Re: Extension ownership and misuse of SET ROLE/SET SESSIONAUTHORIZATION - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Daniel Gustafsson
Subject Re: Extension ownership and misuse of SET ROLE/SET SESSIONAUTHORIZATION
Date
Msg-id B670A32F-6021-4055-B73F-0F717A401DDA@yesql.se
Whole thread Raw
In response to Extension ownership and misuse of SET ROLE/SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION  (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>)
Responses Re: Extension ownership and misuse of SET ROLE/SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION
List pgsql-hackers
> On 13 Feb 2020, at 23:55, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:

Is this being worked on for the 13 cycle such that it should be an open item?

> Given the current behavior of SET ROLE and SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION,
> I don't actually see any way that we could get these features to
> play together.  SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION insists on the originally
> authenticated user being a superuser, so that the documented point of
> --role (to allow you to start the restore from a not-superuser role)
> isn't going to work.  I thought about starting to use SET ROLE for
> both purposes, but it checks whether you have role privilege based
> on the session userid, so that a previous SET ROLE doesn't get you
> past that check even if it was a successful SET ROLE to a superuser.
> 
> The quick-and-dirty answer is to disallow these switches from being
> used together in pg_restore, and I'm inclined to think maybe we should
> do that in the back branches.

..or should we do this for v13 and back-branches and leave fixing it for 14?
Considering the potential invasiveness of the fix I think the latter sounds
rather appealing at this point in the cycle.  Something like the attached
should be enough IIUC.

cheers ./daniel


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