Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Peter Eisentraut
Subject Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Date
Msg-id 430200ed-1751-6c36-826e-4dcc7e5d8cd0@2ndquadrant.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@2ndquadrant.com>)
List pgsql-hackers
On 2019-07-05 22:24, Tomas Vondra wrote:
> What if the granular encryption (not the "whole cluster with a single
> key") case does not encrypt whole blocks, but just tuple data? Would
> that allow at least the most critical WAL use cases (recovery, physical
> replication) to work without having to know all the encryption keys?

Finding the exact point where you divide up sensitive and non-sensitive
data would be difficult.

For example, say, you encrypt the tuple payload but not the tuple
header, so that vacuum would still work.  Then, someone who has access
to the raw data directory could infer in combination with commit
timestamps for example, that on Friday between 5pm and 6pm, 10000
records were updated, 500 were inserted, and 200 were deleted, and that
table has about this size, and this happens every Friday, and so on.
That seems way to much information to reveal for an allegedly encrypted
data directory.

-- 
Peter Eisentraut              http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services



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