On Wed, Mar 8, 2023 at 04:25:04PM -0500, Stephen Frost wrote:
> Agreed, though the latest efforts include an option for *authenticated*
> encryption as well as unauthenticated. That makes it much more
> difficult to make undetected changes to the data that's protected by
> the authenticated encryption being used.
I thought some more about this. GCM-style authentication of encrypted
data has value because it assumes the two end points are secure but that
a malicious actor could modify data during transfer. In the Postgres
case, it seems the two end points and the transfer are all in the same
place. Therefore, it is unclear to me the value of using GCM-style
authentication because if the GCM-level can be modified, so can the end
points, and the encryption key exposed.
> There's clearly user demand for it as there's a number of organizations
> who have forks which are providing it in one shape or another. This
> kind of splintering of the community is actually an actively bad thing
> for the project and is part of what killed Unix, by at least some pretty
> reputable accounts, in my view.
Yes, the number of commercial implementations of this is a concern. Of
course, it is also possible that those commercial implementations are
meeting checkbox requirements rather than technical ones, and the
community has been hostile to check box-only features.
> Certainly agree with you there though there's an overall trajectory of
> patches involved in all of this that's a bit deep. The plan is to
> discuss that at PGCon (On the Road to TDE) and at the PGCon
> Unconference after. I certainly hope those interested will be there.
> I'm also happy to have a call with anyone interested in this effort
> independent of that, of course.
I will not be attending Ottawa.
--
Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> https://momjian.us
EDB https://enterprisedb.com
Embrace your flaws. They make you human, rather than perfect,
which you will never be.
