On Thu, Apr 24, 2025 at 3:16 PM Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl> wrote:
> Why is this dangerous? As long as we'd validate that the provided cert
> by the server is for example.com
I can't help but read this as "as long as everyone mitigates the
danger, what's the danger?" We won't be the only implementers of any
URL schemes we introduce.
> I don't see any security problem in
> having DNS resolution happen for evil.com, nor in having the IP
> addresses hardcoded using hostaddr.
I think if we introduce a new scheme with the idea that it's "HTTPS
mode", it needs to behave very similarly to HTTPS, so people reason
about it correctly in worst-case corner cases.
To attack an https:// connection, you need to both steal the server
key _and_ get the client to talk to you instead of the real server.
And for HTTPS, that second part generally requires hijacking DNS or
mounting a successful MITM, not modifying the query.
The idea of a query string overriding the //authority is... weird. It
breaks the conventions of generic parsers (and I will include "humans"
in that group). We're "allowed" to do it, I guess -- it's our scheme,
we do it with our existing schemes today, and the IETF isn't going to
send spec police to our doors -- but I don't think we should.
Thanks,
--Jacob
