Re: Design Considerations for New Authentication Methods - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Henry B. Hotz
Subject Re: Design Considerations for New Authentication Methods
Date
Msg-id 5EB6D401-8792-4FCF-99A7-A442DBDEB314@jpl.nasa.gov
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Design Considerations for New Authentication Methods  (Richard Troy <rtroy@ScienceTools.com>)
Responses Re: Design Considerations for New Authentication Methods  (Andrew Sullivan <ajs@crankycanuck.ca>)
List pgsql-hackers
On Nov 2, 2006, at 12:26 PM, Richard Troy wrote:

> Well, there's simply no need. While I can agree that more could be  
> done,
> I'm not convinced there's a need because what we have now works  
> fine. Let
> me support my view by stating first that I perceive that combining the
> conception of encrypting a communications channel with user  
> authentication
> to be a very poor choice. I gather from the paragraph above that  
> this is a
> forgone conclusion. Apologies if I'm mistaken.

Understand that I'm talking about *real* security here.  There are  
standard protocols and libraries that support real security:  SASL  
and GSSAPI in particular.  You may for various reasons decide that  
it's "too hard" to do real security.  Most people don't, including  
most people who use SSL.  I'm not saying that's *wrong*, just that  
some possible attack methods have not been prevented.

At the level of detail that's appropriate for this list, all I can do  
is repeat myself.

Part of establishing a secure connection is establishing that the end  
points are the intended ones and there is no Man In the Middle.   
Establishing the end points means the server has identified the user  
within the name space of the security mechanism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
----
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry.B.Hotz@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz@oxy.edu




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