Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Peter Eisentraut
Subject Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack
Date
Msg-id b0bed5b2-2ab7-764e-437d-613d5094294f@2ndquadrant.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack  (Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>)
Responses Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
List pgsql-hackers
On 23/05/2018 08:46, Heikki Linnakangas wrote:
> "tls-unique" and "tls-server-end-point" are overly technical to users. 
> They don't care which one is used, there's no difference in security. 

A question was raised about this in a recent user group meeting.

When someone steals the server certificate from the real database server
and sets up a MITM with that certificate, this would pass
tls-server-end-point channel binding, because both the MITM and the real
server have the same certificate.  But with tls-unique they would have
different channel binding data, so the channel binding would detect this.

Is that not correct?

-- 
Peter Eisentraut              http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services


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