On Mon, 13 May 2024 at 13:07, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> wrote:
> "channel_binding=require sslmode=require" also protects from MITM attacks.
Cool, I didn't realize we had this connection option and it could be
used like this. But I think there's a few security downsides of
channel_binding=require over sslmode=verify-full: If the client relies
on channel_binding to validate server authenticity, a leaked
server-side SCRAM hash is enough for an attacker to impersonate a
server. While normally a leaked scram hash isn't really much of a
security concern (assuming long enough passwords). I also don't know
of many people rotating their scram hashes, even though many rotate
TLS certs.
> I think these options should be designed from the user's point of view,
> so that the user can specify the risks they're willing to accept, and
> the details of how that's accomplished are handled by libpq. For
> example, I'm OK with (tick all that apply):
>
> [ ] passive eavesdroppers seeing all the traffic
> [ ] MITM being able to hijack the session
> [ ] connecting without verifying the server's identity
> [ ] divulging the plaintext password to the server
> [ ] ...
I think that sounds like a great idea, looking forward to the proposal.
