Re: securing pg_proc - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Merlin Moncure
Subject Re: securing pg_proc
Date
Msg-id 6EE64EF3AB31D5448D0007DD34EEB3412A7657@Herge.rcsinc.local
Whole thread Raw
In response to securing pg_proc  ("Merlin Moncure" <merlin.moncure@rcsonline.com>)
Responses Re: securing pg_proc
List pgsql-hackers
> "Merlin Moncure" <merlin.moncure@rcsonline.com> writes:
> > 1. Am I totally off my rocker for suggesting users without 'execute'
> > priv. should not be able to view procedure source.
>
> 1. I don't particularly buy that, no.  Why draw the line at seeing
> source code?  The mere name and argument list might be considered
> 'sensitive' information.

Not a big deal considering where the line gets drawn, but this is moot
considering your next point.  However, I'm a little unclear about where
you stand on the relative merit (whatever the implementation) of hiding
at the very least prosrc from non-priv users.

> 2. We haven't had a policy of hiding schema information in the past,
and
> I don't think it's the sort of thing that can usefully be bolted on
> piecemeal.

Well, at least one system catalog is a view + function (pg_locks),
albeit for completely different reasons.

> 3. The people who ask for this sort of thing frequently don't want
those
> with execute permission to look at the source, either, so your
proposed
> solution really isn't going to satisfy anybody.

It wouldn't?  Your points #1 and #3 could be addressed by configuring
the view one way or another...so ISTM you are arguing for the
flexibility of a view, not against...

If the view approach is out, are there any other alternatives to
consider?  Adding a new priv. for functions to GRANT seems to also pull
pg_proc towards a view.

Merlin


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