Re: dblink connection security - Mailing list pgsql-patches

From Joe Conway
Subject Re: dblink connection security
Date
Msg-id 468823D6.6000104@joeconway.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: dblink connection security  (Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>)
Responses Re: dblink connection security
List pgsql-patches
Joe Conway wrote:
> Robert Treat wrote:
>>>> Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com> writes:
>>> Well certainly dbi-link has the exact same issue.
>> dbi-link only works in plperlu, so you've already decided your superuser only.
>
> How so -- it is fundamentally no different than dblink, which is C
> language (also untrusted).
>
> I think the issue is that once the superuser creates said functions,
> usage of the functions is automatically granted to PUBLIC, no? Being an
> untrusted language just means that it takes a superuser to create the
> functions using that language, not to use the functions themselves.

In fact, this misconception can prove dangerous in other ways. From the
docs:

CREATE FUNCTION badfunc() RETURNS integer AS $$
   my $tmpfile = "/tmp/badfile";
   open my $fh, '>', $tmpfile
       or elog(ERROR, qq{could not open the file "$tmpfile": $!});
   print $fh "Testing writing to a file\n";
   close $fh or elog(ERROR, qq{could not close the file "$tmpfile": $!});
   return 1;
$$ LANGUAGE plperlu;

select usename, usesuper from pg_shadow;
  usename  | usesuper
----------+----------
  postgres | t
  foo      | f
(2 rows)

contrib_regression=# \c - foo
You are now connected to database "contrib_regression" as user "foo".
contrib_regression=> select badfunc();
  badfunc
---------
        1
(1 row)

So anyone thinking that just because a language is untrusted means that
they don't need to be careful, is mistaken.

Joe

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