Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Tom Lane
Subject Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
Date
Msg-id 29738.1342813515@sss.pgh.pa.us
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)  (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>)
Responses Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
List pgsql-hackers
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> I don't particularly care for that solution; it seems like a kludge.
> I've kind of wondered whether we ought to have checks in all the ALTER
> routines that spit up if you try to ALTER an extension member from any
> place other than an extension upgrade script...  but that still
> wouldn't prevent the extension owner from dropping the members out of
> the extension and then modifying them afterwards.  I'm not sure we
> want to prevent that in general, but maybe there could be some
> locked-down mode that has that effect.

Right, I wasn't too clear about that, but I meant that we'd have some
sort of locked-down state for an extension that would forbid fooling
with its contents.  For development purposes, or for anybody that "knows
what they're doing", adding/subtracting/modifying member objects is
mighty handy.  But a non-superuser who's loaded an extension that
contains C functions ought not have those privileges for it.
        regards, tom lane


pgsql-hackers by date:

Previous
From: Robert Haas
Date:
Subject: Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
Next
From: Robert Haas
Date:
Subject: Re: Event Triggers reduced, v1