Re: Marking some contrib modules as trusted extensions - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Dean Rasheed
Subject Re: Marking some contrib modules as trusted extensions
Date
Msg-id CAEZATCXeVkFfytGYxuF1Th-5-dPEoDuOrx-7Tc_rjfJ8XLWAbw@mail.gmail.com
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In response to Re: Marking some contrib modules as trusted extensions  (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>)
Responses Re: Marking some contrib modules as trusted extensions  (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>)
List pgsql-hackers
On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 at 21:39, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
>
> >>> pg_stat_statements
>
> Mmm, I'm not convinced --- the ability to see what statements are being
> executed in other sessions (even other databases) is something that
> paranoid installations might not be so happy about.  Our previous
> discussions about what privilege level is needed to look at
> pg_stat_statements info were all made against a background assumption
> that you needed some extra privilege to set up the view in the first
> place.  I think that would need another look or two before being
> comfortable that we're not shifting the goal posts too far.
>
> The bigger picture here is that I don't want to get push-back that
> we've broken somebody's security posture by marking too many extensions
> trusted.  So for anything where there's any question about security
> implications, we should err in the conservative direction of leaving
> it untrusted.
>

+1

I wonder if the same could be said about pgrowlocks.

Regards,
Dean



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