Re: [PATCH] Accept IP addresses in server certificate SANs - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Andrew Dunstan
Subject Re: [PATCH] Accept IP addresses in server certificate SANs
Date
Msg-id 370ea6d1-b500-113e-ef41-d4fa892a8a59@dunslane.net
Whole thread Raw
In response to [PATCH] Accept IP addresses in server certificate SANs  (Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>)
Responses Re: [PATCH] Accept IP addresses in server certificate SANs  (Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>)
List pgsql-hackers
On 12/15/21 20:13, Jacob Champion wrote:
> Hello all,
>
> libpq currently supports server certificates with a single IP address
> in the Common Name. It's fairly brittle; as far as I can tell, the
> single name you choose has to match the client's address exactly.
>
> Attached is a patch for libpq to support IP addresses in the server's
> Subject Alternative Names, which would allow admins to issue certs for
> multiple IP addresses, both IPv4 and IPv6, and mix them with
> alternative DNS hostnames. These addresses are compared bytewise
> instead of stringwise, so the client can contact the server via
> alternative spellings of the same IP address.


Good job, this is certainly going to be useful.



>
> This patch arose because I was writing tests for the NSS implementation
> that used a server cert with both DNS names and IP addresses, and then
> they failed when I ran those tests against the OpenSSL implementation.
> NSS supports this functionality natively. Anecdotally, I've heard from
> at least one client group who is utilizing IP-based certificates in
> their cloud deployments. It seems uncommon but still useful.
>
> There are two open questions I have; they're based on NSS
> implementation details that I did not port here:
>
> - NSS allows an IPv4 SAN to match an IPv6 mapping of that same address,
>   and vice-versa. I chose not to implement that behavior, figuring it
>   is easy enough for people to issue a certificate with both addresses.
>   Is that okay?


Sure.


>
> - If a certificate contains only iPAddress SANs, and none of them
>   match, I fall back to check the certificate Common Name. OpenSSL will
>   not do this (its X509_check_ip considers only SANs). NSS will only do
>   this if the client's address is itself a DNS name. The spec says that
>   we can't fall back to Common Name if the SANs contain any DNS
>   entries, but it's silent on the subject of IP addresses. What should
>   the behavior be?


I don't think we should fall back on the CN. It would seem quite odd to
do so for IP addresses but not for DNS names.


cheers


andrew


--
Andrew Dunstan
EDB: https://www.enterprisedb.com




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