Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Stephen Frost
Subject Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend
Date
Msg-id 20210324181016.GU20766@tamriel.snowman.net
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend  (Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>)
Responses Re: Support for NSS as a libpq TLS backend  (Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>)
List pgsql-hackers
Greetings,

* Jacob Champion (pchampion@vmware.com) wrote:
> On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 13:00 -0400, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > * Jacob Champion (pchampion@vmware.com) wrote:
> > > Right, but to clarify -- I was asking if *NSS* supports loading and
> > > using separate certificate databases as part of its API. It seems like
> > > the internals make it possible, but I don't see the public interfaces
> > > to actually use those internals.
> >
> > Yes, this is done using SECMOD_OpenUserDB, see:
> >
> > https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/PKCS11_Functions#SECMOD_OpenUserDB
>
> Ah, I had assumed that the DB-specific InitContext was using this
> behind the scenes; apparently not. I will give that a try, thanks!
>
> > also there's info here:
> >
> > https://groups.google.com/g/mozilla.dev.tech.crypto/c/Xz6Emfcue0E
> >
> > We should document that, as mentioned in the link above, the NSS find
> > functions will find certs in all the opened databases.  As this would
> > all be under one application which is linked against libpq and passing
> > in different values for ssl_database for different connections, this
> > doesn't seem like it's really that much of an issue.
>
> I could see this being a problem if two client certificate nicknames
> collide across multiple in-use databases, maybe?

Right, in such a case either cert might get returned and it's possible
that the "wrong" one is returned and therefore the connection would end
up failing, assuming that they aren't actually the same and just happen
to be in both.

Seems like we could use SECMOD_OpenUserDB() and then pass the result
from that into PK11_ListCertsInSlot() and scan through the certs in just
the specified database to find the one we're looking for if we really
feel compelled to try and address this risk.  I've reached out to the
NSS folks to see if they have any thoughts about the best way to address
this.

Thanks,

Stephen

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