Re: Removing pg_pltemplate and creating "trustable" extensions - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Robert Haas
Subject Re: Removing pg_pltemplate and creating "trustable" extensions
Date
Msg-id CA+TgmobkVfUCSFOuO89MM3FhGkwGg29=HU7zLL7DhWW78h3=Ug@mail.gmail.com
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In response to Re: Removing pg_pltemplate and creating "trustable" extensions  (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>)
List pgsql-hackers
On Thu, Jan 9, 2020 at 3:18 PM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> * ISTM that that's assuming that the DBA and the sysadmin are the same
> person (or at least hold identical views on this subject).  In many
> installations it'd only be root who has control over what's in that
> directory, and I don't think it's unreasonable for the DBA to wish
> to be able to exercise additional filtering.

An emphatic +1 from me. This is what I've been trying to argue over
and over, apparently rather unclearly.

> * The point of a default role would be for the DBA to be able to
> control which database users can install extensions.  Even if the
> DBA has full authority over the extension library, that would not
> provide control over who can install, only over what is available
> for any of them to install.

I agree with that, too. I guess you could decide that the answer to
the question "who can install extensions?" must be the same as the
answer to the question "who owns a database?" but having the
flexibility to make the answers to those questions different seems
better than forcing them to always be the same.

-- 
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company



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