Bruce Momjian <pgman@candle.pha.pa.us> writes:
> I have applied the following modified version of your patch. The
> original version would not apply to CVS.
Yes, the reason being that Tom removed the entire section of code that
my patch modified (and that is the better solution, IMHO).
The patch you've applied does something rather different, and is
unrelated to the "vulnerability" reported by Mordred and referred to
in the Subject -- your patch adds some additional sanity checking when
reading the password packet from v1 protocol clients. This is
unnecessary for two reasons:
(1) We use a StringInfo to hold the input data, which is
dynamically allocated as necessary. Since there's no
palloc() with user-supplied data, you'd need to write x
bytes to the backend to force it to allocate x bytes of
memory (i.e. potential for DoS is low).
(2) The length supplied by the user is completely ignored by
the code, and it simply reads the input until it sees a
NULL terminator (read the comments in the code about 10
lines down.) Therefore, any sanity checking on the length
specified by the user is a waste of time.
You should probably back out your patch.
Cheers,
Neil
--
Neil Conway <neilc@samurai.com> || PGP Key ID: DB3C29FC
