Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net> writes:
> I have no problem with that. But it does seem to me that we are going
> about this all wrong. The OP proposed a "solution" which was intended to
> ensure at the server end that an untrusted user could not spoof the
> postmaster if the postmaster were not running. Putting the onus of this
> on clients seems wrong. I don't have any experience with SELinux, but my
> impression is that it can be used to control who or what can open files,
> sockets etc. On Linux at least this strikes me as a more productive
> approach to the original problem, as it would put the solution in the
> SA's hands. Maybe other Unices and Windows have similar capabilities?
Most Linux distros don't have SELinux, AFAIK, so this is probably not a
very useful suggestion. Not that I have a problem with Red-Hat-specific
solutions ;-) ... but since one of the arguments being made against
move-the-socket is that it introduces a lot of platform-specific
assumptions, we have to apply that same criterion to alternative
answers.
As far as ensuring security from the server end, what about extending
the pg_hba.conf options to require that the server has both checked
a client certificate and presented its own certificate? (I'm not sure
whether OpenSSL provides a way to determine that, though.)
regards, tom lane
