Re: Delegating superuser tasks to new security roles (Was: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Robert Haas
Subject Re: Delegating superuser tasks to new security roles (Was: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers)
Date
Msg-id CA+TgmoYm=uHdjYSmS_uBq53V0qAniK_Bp-ZCp3ZSyDtMYn5-ZQ@mail.gmail.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Delegating superuser tasks to new security roles (Was: Granting control of SUSET gucs to non-superusers)  ("Bossart, Nathan" <bossartn@amazon.com>)
List pgsql-hackers
On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 8:22 PM Bossart, Nathan <bossartn@amazon.com> wrote:
> The changes for adding GUC management roles seem pretty
> straightforward and would likely be helpful for service providers.
> However, I was kind of surprised that membership to such roles also
> provided access to ALTER SYSTEM SET.  IMO there's quite a big
> difference between allowing a user to set a GUC per-session versus
> cluster-wide.  With these patches, if I just want to allow a user to
> set a GUC like temp_file_limit or log_statement, I also have to give
> them the ability to change it (and several other GUCs) for all roles
> on the system.

There's also ALTER ROLE and ALTER DATABASE, which provide more ways to
set GUCs. I agree that we could choose make distinctions here, but I
think if we make too many distinctions, it will become complicated to
administer. And if we don't have *any* way to delegate ALTER SYSTEM,
then I think we have missed the mark.

-- 
Robert Haas
EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com



pgsql-hackers by date:

Previous
From: Mark Dilger
Date:
Subject: Re: Role Self-Administration
Next
From: Vik Fearing
Date:
Subject: Re: Role Self-Administration