On Mon, 11 Oct 2021 at 22:15, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote:
> Yes, that's the direction that I was thinking also and specifically with > XTS as the encryption algorithm to allow us to exclude the LSN but keep > everything else, and to address the concern around the nonce/tweak/etc > being the same sometimes across multiple writes. Another thing to > consider is if we want to encrypt zero'd page. There was a point > brought up that if we do then we are encrypting a fair bit of very > predictable bytes and that's not great (though there's a fair bit about > our pages that someone could quite possibly predict anyway based on > table structures and such...). I would think that if it's easy enough > to not encrypt zero'd pages that we should avoid doing so. Don't recall > offhand which way zero'd pages were being handled already but thought it > made sense to mention that as part of this discussion.
Yeah, I wanted to mention that. I don't see any security difference between fully-zero pages, pages with headers and no tuples, and pages with headers and only a few tuples. If any of those are insecure, they all are. Therefore, I don't see any reason to treat them differently.
We had to special case zero pages and not encrypt them because as far as I can tell, there is no atomic way to extend a file and initialize it to Enc(zero) in the same step.
