Greetings,
* Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
> Pavel Borisov <pashkin.elfe@gmail.com> writes:
> > Regarding the fact that using weak passwords isn't limited, I think
> > anyone can write an extension that limits (or advises against) weak
> > passwords based on the author's definition of weakness, like checking
> > by dictionary or so. That's the power of Postgres extensibility. I
> > don't like an idea that Postgres core should enforce some arbitrary
> > things like "weakness".
>
> It's less easy than it sounds, actually, because current best practice
> is that the server will never see the cleartext password at all, so
> you can't apply the usual litany of weak-password checks. About all
> you can do is apply a brute force rainbow attack, which is far from
> cheap (although I guess the DBA could run such checks in the background).
> Even that might be rendered infeasible if the password is stored as
> a SCRAM verifier; I'm not sure about that. Anyway, this is why
> contrib/passwordcheck is a development backwater rather than something
> people actually use.
For better or worse, people do actually use it and it would be much
better if we'd actually allow some effort to be put into improving this
situation. I'm all for better choices of authentication methods, but
that simply isn't always an option and there are cases where DBAs have
to be able to require passwords on select accounts be set via cleartext
to allow passwordcheck and similar tools to enforce password complexity
requirements.
Pushing back against that means fewer folks will use PostgreSQL because
it isn't able to reasonably address this requirement (unlike most of the
other databases out there..), and that's unfortunate.
Thanks,
Stephen
