Re: password rules - Mailing list pgsql-general
From | Peter J. Holzer |
---|---|
Subject | Re: password rules |
Date | |
Msg-id | 20250628135923.v2hrctnfjpqlcnqs@hjp.at Whole thread Raw |
In response to | password rules (raphi <raphi@crashdump.ch>) |
Responses |
Re: password rules
|
List | pgsql-general |
On 2025-06-27 19:00:36 +0200, raphi wrote: > > > Am 26.06.2025 um 14:27 schrieb Peter J. Holzer: > > On 2025-06-25 17:55:12 +0200, raphi wrote: > > > Am 25.06.2025 um 17:33 schrieb Peter J. Holzer: > > > > On 2025-06-25 14:42:26 +0200, raphi wrote: > > > > > That's not how the identiy principle works, at least not how it's > > > > > implement in our company. A user in ldap has a direct relation to > > > > > one digital entity, either a token from an application or > > > > > certificate from a physical person (maybe some AD shenanigans > > > > > also). We don't have digital entities for teams, that's what's > > > > > missing. For it to work they (security) would need to allow to > > > > > weaken this principle and as you said, allow everyone who has a > > > > > certain role to manage the associated user in LDAP, like setting a > > > > > new password. > > > > That user shouldn't have a password, since nobody is authenticating as > > > > that user. It also doesn't have to exist in LDAP. It's just a role in > > > > the database. > > > hmm I don't follow, maybe I was doing it wrong? > > I'm thinking of something like this: > > > > Roles assigned to people are in LDAP, and only they have passwords. > > Application roles don't have to be in LDAP (maybe there are operational > > reasons to have them there, but PostgreSQL doesn't need them) and don't > > have passwords. > Thank you very much for the detailed test. It will be useful for other ideas > I have but (I think) it does not solve our particular case. Maybe I wasn't > clear enough and I'm sorry for that, but our problem lies in the way how > applications connect. The passwords that devs are ordering via our self > service is for the application that is connecting to the database, not for > themselfs. Ok. I misunderstood that. > It's the application's password that we want to ensure that it is > complex and gets changed after we set an initial password for it. Why let a human change that at all? Couldn't you just create a suitable random password at deployment time? (And then automatically every n months if you want to rotate it.) > But the more I think about it the more I like switching to > certificates, after all we already have mechanisms in place to > automatically get new officially trusted (not selfsigned) > certificates, it could be adoptable for PG connects too. I agree. If you already have the infrastructure for that, that's a good way to avoid some (but not all) of the problems with passwords. hjp -- _ | Peter J. Holzer | Story must make more sense than reality. |_|_) | | | | | hjp@hjp.at | -- Charles Stross, "Creative writing __/ | http://www.hjp.at/ | challenge!"
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