Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Ryan Lambert
Subject Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Date
Msg-id CAN-V+g8fCt7OKafNUvBRSevERxt0u1LXJUUh5YwfPyU+6Aa7DA@mail.gmail.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@2ndquadrant.com>)
Responses Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
List pgsql-hackers

what is it that gets stored in the page for
decryption use, the nonce or the IV derived from it?

I believe storing the IV is preferable and still secure per [1]: "The IV need not be secret"

Beyond needing the database oid, if every decrypt function has to regenerate the IV from the nonce that will affect performance.  I don't know how expensive the forward hash is but it won't be free.




Ryan Lambert

 

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