On Mon, Jul 29, 2019 at 6:42 AM Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com> wrote:
> > An argument could be made to push that problem upstream, i.e. let the
> > supplier of the passphrase deal with the indirection. You would still
> > need to verify the supplied passphrase/key is correct via something
> > like authenticating against a stored MAC.
>
> So do we need the key for MAC of passphrase/key in order to verify?
Yes. Any 128 or 256-bit value is a valid AES key and any 16-byte input
can be "decrypted" with it in both CTR and CBC mode, you'll just end
up with garbage data if the key does not match. Verification of the
key prior to usage (i.e. starting DB and encrypting/decrypting data)
is a must as otherwise you'll end up with all kinds of corruption or
data loss.
From a single user supplied passphrase you would derive the MDEK and
compute a MAC (either using the same key or via a separate derived
MDEK-MAC key). If the computed MAC matches against the previously
stored value then you know the MDEK is correct as well.
Regards,
-- Sehrope Sarkuni
Founder & CEO | JackDB, Inc. | https://www.jackdb.com/
