On 6/15/19 9:28 PM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 02:27:17PM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
>> On 6/13/19 11:07 AM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
>> > On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 04:26:47PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
>> >> Yeah, in principle since data key of 2 tier key architecture should
>> >> not go outside database I think we should not tell data keys to
>> >> utility commands. So the rearranging WAL format seems to be a better
>> >> solution but is there any reason why the main data is placed at end of
>> >> WAL record? I wonder if we can assemble WAL records as following order
>> >> and encrypt only 3 and 4.
>> >>
>> >> 1. Header data (XLogRecord and other headers)
>> >> 2. Main data (xl_heap_insert, xl_heap_update etc + related data)
>> >> 3. Block data (Tuple data, FPI)
>> >> 4. Sub data (e.g tuple data for logical decoding)
>> >
>> > Yes, that does sound like a reasonable idea. It is similar to us not
>> > encrypting the clog --- there is little value. However, if we only
>> > encrypt the cluster, we don't need to expose the relfilenode and we can
>> > just encrypt the entire WAL --- I like that simplicity. We might find
>> > that the complexity of encrypting only certain tablespaces makes the
>> > system slower than just encrypting the entire cluster.
>>
>>
>> There are reasons other than performance to want more granular than
>> entire cluster encryption. Limiting the volume of encrypted data with
>> any one key for example. And not encrypting #1 & 2 above would help
>> avoid known-plaintext attacks I would think.
>
> There are no known non-exhaustive plaintext attacks on AES:
>
> https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1512/why-is-aes-resistant-to-known-plaintext-attacks
Even that non-authoritative stackexchange thread has varying opinions.
Surely you don't claim that limiting know plaintext as much as is
practical is a bad idea in general.
> Even if we don't encrypt the first part of the WAL record (1 & 2), the
> block data (3) probably has enough format for a plaintext attack.
Perhaps.
In any case it doesn't address my first point, which is limiting the
volume encrypted with the same key. Another valid reason is you might
have data at varying sensitivity levels and prefer different keys be
used for each level.
And although I'm not proposing this for the first implementation, yet
another reason is I might want to additionally control "transparent
access" to data based on who is logged in. That could be done by
layering an additional key on top of the per-tablespace key for example.
The bottom line in my mind is encrypting the entire database with a
single key is not much different/better than using filesystem
encryption, so I'm not sure it is worth the effort and complexity to get
that capability. I think having the ability to encrypt at the tablespace
level adds a lot of capability for minimal extra complexity.
Joe
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