Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Pavel Stehule
Subject Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks
Date
Msg-id CAFj8pRCO7KhxwXbLRL_cGry-hbZKOfXqLELLupwybeAjT7ZoGw@mail.gmail.com
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In response to system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks  (Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>)
Responses Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks  (Tomas Vondra <tv@fuzzy.cz>)
List pgsql-hackers
2012/12/18 Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>:
> There are some system administration functions that have hardcoded
> superuser checks, specifically:
>
> pg_reload_conf
> pg_rotate_logfile
>
> Some of these are useful in monitoring or maintenance tools, and the
> hardcoded superuser checks require that these tools run with maximum
> privileges.  Couldn't we just install these functions without default
> privileges and allow users to grant privileges as necessary?

isn't it too strong gun for some people ???

I believe so some one can decrease necessary rights and it opens doors
to system.

> pg_read_file
> pg_read_file_all
> pg_read_binary_file
> pg_read_binary_file_all
> pg_stat_file
> pg_ls_dir

is relative dangerous and I am not for opening these functions.

power user can simply to write extension, but he knows what he does/

Regards

Pavel



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