libpq would consult, before or instead of
PGPASSWORD? That would give us the same feature for free across all
libpq-using apps, not only psql. Exposing a file name in the
environment is not a security risk, I hope.
regards, tom lane
> Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > > The idea of allowing the password to be stored in a file with 600 > > permissions seems quite standard. CVS does this. > > Seems it would be nice if psql could accept a switch along the lines of > --password-is-in-file filename > and go off to read the password from the named file (which we hope is > secured correctly). We can check security of the file if we wish. > Or take it a little further: what about defining a PGPASSWORDFILE > environment variable that libpq would consult, before or instead of > PGPASSWORD? That would give us the same feature for free across all > libpq-using apps, not only psql. Exposing a file name in the > environment is not a security risk, I hope. Yes, seems like a good idea. Seems we may need both. Either we allow multiple host/password combinations in the file or we need a psql flag, but then again, a psql flag doesn't cover the other interfaces. We could require they use one password file per host. Added to TODO: * Add PGPASSWORDFILE password file capability to libpq and psql flag -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > OK, new text is: > > <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar> > sets the password used if the backend demands password > authentication. This is not recommended because the password can > be read by others using <command>ps -e</command>. Just a nit--the 'e' option is for Berkeley-style ps (/usr/ucb/ps on Solaris). SysV ps doesn't have an equivalent from what I can see, (though I may have missed it) and '-e' does something totally different. > I am unsure if Linux has this problem but it seems most other Unix's do. Modern versions (of Linux) don't seem to--you can see the env for your processes but not for others'. -Doug -- Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees. --T. J. Jackson, 1863
> Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > > > OK, new text is: > > > > <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar> > > sets the password used if the backend demands password > > authentication. This is not recommended because the password can > > be read by others using <command>ps -e</command>. > > Just a nit--the 'e' option is for Berkeley-style ps (/usr/ucb/ps on > Solaris). SysV ps doesn't have an equivalent from what I can see, > (though I may have missed it) and '-e' does something totally > different. Yes, I debated that one. I wanted to mention the environment issue without being verbose. I believe 'ps e', without the dash, does show environment, doesn't it? > > > I am unsure if Linux has this problem but it seems most other Unix's do. > > Modern versions (of Linux) don't seem to--you can see the env for your > processes but not for others'. If Linux doesn't have this problem, I should mention it is a problem on _some_ platforms. New text is: <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar>sets the password used if the backend demands passwordauthentication. This is not recommended becausethe password canbe read by others using <command>ps e</command> on someplatforms. I am glad to continue revising it until we are all happy. I throw these texts out so people can make comments and improve upon it. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Tom Lane writes: > It's not that it's "okay", it's that we haven't got any good > alternatives. Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view > (or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget > the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a > script *cannot* supply a password to psql). Ident auth doesn't work, > or isn't secure, in a lot of cases. Kerberos, well, not a lot to > offer there either. What else do you want to make the default? unix_socket_permissions = 0700 -- Peter Eisentraut peter_e@gmx.net
> Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > > > OK, new text is: > > > > <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar> > > sets the password used if the backend demands password > > authentication. This is not recommended because the password can > > be read by others using <command>ps -e</command>. > > Just a nit--the 'e' option is for Berkeley-style ps (/usr/ucb/ps on > Solaris). SysV ps doesn't have an equivalent from what I can see, > (though I may have missed it) and '-e' does something totally > different. OK, I reread what you said and I see now I am not going to get away with being brief. Text is now: <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar>sets the password used if the backend demands passwordauthentication. This is not recommended becausethe password canbe read by others using a <command>ps</command> environment flagon some platforms. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
> Tom Lane writes: > > > It's not that it's "okay", it's that we haven't got any good > > alternatives. Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view > > (or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget > > the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a > > script *cannot* supply a password to psql). Ident auth doesn't work, > > or isn't secure, in a lot of cases. Kerberos, well, not a lot to > > offer there either. What else do you want to make the default? > > unix_socket_permissions = 0700 Interesting. This means only the super-user can connect. Hmm, seems like an interesting idea. You have to _open_ up the database to other users on your local system. If you are running a server, you are the only person so there is no downside. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
Bruce Momjian writes: > OK, new text is: > > <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar> > sets the password used if the backend demands password > authentication. This is not recommended because the password can > be read by others using <command>ps -e</command>. > > I am unsure if Linux has this problem but it seems most other Unix's do. Please qualify "most". -- Peter Eisentraut peter_e@gmx.net
Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > OK, I reread what you said and I see now I am not going to get away with > being brief. Text is now: > > <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar> > sets the password used if the backend demands password > authentication. This is not recommended because the password can > be read by others using a <command>ps</command> environment flag > on some platforms. Looks good to me. I think the 'ps' options are the most annoying difference between SysV and BSD Unices. Linux 'ps' tries to be both by acting BSDish if you supply options without a dash, and SysVish if you use one. Ambitious, but it's bitten me once or twice... -Doug -- Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees. --T. J. Jackson, 1863
> Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > > > OK, I reread what you said and I see now I am not going to get away with > > being brief. Text is now: > > > > <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar> > > sets the password used if the backend demands password > > authentication. This is not recommended because the password can > > be read by others using a <command>ps</command> environment flag > > on some platforms. > > Looks good to me. I think the 'ps' options are the most annoying > difference between SysV and BSD Unices. Linux 'ps' tries to be both > by acting BSDish if you supply options without a dash, and SysVish if > you use one. Ambitious, but it's bitten me once or twice... I dealt with this in pgmonitor. Got it working by trying different combinations and checking the result. -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026
On Wed, 28 Nov 2001, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > > > > > OK, new text is: > > > > > > <envar>PGPASSWORD</envar> > > > sets the password used if the backend demands password > > > authentication. This is not recommended because the password can > > > be read by others using <command>ps -e</command>. > > > > Just a nit--the 'e' option is for Berkeley-style ps (/usr/ucb/ps on > > Solaris). SysV ps doesn't have an equivalent from what I can see, > > (though I may have missed it) and '-e' does something totally > > different. > > Yes, I debated that one. I wanted to mention the environment issue > without being verbose. I believe 'ps e', without the dash, does show > environment, doesn't it? Some OSs, I know AIX for example, use SysV options if you have a dash, and BSD options if you don't. So ps -e does the SysV -e option, while ps e does the BSD -e option. Take care, Bill
On Wed, 28 Nov 2001, Tom Lane wrote: > >> Is there a safe way to send username and password to psql? > > > The standard way I know of is to use 'expect' and wrap your psql call > > around that. > > Didn't you break that by making psql read the password from /dev/tty? > Or can 'expect' take control of /dev/tty? Expect sets up a pty: $ tty /dev/pts/6 $ cat script.exp spawn tty expect eof $ expect -f script.exp spawn tty /dev/pts/5 Matthew.
> Tom Lane writes: > > > It's not that it's "okay", it's that we haven't got any good > > alternatives. Password auth sucks from a convenience point of view > > (or even from a possibility point of view, for scripts; don't forget > > the changes that you yourself recently applied to guarantee that a > > script *cannot* supply a password to psql). Ident auth doesn't work, > > or isn't secure, in a lot of cases. Kerberos, well, not a lot to > > offer there either. What else do you want to make the default? > > unix_socket_permissions = 0700 Added to TODO: * Allow secure single-user use without passwords using Unix socket permissions -- Bruce Momjian | http://candle.pha.pa.us pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610) 853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania19026