On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Kohei KaiGai <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp> wrote:
> It is a practical reason. In case when httpd open the connection to PG and
> set a suitable security label according to the given credential prior to launch
> of user application, then keep this connection for upcoming request, it is
> worthwhile to reset security label of the client.
But wait a minute - how is that any good? That allows the client to
pretty trivially circumvent the security restriction that we were
trying to impose by doing sepgsql_setcon() in the first place. It
doesn't matter how convenient it is if it's flagrantly insecure.
Am I missing something here?
--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
