Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Robert Haas
Subject Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions
Date
Msg-id CA+Tgmoax+zZPYWMKpNOtcxpHy0Xe8t4S6agbW_WthR=ThdMquA@mail.gmail.com
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In response to Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions  (Ashutosh Sharma <ashu.coek88@gmail.com>)
Responses Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions
Re: Addressing SECURITY DEFINER Function Vulnerabilities in PostgreSQL Extensions
List pgsql-hackers
On Mon, Jul 15, 2024 at 8:05 AM Ashutosh Sharma <ashu.coek88@gmail.com> wrote:
> I've added these changes to restrict users from explicitly setting the
> $extension_schema in the search_path. This ensures that
> $extension_schema can only be set implicitly for functions created by
> the extension when the "protected" flag is enabled.

But ... why? I mean, what's the point of prohibiting that? In fact,
maybe we should have *that* and forget about the protected flag in the
control file.

--
Robert Haas
EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



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