Ron Mayer <rm_pg@cheapcomplexdevices.com> writes:
> It seems to me that there are two different standards to which this feature
> might be held.
> Is the goal
> a) SEPostgres can provide useful rules to add security to some
> specific applications so long as you're careful to avoid crafting
> policies that produce bizarre behaviors (like avoiding restricing
> access to foreign key data you might need). On the other hand it
> gives you enough rope to hang yourself and produce weird results
> that don't make sense from a SQL standard point of view if you
> aren't careful matching the SEPostgres rules with your apps.
> or
> b) SEPostgreSQL should only give enough rope that you can not
> craft rules that produce unexpected behavior from a SQL point
> of view; and that it would be bad if one can produce SEPostgres
> policies that produce unexpected SQL behavior.
With my other hat on (the red one) what I'm concerned about is whether
this patch will ever produce a feature that I could turn on in the
standard Red Hat/Fedora build of Postgres. Right at the moment it seems
that the potential performance hit, for users who are *not using*
SEPostgres but merely have to use a build in which it is present,
might be bad enough to guarantee that that will never happen.
regards, tom lane
