Re: How to get SE-PostgreSQL acceptable - Mailing list pgsql-hackers
From | KaiGai Kohei |
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Subject | Re: How to get SE-PostgreSQL acceptable |
Date | |
Msg-id | 49810BC9.7060202@ak.jp.nec.com Whole thread Raw |
In response to | Re: How to get SE-PostgreSQL acceptable (Ron Mayer <rm_pg@cheapcomplexdevices.com>) |
Responses |
Re: How to get SE-PostgreSQL acceptable
|
List | pgsql-hackers |
Obviously, we cannot make clear state of the row-level access controls by the date of v8.4 freeze. I agree the row-level access controls can be separated and postponed to v8.5 development cycle. So, I'll cut off a few part of previous patches for v8.4. Stephen Frost gave me a guideline about what should be remained or postponed *now*. It is SE-PG feature covers granularity existing PG facility enables to provide. (Typically, table/column level checks without row level) * The following features are still included for v8.4 (stage #01) - Centralized SELinux policy and getpeercon(3). - Table/Columnlevel access controls. Keep the current behavior. It checks client's privileges and raises error, if violated. - Functions, Databases The places to make decision are controversial. Is pg_xxx_aclcheck() possible to add SELinx check? I'll check it later. - Permission checks on shared library file The vanilla PG trusts superuser, but MAC don't trust him. So, we have tocheck the library's attribute. It should not be postponed because a malicious library once loaded can do anything internally. * The following features are postponed for v8.5 - Row-level access controls - Binary-large-objects access controls - Writablesystem column Because Row-level one is postponed, we don't need to export/import security_label of tuples to/fromusers now. * The following features are scraped. - PGACE security framework As I estimated in the previous message, scale of the main patch will be 6000-7000 lines. I'll pay my highest efforts to show the stripped patches within 5 days, due to Feb 04 JST. Thanks, | ---- Road Map (My plan) ---- | | * The stage#1 patches. V ---- PostgreSQL v8.4 ---- | | * Platform independent row-level access controls | * Writable system column (security_label, security_acl). | Maybe, we can also discuss writable "oid" in same time. V ---- First CommitFest ---- | | * SE-PostgreSQL row-level access controls. V ---- Second CommitFest ---- | | * Rest of features like binary large objects. V ---- Third CommitFest ---- | : V ---- PostgreSQL v8.5 ---- Ron Mayer wrote: > Joshua Brindle wrote: >> Nonetheless, this conversation seems moot now that Tom has walled off >> and won't even discuss row-level access controls. > > I think that's a bit of an overstatement. > > He says he's against them[1] and he says that they are the sticking > point on this patch[2], and that they break SQL[2] and that he believes > that implementations of row level acls he can imagine would be buggy[2]. > > Elsewhere other people on the core team are suggesting that > others want to see SQL-level row permissions[3]. > > > My reading of the discussion is that row-level access controls aren't > vetoed permanently, but rather that (a) it's still clear what SQL > semantics they'll break, (b) the implementations discussed so far > seem at high risk of bugs to some people, and (c) some people haven't > been sold on the need for them. None of those necessarily state > that the feature will never get into postgres; but it makes it sound > like a really high bar to jump over for a release that was originally > scheduled to be done a while ago. > > [1] http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2009-01/msg02389.php > [2] http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2009-01/msg02339.php > [3] http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2009-01/msg02391.php -- OSS Platform Development Division, NEC KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
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