On Tue, Nov 8, 2022 at 5:16 PM Bryn Llewellyn <bryn@yugabyte.com> wrote:
Is there anything that can be done to limit the scope of the ability to end up in a database like I'd thought would be possible? (A little test showed me that "set role" doesn't fire an event trigger.)
I do see that, as far as I've taken this test, "d2$mgr" is entirely impotent when the "current_database()" is "d1". Is this, maybe, just as good as it gets. I suppose I can live with what seems to me to be very odd as long as no harm can come of it.
Yes. In short, you can prevent a person from connecting to specific databases by ensuring the credentials they hold only resolve successfully on those specific databases. Both via connect privilege and pg_hba.conf can this be done. But that person, while connected to any databases, can assume any roles the user name of the credentials they used are a member of. Whether that is actually useful or not depends upon grants. But in no case can you prevent them from, say, examining the database catalog tables, or executing at least some limited SQL.
