Hi,
On 2023-02-28 08:37:02 -0500, Robert Haas wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 7:37 PM Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com> wrote:
> > > Yeah. That's the idea I was floating, at least.
> >
> > Isn't that a hard problem; maybe impossible?
>
> It doesn't seem that hard to me; maybe I'm missing something.
>
> The existing SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION flag basically prevents you
> from tinkering with the session state. If we also had a similar flags
> like DATABASE_READS_PROHIBITED and DATABASE_WRITES_PROHIBITED (or just
> a combined DATABASE_ACCESS_PROHIBITED flag) I think that would be
> pretty close to what we need. The idea would be that, when a user
> executes a function or procedure owned by a user that they don't trust
> completely, we'd set
> SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION|DATABASE_READS_PROHIBITED|DATABASE_WRITES_PROHIBITED.
> And we could provide a user with a way to express the degree of trust
> they have in some other user or perhaps even some specific function,
> e.g.
ISTM that this would require annotating most functions in the system. There's
many problems besides accessing database contents. Just a few examples:
- dblink functions to access another system / looping back
- pg_read_file()/pg_file_write() allows almost arbitrary mischief
- pg_stat_reset[_shared]()
- creating/dropping logical replication slots
- use untrusted PL functions
- many more
A single wrongly annotated function would be sufficient to escape. This
includes user defined functions.
This basically proposes that we can implement a safe sandbox for executing
arbitrary code in a privileged context. IMO history suggests that that's a
hard thing to do.
Am I missing something?
Greetings,
Andres Freund
