Re: [v9.4] row level security - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Tom Lane
Subject Re: [v9.4] row level security
Date
Msg-id 9787.1377797318@sss.pgh.pa.us
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [v9.4] row level security  (Josh Berkus <josh@agliodbs.com>)
Responses Re: [v9.4] row level security  (Kohei KaiGai <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>)
List pgsql-hackers
Josh Berkus <josh@agliodbs.com> writes:
>> That would close only one covert channel.  Others were already pointed out
>> upthread, and I'll bet there are more ...

> Mind you, fundamentally this is no different from allowing INSERT
> permission on a table but denying SELECT, or denying SELECT on certain
> columns.  In either case, covert channels for some data are available.

Certainly.  But INSERT's purpose in life is not to prevent people from
inferring what data is in the table.  What we have to ask here is whether
a "row level security" feature that doesn't deal with these real-world
attack techniques is worth having.
        regards, tom lane



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