On 08/15/2012 11:48 AM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:37:04AM -0400, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>> On 08/15/2012 11:22 AM, Joe Conway wrote:
>>> On 08/15/2012 06:48 AM, Tom Lane wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 6:11 AM, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote:
>>>>>> Is there a TODO here?
>>>> If anybody's concerned about the security of our password storage,
>>>> they'd be much better off working on improving the length and randomness
>>>> of the salt string than replacing the md5 hash per se.
>>> Or change to an md5 HMAC rather than straight md5 with salt. Last I
>>> checked (which admittedly was a while ago) there were still no known
>>> cryptographic weaknesses associated with an HMAC based on md5.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Possibly. I still think the right time to revisit this whole area
>> will be when the NIST Hash Function competition ends supposedly
>> later this year. See
>> <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/timeline.html>. At that time we
>> should probably consider moving our password handling to use the new
>> standard function.
> Are we really going to be comforable with a algorithm that is new?
>
The only thing that will be new about it will be that it's the new
standard. There is a reason these crypto function competitions runs for
quite a few years.
cheers
andrew
