On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> "Brightwell, Adam" <adam.brightwell@crunchydatasolutions.com> writes:
>> The attached patch for review implements a directory permission system that
>> allows for providing a directory read/write capability to directories for
>> COPY TO/FROM and Generic File Access Functions to non-superusers.
>
> TBH, this sounds like it's adding a lot of mechanism and *significant*
> risk of unforeseen security issues in order to solve a problem that we
> do not need to solve. The field demand for such a feature is just about
> indistinguishable from zero.
I am also not convinced that we need this. If we need to allow
non-superusers COPY permission at all, can we just exclude certain
"unsafe" directories (like the data directory, and tablespaces) and
let them access anything else? Or can we have a whitelist of
directories stored as a PGC_SUSER GUC? This seems awfully heavyweight
for what it is.
--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
