Re: Linux Downloads page change - Mailing list pgsql-www
From | Dave Page |
---|---|
Subject | Re: Linux Downloads page change |
Date | |
Msg-id | CA+OCxoz7-Guj3861feYOTD59RNw06-5neMmSUZD+vvvvm3NvQg@mail.gmail.com Whole thread Raw |
In response to | Re: Linux Downloads page change (Simon Riggs <simon@2ndQuadrant.com>) |
List | pgsql-www |
On Mon, Jul 9, 2012 at 3:50 PM, Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com> wrote: > On 9 July 2012 13:05, Dave Page <dpage@pgadmin.org> wrote: > >> Right - that's more or less what's been discussed and agreed. The >> issue with the installers that Magnus raised, is that at present I >> manually push the canonical GIT repo to git.postgresql.org, and often >> forget to do it until reminded. That was raised in response to my >> comment that the OpenSCG build scripts are not currently public at all >> as far as I could see, and should be if their work is to be listed on >> postgresql.org's primary downloads page. > > It's not more or less. What you have said is not the same thing as I > have requested. > > If it was done as I suggest, when you forget a step in the process > then the process would fail. > > If you build from the public repo then you simply can't forget. The security issue you quote is precisely why we built from the canonical source, and not a secondary mirror. You also wouldn't see a failure as you suggest - you'd probably see a successful build that you later discover is missing recent bug fixes. >>> Unverifiable binaries are a quality and security risk to the project. >> >> In theory. In practice it seems unlikely anyone would ever take the >> time and energy to build them themselves and actually verify them - >> the effort to do so would be huge (for example, assembling the 9.2 >> build machine for the installers and building all the necessary >> dependencies for all the supported platforms etc. has so far taken a >> number of man weeks). To verify the binaries we put out, someone would >> have to build an exact mirror of that environment. That's not to say >> it shouldn't be possible of course. In fact, it wouldn't even be >> possible, as we digitally sign some of the executables to appease >> Windows, and we obviously cannot share that certificate. > > I know multiple users (aside from 2ndQuadrant) that re-build their own > binaries as a safety barrier in their release process, so I don't > believe the effort level is that high, nor do I believe people won't > do it. I take your point that it is maybe only 1% of people, but those > are the ones that report all the bugs. Well if you believe it's that easy, then I'd suggest you try for yourself. Building the installers is *not* trivial, and building the installers with an identical dependency tree to verify everything we've built is a huge undertaking - and as I mentioned, not actually possible on Windows because you would have no way to sign the binaries you create with our certificate. Note again though that we're talking *installers* here, and not RPMs or other types of packages. The installers are *very* different from other packages because we have to build so many of the dependencies ourselves to ensure they'll run successfully on all the supported platforms. > The most important thing is that people can see the ingredients before > they eat the food. You're welcome to see the code - it's on git.postgresql.org. But that doesn't mean it would be easy to build a bit-level verifiable copy of our binaries. -- Dave Page Blog: http://pgsnake.blogspot.com Twitter: @pgsnake EnterpriseDB UK: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company